Issue No. 223

Published 27 Feb 2024

More trouble with another MOU? Not necessarily

Published on 27 Feb 2024 16:42 min

More trouble with another MOU? Not necessarily 

Last week, seemingly out of nowhere, a 10-year 'Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement' between Turkey and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was announced by Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). While the agreement remains unpublished and contentious, it appears that Turkey will develop, train, and equip Somalia's currently non-existent navy. In return, it is rumoured that the federal government has promised 30% of the country's maritime resources to Turkey, though what this might precisely entail is unclear. The timing of this new security pact is conspicuous, arriving just weeks after the New Year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland on sea access, purportedly in exchange for sovereign recognition.
 
In a harried press conference on 21 February in Mogadishu, HSM insisted that the timing was a "coincidence" and that the two states had been working on the deal for several months prior. Still, the optics suggest that Villa Somalia hopes the agreement may deter Addis' naval ambitions in Somaliland; pro-Mogadishu commentators have also seized upon the deal as thwarting the Ethiopia-Somalialnd MoU. In other circles within Somalia, there are concerns over the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of Somalia and Turkey’s security pact. And, ironically, its apparent submission of sovereignty and natural resources to a foreign power. Amid both the congratulations and hand-wringing, the reality is that the new pact is unlikely to change the rationale for Addis and Hargeisa for several reasons.
 
The political heat and sabre-rattling recently trained on Addis and Hargeisa by Mogadishu and its close allies have so far failed to deter them from their MoU. Concerted pressure on multilateral bodies such as the African Union and the United Nations has not led to the full-throated condemnation of Ethiopia that Villa Somalia has sought. Instead, a limbo in which these multilaterals issue repeated calls for dialogue between Mogadishu and Addis, and Mogadishu and Hargeisa has emerged. Somaliland and Ethiopia, apparently set on realising the MOU, have both shown steel when responding to FGS statements.
 
The Turkey-Somalia deal remains under wraps, with at least some of Somalia's Members of Parliament not having read it before it was hurriedly pushed through both chambers. What it does contain, if implemented, will likely play out over the course of years. Building an entire navy from scratch-- while Somalia faces looming security and personnel vacuums on the ground amid the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) draw-down-- would be a herculean task. It is more likely that Turkish fleets would be brought in as an outsourced coastguard. Due to the lack of transparency about the announced agreement, it is entirely unclear what relationship, if any, this body would have with the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) or Somaliland's navy. Both Somaliland and the PMPF are supported by Turkey's geopolitical rival, the United Arab Emirates, further complicating any implementation of the Turkey-Somalia deal.
 
Strong bilateral ties between Turkey and Ethiopia are another reason the new security pact will not kill the New Year MoU. Ankara has well-established commercial and financial ties with Addis, with significant Turkish investment in a raft of industries, including textiles and construction, across Ethiopia. Over USD 2.5 billion has been invested by Turkish companies in Ethiopia despite its costly wars in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. There is little indication that Turkey's President Recip Tayyip Erdogan, a famously wily operator, would be happy to see Ankara walking away from these investments and trade. Including the naval deal with Somalia with its rumoured 30% coastal revenue, Turkey's financial commitment to Ethiopia dwarfs its commercial relationship with Somalia. Moreover, during the Tigray War, Ankara sold its much-vaunted Bayaktar drones to Ethiopia amid the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) advance towards Addis. These drones, along with a similar delivery of Emirati drones, proved decisive in turning the tide of the war.
 
The new Turkish intervention also comes against the backdrop of Qatar’s increasing influence in Mogadishu. Qatar and Turkey have maintained close military and political ties. The Gulf state has provided significant loans to and investments in Turkish defence companies, including USD 100 million invested in a government-backed military vehicle manufacturer. While the Qatar Armed Forces have little military strength to speak of, Doha was nevertheless the fourth largest importer of Turkish military equipment in 2020, at around USD 139 million. Qatar and Somalia, too, have signed a host of agreements in recent weeks, including both military and economic pacts. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Qatar had some hand in the timing of the new Turkey-Somalia security pact.
 
Turkey and Somalia have had relatively strong relations, dating back several years, but even during the tenure of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, with relations at their zenith, Ankara signalled no interest in responsibilities like a coastguard. The Turkey-Somalia deal may have been lying dormant for an extended period, but it is likely the proxy tussle between Qatar and the UAE over the Red Sea that conceivably brought it to the fore.
 
Another reason the Turkey-Somalia security pact is no true deterrent to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). While Turkey exercises its independent streak, NATO membership can reign it in. Many of its fellow members, including the US and European nations, do not align with Qatar’s political vision of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. The European Union and the US lead separate coalitions of naval vessels currently patrolling the Red Sea in a bid to quell Yemen's Houthi rebel violence.
 
Moreover, assuming that both agreements-- the MOU and the security pact-- come to fruition, Turkish naval vessels could end up patrolling Somali waters that are de facto controlled by Somaliland. Would Turkish ships actually detain or clash with Ethiopian naval vessels on behalf of the FGS? While some Somalis like to imagine that Turkey might go to war on behalf of the FGS over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, it is clear that it is in neither Ethiopia's nor Turkey's interest to come to blows.
 
Mogadishu has recently displayed a ‘with us or against us’ stance with its partners, but the
geopolitics of the Horn of Africa today is immensely complex. While backers of the FGS’ agreement with Turkey are trying to sell it as the straw that will break the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the reality remains that Turkey is a mid-ranking power that does not need to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 946
The Reckoning: Breakdown of Somalia’s Third Republic
The Somali Wire

The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov: “Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.” In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.


18:55 min read 10 Apr
Issue No. 124
A Trade That Won't Die
The Horn Edition

In September 2025, Feisal Mohammed Ali was arrested for possession and trading in two rhino horns worth USD 63,000. This was not the first time that this smuggler had seen the bars of a Kenyan prison cell. On 22 July 2016, Feisal - described as an “ivory smuggling kingpin” - received a 20-year prison sentence and fined USD 150,000 for dealing 314 pieces of ivory. Weighing over two tonnes, the ivory was estimated to have come from around 120 elephants. Hailed as a turning point in Kenya’s pioneering crackdown on Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT), Feisal’s incarceration became proof of the country’s commitment to safeguarding its wildlife. This frail pillar came crashing down in August 2018 when Feisal was released following the acquittal of his sentence due to alleged use of tampered evidence by the prosecution.


30:03 min read 09 Apr
Issue No. 945
The Baidoa Electoral Heist - The Turkish Connection
The Somali Wire

On Monday, a politician widely regarded as Ankara’s primary proxy in Somalia was inaugurated as a Member of Parliament (MP) under circumstances that Somali citizens and political observers are denouncing as a brazen institutional theft. This unprecedented case of electoral misconduct occurs in the twilight of the current parliament’s mandate, signaling a deep-seated crisis in legislative integrity.


6:32 min read 08 Apr
Issue No. 326
Ethiopia Grinds to a Halt
The Ethiopian Cable

The sparks from the Middle East's conflagration have set Ethiopia's laboured fuel industry ablaze, and the country is grinding to a halt. Ongoing geopolitical and fiscal shocks emanating from the US/Israel war with Iran—and the spill-over across the Gulf—have left few regions untouched. With no satisfactory end in sight, the decades-old—if creaking—US-underpinned security architectThe sparks from the Middle East's conflagration have set Ethiopia's laboured fuel industry ablaze, and the country is grinding to a halt. Ongoing geopolitical and fiscal shocks emanating from the US/Israel war with Iran—and the spill-over across the Gulf—have left few regions untouched. With no satisfactory end in sight, the decades-old—if creaking—US-underpinned security architecture in the Middle East has been upended, as have the globalised hydrocarbon networks that long served as the financial lifeblood of energy-importing states.


33:50 min read 07 Apr
Issue No. 123
Another Election and Djibouti's Succession Problem
The Horn Edition

Apathy pervades the Djiboutian population. A week tomorrow, on April 10, the country will head to the polls, with President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh seeking a 6th— essentially uncontested — term in office. With his coronation inevitable, his family's dynastic rule over this rentier city-state will be extended once more. But in a region wracked by armed conflict and geopolitical contestation, the ageing Guelleh's capacity to manage the familial, ethnic, and regional fractures within and without grows ever more complicated. And Djibouti's apparent stability is no product of institutional strength, but rather an increasingly fractious balance of external rents and coercive control-- underpinned by geopolitical relevance.


23:43 min read 02 Apr
Issue No. 944
Türkiye's Deepwater Reach in Somalia
The Somali Wire

In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.


21:14 min read 01 Apr
Issue No. 325
Dammed If They Do
The Ethiopian Cable

Why have one mega-dam when you can have three more? Details are scarce, but Ethiopia has unveiled plans to build three more dams on the Blue Nile, just a few months after the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was completed.


14:12 min read 31 Mar
Issue No. 943
Baidoa Falls and Federal Power Prevails
The Somali Wire

Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.


18 min read 30 Mar
Issue No. 942
A Son Sent to Die in Jihad
The Somali Wire

Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.


22:20 min read 27 Mar
Scroll