The Pretoria agreement revisited
Last week, for the first time since the formation of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) in March 2023, senior Tigrayan and federal officials met in Addis to discuss implementing the Pretoria agreement. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and TIA President Getachew Reda were both present at the meeting, as well as the recently re-elected Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) Chairman, Debretsion Gebremichael, among others. The meeting saw the federal and regional governments agree to fully realise the Pretoria agreement, with the expectation of further negotiations in the presence of African Union, United Nations, and US government representatives.
The buildup to the meeting on 9 February was acrimonious, with frustrations spilling over about the ongoing humanitarian crisis consuming Tigray and the future of occupied Western Tigray. Still, negotiations between Mekelle and Addis are long overdue. The Pretoria agreement had gaping holes and was abnormal in its structure-- being essentially an expanded upon Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Since the conclusion of fighting in November 2022, the implementation of the deal has been irregular or entirely absent. Promises of a national dialogue and a transitional justice mechanism, among other issues, remain contested and unresolved. Most pressing of all is the continued occupation of large parts of Tigray by Amhara and Eritrean forces.
Since last summer, federal officials have touted the possibility of a referendum as a means to resolve the continued occupation of Western Tigray by Amhara forces, despite pushback from Tigrayan officials and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In his parliamentary question-and-answer session on 6 February, Ethiopian Prime Minister Aby Ahmed asserted that the TIA was in favour of a referendum to resolve the occupation.
This held little truck in Mekelle, which has increasingly pushed back against the federal government in recent weeks. Before the meeting on 9 February, TIA President Getachew Reda publicly refuted the PM's comments on several grounds in a TV interview. First, he insisted that the 1994 Constitution "is clear" that the structures for implementing and overseeing a referendum are absent, with no popular mandate for the TIA and with no regional council in Tigray. Second, the TIA president questioned how a referendum could be conducted with over a million IDPs still encamped in Tigray and unable to return to their homes. Other questions also remain, including how the ENDF might subdue the vast territory for a referendum when the Amhara nationalist militias known as 'Fano' remain deeply opposed to restoring Tigray's control over its constitutional lands. On 12 February, in a press conference in Mekelle, Getachew confirmed that the talk of a referendum was the central sticking point of the discussions. Still, the TIA president said that there was interest from both parties to deepen the fragile peace, particularly with the region so volatile.
In large part, the current humanitarian crisis engulfing Tigray is borne out of the Eritrean and Amhara occupation. The region has badly suffered without the fertile land of Western Tigray to provide a surplus in lean harvests. Despite new pledges by international donors, including the UK, immediate and immense humanitarian and financial support is urgently needed across Tigray. Initial fears that the World Food Programme (WFP) and USAID had slashed their distribution targets by as much as 80% have, thankfully, turned out not to be the case. The WFP and USAID-backed Joined Emergency Operation (JEOP) current food distribution cycle was 3.2 million people outside of Western Tigray for January 2024, far higher than their combined target of 970,100 for December 2023.
But there remain several major stumbling blocks to reaching those in urgent need of food aid. First is the continued lack of data as to where precisely the aid is needed, though there have been improvements in this in recent weeks. Second is an issue of distribution, with the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) temporarily suspended as an aid distributor for JEOP. While USAID has publicly attributed its suspension to technical problems connected to an audit, the suspension appears to be disrupting aid delivery, with WFP and JEOP reaching just 14% of their distribution target by 21 January. The nutrition response for children is also deeply lacking, with only a fraction of the necessary aid reaching the most vulnerable.
There is little manoeuvrability due to the scale of hunger and malnutrition. The systematic destruction of grain stores, farms, crops, factories, water pipes, and much else during the war by ENDF, Amhara and Eritrean forces destroyed the traditional social safety net in Tigray, which could, at least partially, absorb lean years from a poor harvest. But the worst drought in years, on top of the months of aid suspension, means that any delay in aid delivery will surely result in further preventable deaths.
With fresh talks between Addis and Mekelle expected in the coming days, there is an opportunity to reflect on the failures and possibilities of the Pretoria agreement. And with African Union and US officials present, both guarantors of the accord, there is a pressing need to ensure its implementation and restore Tigray’s control over its constitutional territory. While Addis and the international community's response to Tigray has been deeply lacking post-war, it is not too late to change course.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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