Issue No. 223

Published 27 Feb 2024

More trouble with another MOU? Not necessarily

Published on 27 Feb 2024 16:42 min

More trouble with another MOU? Not necessarily 

Last week, seemingly out of nowhere, a 10-year 'Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement' between Turkey and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was announced by Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). While the agreement remains unpublished and contentious, it appears that Turkey will develop, train, and equip Somalia's currently non-existent navy. In return, it is rumoured that the federal government has promised 30% of the country's maritime resources to Turkey, though what this might precisely entail is unclear. The timing of this new security pact is conspicuous, arriving just weeks after the New Year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland on sea access, purportedly in exchange for sovereign recognition.
 
In a harried press conference on 21 February in Mogadishu, HSM insisted that the timing was a "coincidence" and that the two states had been working on the deal for several months prior. Still, the optics suggest that Villa Somalia hopes the agreement may deter Addis' naval ambitions in Somaliland; pro-Mogadishu commentators have also seized upon the deal as thwarting the Ethiopia-Somalialnd MoU. In other circles within Somalia, there are concerns over the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of Somalia and Turkey’s security pact. And, ironically, its apparent submission of sovereignty and natural resources to a foreign power. Amid both the congratulations and hand-wringing, the reality is that the new pact is unlikely to change the rationale for Addis and Hargeisa for several reasons.
 
The political heat and sabre-rattling recently trained on Addis and Hargeisa by Mogadishu and its close allies have so far failed to deter them from their MoU. Concerted pressure on multilateral bodies such as the African Union and the United Nations has not led to the full-throated condemnation of Ethiopia that Villa Somalia has sought. Instead, a limbo in which these multilaterals issue repeated calls for dialogue between Mogadishu and Addis, and Mogadishu and Hargeisa has emerged. Somaliland and Ethiopia, apparently set on realising the MOU, have both shown steel when responding to FGS statements.
 
The Turkey-Somalia deal remains under wraps, with at least some of Somalia's Members of Parliament not having read it before it was hurriedly pushed through both chambers. What it does contain, if implemented, will likely play out over the course of years. Building an entire navy from scratch-- while Somalia faces looming security and personnel vacuums on the ground amid the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) draw-down-- would be a herculean task. It is more likely that Turkish fleets would be brought in as an outsourced coastguard. Due to the lack of transparency about the announced agreement, it is entirely unclear what relationship, if any, this body would have with the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) or Somaliland's navy. Both Somaliland and the PMPF are supported by Turkey's geopolitical rival, the United Arab Emirates, further complicating any implementation of the Turkey-Somalia deal.
 
Strong bilateral ties between Turkey and Ethiopia are another reason the new security pact will not kill the New Year MoU. Ankara has well-established commercial and financial ties with Addis, with significant Turkish investment in a raft of industries, including textiles and construction, across Ethiopia. Over USD 2.5 billion has been invested by Turkish companies in Ethiopia despite its costly wars in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. There is little indication that Turkey's President Recip Tayyip Erdogan, a famously wily operator, would be happy to see Ankara walking away from these investments and trade. Including the naval deal with Somalia with its rumoured 30% coastal revenue, Turkey's financial commitment to Ethiopia dwarfs its commercial relationship with Somalia. Moreover, during the Tigray War, Ankara sold its much-vaunted Bayaktar drones to Ethiopia amid the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) advance towards Addis. These drones, along with a similar delivery of Emirati drones, proved decisive in turning the tide of the war.
 
The new Turkish intervention also comes against the backdrop of Qatar’s increasing influence in Mogadishu. Qatar and Turkey have maintained close military and political ties. The Gulf state has provided significant loans to and investments in Turkish defence companies, including USD 100 million invested in a government-backed military vehicle manufacturer. While the Qatar Armed Forces have little military strength to speak of, Doha was nevertheless the fourth largest importer of Turkish military equipment in 2020, at around USD 139 million. Qatar and Somalia, too, have signed a host of agreements in recent weeks, including both military and economic pacts. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Qatar had some hand in the timing of the new Turkey-Somalia security pact.
 
Turkey and Somalia have had relatively strong relations, dating back several years, but even during the tenure of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, with relations at their zenith, Ankara signalled no interest in responsibilities like a coastguard. The Turkey-Somalia deal may have been lying dormant for an extended period, but it is likely the proxy tussle between Qatar and the UAE over the Red Sea that conceivably brought it to the fore.
 
Another reason the Turkey-Somalia security pact is no true deterrent to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). While Turkey exercises its independent streak, NATO membership can reign it in. Many of its fellow members, including the US and European nations, do not align with Qatar’s political vision of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. The European Union and the US lead separate coalitions of naval vessels currently patrolling the Red Sea in a bid to quell Yemen's Houthi rebel violence.
 
Moreover, assuming that both agreements-- the MOU and the security pact-- come to fruition, Turkish naval vessels could end up patrolling Somali waters that are de facto controlled by Somaliland. Would Turkish ships actually detain or clash with Ethiopian naval vessels on behalf of the FGS? While some Somalis like to imagine that Turkey might go to war on behalf of the FGS over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, it is clear that it is in neither Ethiopia's nor Turkey's interest to come to blows.
 
Mogadishu has recently displayed a ‘with us or against us’ stance with its partners, but the
geopolitics of the Horn of Africa today is immensely complex. While backers of the FGS’ agreement with Turkey are trying to sell it as the straw that will break the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the reality remains that Turkey is a mid-ranking power that does not need to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

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