Famine looms in Tigray
Over a year has passed since the signing of the Pretoria agreement, yet the humanitarian situation in Tigray is rapidly deteriorating as famine takes hold. The displaced and rural population across the region, particularly in central and eastern Tigray, is almost uniformly facing immense hunger due to a confluence of the suspension of international food aid, poor harvest and drought, and the systematic destruction of food infrastructure during the Tigray War.
International and domestic reaction has been largely muted. There appears to be an unwillingness to acknowledge the scale of the damage inflicted by the 'pause' in humanitarian aid from May 2023 by USAID and the World Food Programme (WFP). Thousands of people have since starved to death, and thousands more are expected to die in the coming weeks. While the tragedy unfurling in Tigray was predictable, a plentiful harvest could have staved off some of the hunger. Instead locust swarms and drought ended these hopes. In the Eastern zone, the punishing drought has seen entire rivers dry up; dozens died in districts like Atsbi and Abergele in November and December, usually a time of plenty.
Food aid was meant to have resumed region-wide by this time, except in occupied areas, but reports suggest there has been little aid delivery outside of Mekelle to date. The TIA has said that USAID's new case load in Tigray will be only 20% of its pre-suspension level. While USAID has not yet confirmed this, and details surrounding the 20% are murky, it is nonetheless a deeply alarming figure.
Negotiations over reforms to aid delivery dragged on for months as the federal government delayed, eventually landing on a compromise that may end up being unworkable in Tigray. USAID has insisted that aid distribution must now be carried out with no government input, including at the most local level. However, officials at the lower administrative levels in Tigray, below the woreda (district), were not been implicated in the theft of aid. They are integral to their communities, including effectively identifying who is most in need of aid within them.
Many of Tigray's most extreme areas of starvation are hours of walking from the nearest asphalt roads; aid distributors will surely require guidance to locate them. There is also a gaping lack of data about the variation between the pockets of starvation in Tigray from village to village. However, according to Joint Emergency Operation Programme data from October, the Irob, Adwa, Adet, and Atsbi districts are all experiencing 60% or higher child malnutrition – well above rates indicative of famine.
Some communities may be able to stave off starvation for a short time, but many more need immediate support, some of which is unlikely to arrive. While the consequences of starvation and malnutrition are well-known, the long-term economic and social consequences of asset loss are less often considered. Households are being forced to strip their homes, including remaining livestock, for cash to buy food at inflated prices.
The domestic and international response has been lacklustre. The TIA was forced to allocate ETB 50 million from its limited budget to some of the most vulnerable citizens in cash aid due to the immediacy of the problem. The federal government disaster agency has also offered several million in USD. Meanwhile, USAID and the WFP are not the only humanitarian agencies that have scaled down operations in Tigray, despite the escalating crisis. Armed conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza continue to pull the attention and funding of multilateral institutions and humanitarian organisations away from Tigray.
The WFP and USAID have barely commented on the humanitarian situation since they suspended aid to Tigray in late April. Yes, measures needed to be taken to prevent the misappropriation of food aid, but their extreme response has compounded the suffering of innocent people. Moreover, their refusal to publish internal reports that led to the suspension of aid has generated deep suspicion of these organisations in Tigray. Particularly disturbing is the drop in critical nutritional supplements for the most vulnerable children and mothers in Tigray that they had promised to sustain.
More specific data is now urgently needed. Precise figures on the most recent harvest, which communities are most in need of food aid, and the scale of sales of personal belongings and livestock can all help formulate an adequate emergency response. The tragic reality is that this could all be too little, too late. The demand is too high and the current capacity too low; it is even unclear whether enough transport capacity exists to truck aid to those who need it.
The failings of a variety of actors have led us to this point in Ethiopia. The consequences of the devastating Tigray War continue to roll on with little reconstruction in sight and with western Tigray, one of the most fertile areas of production in northern Ethiopia, still embargoed. The deeply corrupt aid management system at the regional and federal levels saw the theft of huge quantities of aid intended for starving communities. And there has been a clear unwillingness of the international community to push for the full implementation of the Pretoria agreement, instead preferring to normalise relations with Addis. While the situation is particularly dire in Tigray, other states, particularly Amhara and pastoral communities in Oromia and the Somali region, are also facing rapidly rising malnutrition and starvation. Thousands of Ethiopian citizens are now dying at a rate not seen in nearly 40 years.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.