The Battle of Adwa: A Pivotal Colonial Encounter Shaping History
The 128th commemoration of the Battle of Adwa was marked in Ethiopia on 2 March amidst grand celebrations and the inauguration of the Adwa Museum, one of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's grand projects. The historical narrative of the Battle of Adwa, a cornerstone of Ethiopian heritage, often sparks debate among Ethiopians regarding the pivotal figures in the victory. Despite the grandeur of the festivities, which underscore the triumph of an African force over a European one, the harsh reality of ongoing internal conflicts cast a shadow over them. Further complicating the historical narrative of Adwa is the plight of the Eritrean askari--regular colonial army soldiers-- captured in battle. These African combatants, aligned with the opposing Italian forces, faced egregious persecution at the hands of the Italian military and the Ethiopian government.
During the Battle of Adwa, approximately 8,000 askari engaged in combat. Among them, some 2,000, mostly Eritreans, lost their lives, a staggering 25% casualty rate. In the grim aftermath of the battle, some 800 survivors were liberated from Ethiopian captivity, but only after being subjected to the brutal amputation of their right hands and left feet, a fate that underscores the battle's dark legacy. Despite these atrocities, some 300 survivors returned to Asmara. On the Italian side, 20,000 soldiers were involved in the fighting, with some 4,800 (24%) succumbing in the battle.
Medical professionals who provided care for the wounded at a hospital in Asmara detailed their observations in a report published by the British Medical Journal in August 1896. These accounts describe how victims, subjected to the severing of limbs, were left to fend for themselves, facing the risk of bleeding to death. Survival was possible only for those who managed to stem the bleeding using their own clothing, often a futah (East African Loincloth). A similar form of mutilation applied to thieves was accompanied by the cauterization of wounds with boiling butter to prevent blood loss. However, individuals deemed as 'traitors'—those accused of collaborating with the invading Italian forces—were denied this mercy. Remarkably, the resilience and determination of wives, who often carried their injured husbands for miles played a crucial role in saving many lives. Survivors were then transported to the closest Italian outpost for medical treatment.
In comparison, while a small number of Italian captives also suffered mutilation, including the removal of genitalia, the majority were spared from serious harm. The 1896 medical journal report noted that Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik II was against mutilation. Nonetheless, significant figures around him, including his wife Taitu, the current Abune (Patriarch), and Tigrayan leader Ras Mengesha Yohannes, son of Emperor Yohannes IV, advocated for this punishment. Execution of such extreme punitive measures was carried out at the Abba Gerima Monastery near Adwa. This episode of brutality cast a long shadow over the relationship between Eritrea and Tigray (and Ethiopia) for generations to come.
On the anniversary of the Battle of Adwa in 2020, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed remarked on Ethiopia's generous act of pardoning and releasing Italian prisoners in 1896, but did not address the suffering endured by the Eritrean askari, who were victims of both Italian colonialism and past Ethiopian cruelty. The askari, who were predominantly Eritrean, were essential to the Italian colonial military, and highly valued as capable fighters. In addition to Eritreans, individuals from various Ethiopian ethnic groups also served in Italy’s colonial army. At one time, in Libya, Italy’s force included some 4,000 Eritreans, as well as another 4,000 from Ethiopia and a smaller number from Sudan, all of whom had been recruited and trained in Eritrea.
Until the early 1930s, joining the Italian colonial army was voluntary. However, once enlisted, Eritrean soldiers were required to serve abroad if called on to do so. Those deployed to Libya received double their standard pay. An early group of Eritrean soldiers was sent to Somalia in 1907, followed by a battalion dispatched to Libya in early 1912. Overall, Eritrean colonial forces were known for their loyalty and their effectiveness. From 1936 to 1941, nearly all 60,000 Eritrean colonial soldiers served outside their homeland. Families of Eritrean soldiers who perished in Libya or Ethiopia were compensated with a mere two months' pay. A recent publication "Il coragio degli ascari" by Vito Zita, named 19,098 individuals, primarily Eritreans, who were awarded for bravery during their service to the Italian army. But the exact number of Eritreans who were injured or lost their lives while fighting for Italy remains unknown.
In, a May 2017 interview with Eritrean TV, President Isaias Afeworki made the controversial claim that there had been no Italian colonialism in Africa, attributing the occupations of Libya, Ethiopia, and Somalia to the 150,000 Eritreans recruited by Italy alone. During a recent trip to Italy for the Italy-Africa Summit in January 2024, a visit he prioritized over attending an IGAD summit and an AU summit that followed, Isaias belatedly raised questions concerning the roster of Eritrean soldiers who had been enlisted in the Italian military. Interestingly, that moment highlighted the need for Eritreans and Ethiopians to reconcile some of their historical narratives, and draw lessons from their past to forge a path towards peace and goodwill between them.
No other battle resonates historically quite like the Battle of Adwa, with its deep resonance and contested political ramifications. Elites often invoke the Battle of Adwa to mobilise their constituencies, but it could also serve not as a divisive event, but rather one that fosters unity and solidarity across the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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