Issue No. 220

Published 06 Feb 2024

Strikes and the Qeeroo movement in Oromia

Published on 06 Feb 2024 19:23 min

Strikes and the Qeeroo movement in Oromia

Since early January 2024, in a departure from its typical insurgent tactics, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has renewed pressure on the federal government by encouraging civil disobedience. Intermittent market and transport strikes have ground much of Oromia to a halt, particularly in the west, as the tactics of the 'Qeeroo' movement resurface. On 28 January, another, wider transport strike was called, and the OLA began torching vehicles that had ignored its command.
 
Ethiopia’s ‘National Youth Movement for Freedom and Democracy,’ widely known as Qeeroo, is the Oromo nationalist protest movement that has agitated for greater political representation and the recognition of Oromo culture. It was particularly influential in the latter days of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) administration, holding nationwide demonstrations as well as general strikes. It has since waned, however, with many of the movement’s leaders co-opted into the Prosperity Party government or jailed.
 
Since the transport strike in Oromia was announced last month, the region’s Administration and Security Bureau have laid into the OLA, accusing it of seeking to disrupt "development activities" and disseminating "propaganda." In response to the OLA's increasing social pressure on the federal and regional governments, ENDF and Prosperity Party officials have met with communities in Ambo, Shino, and Eastern Arsi towns. More troops have also been deployed on key arterial roads. Nevertheless, towns, including Shambu and Nekemte, are experiencing significant disruption, with limited vehicles on the streets and businesses shuttering.
 
The severe drop in transport is compounding the economic crises facing communities in both Addis and parts of Oromia. Just a few trucks are entering the capital, causing food costs to spiral on top of double-digit inflation. And since the imposition of the state of emergency in the Amhara region in August 2023, transportation and trucking have also been limited in and out of Amhara.
 
In early January 2024, a brief lull in fighting in Oromia ended, with the ENDF intensifying its drone strikes on OLA positions, particularly in southern Oromia. Recent weeks have also seen reports of heavy fighting in the East Guji, South and East Shewa zones. As the conflict has intensified again, the faultlines that have deepened and emerged after 5 years of violence continue to flare. One of the most visible is the religious divisions in Oromia associated with the Oromia Synod, with another church in the West Guji zone burned by unidentified armed men last month.
 
The reasons for the seemingly sudden re-emergence of Qeeroo-style civil disobedience tactics are not hard to discern. With the ENDF bogged down in Amhara and the influential Eastern Command forces now positioned on the Somali border, the OLA has spied an opportunity to seize the advantage against the federal government. This further comes against the backdrop of senior government officials signalling that it may seek to restart peace talks with the insurgent group.
 
Following the ruling Prosperity Party's conference at the end of January, the Oromia regional President Shimelis Abdissa said the government was "ready to continue the peace talks." Providing few details, he said that the last round of talks in Dar es Salaam in November 2023 had broken down due to the OLA's "unconstitutional demands." While he did not elucidate on them, the OLA had called for a more radical form of power-sharing in Oromia than the federal government was willing to countenance. The arrival of Ethiopia's National Security Advisor Redwan Hussein and the presence of OLA senior commander Jaal Maaroo had raised hopes for the success of the negotiations. However, following the collapse of the initial talks in April and the subsequent negotiations in November 2023, the federal government launched several assaults on OLA positions.
 
Another reason the federal government may be ready to return to the negotiating table is the continuing armed conflict in the Amhara region. On 2 February, Ethiopia's Lower House extended the region's 6-month state of emergency. This followed the departure of Ethiopia's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Demeke Mekkonen, from the government. A major political actor in Amhara for decades, he played a central role in the ascension of current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 from the internal Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) power struggles. He was believed to be supportive of negotiations with Fano, but Demeke's likely successor, the National Intelligence and Security Service Head Temesgen Tiruneh, has overseen the implementation of the restrictive state of emergency. But the intense asymmetric counter-insurgency operations on two fronts are proving costly for the stretched ENDF.
 
Perhaps in anticipation of a fresh round of talks, the OLA is positioning itself to seek broad concessions, including recognising Afaan Oromo as a national language and Addis as the Oromo's historic capital. The insurgent group is also likely wary of the federal government's lack of implementation of the Pretoria agreement and is seeking to extract firmer assurances of its own future.

The OLA is not the Qeeroo movement, however. While the latter enjoyed broad public support, Ethiopia today is beset by major humanitarian crises and large-scale insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia. Many in Oromia are worn out by the years of armed conflict that the international community has largely overlooked. The mixed support for the OLA has been reflected in the strength of the protests in Wollega, where the strike has been carried out, and the more limited strikes in North Shewa, for example.
 
It is not uncommon to seek the military or political upper hand before engaging in any peace talks. The federal government, too, has a recent history of engaging in talks when it can extract a 'victor's peace,' as it did in November 2022 when it came to the negotiating table with Tigray under intense international pressure. But 5 years into a punishing armed conflict, any renewed fighting remains costly for communities that have enjoyed little respite. Possible renewed negotiations should be welcomed, but it is not clear if the federal government or the OLA are yet ready to make the necessary compromises for peace in Oromia.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

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