Issue No. 213

Published 28 Nov 2023

War on Two Fronts

Published on 28 Nov 2023 16:51 min

War on Two Fronts

Last Tuesday, 21 November, peace talks between the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) and the rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) collapsed. Initial optimism, buoyed by the arrival of Ethiopia’s National Security Adviser Redwan Hussein and Justice Minister Gedion Timothewos in Dar es Salaam, stalled with the two sides divided over power-sharing and structural political reform. Condemnatory statements soon followed, with the OLA accusing the FGE of attempting to "entice the OLA leadership with offers of power… while failing to address the underlying issues," and the government pinning responsibility on the "obstructive approach and unrealistic demands" of the OLA. The day before the talks concluded, 20 November, intense clashes between government forces and the OLA in the Sulula Fincha district of the Horru Guduru Wollega zone erupted, killing four civilians.
 
Redwan Hussein's statement that the FGE was "primarily… motivated by its desire to silence the guns" was telling. During the talks, the FGE sought to replicate a Pretoria-style agreement for Oromia, with senior military and political posts offered to OLA leaders in exchange for disarmament and demobilisation. A Pretoria-style agreement was always unlikely to be accepted by the OLA, however, considering the now 'frozen conflict' in Tigray and the major political concessions the OLA had sought in earlier talks. But the OLA's proposed "shift in governance," including a power-sharing agreement in Oromia that incorporated "all political parties," was clearly unacceptable to the FGE. Instead, the FGE now seems set on launching another offensive in another attempt to change the dynamics on the ground.
 
The collapse of the peace talks is grim news for Oromia, and for Ethiopia as a whole. Both sides are manoeuvring their forces in anticipation of renewed conflict. Freshly graduated Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) divisions are being deployed to Western Wollega, Central Shewa, and Southern Oromia in expectation of a large-scale offensive against OLA forces. Back in Dar es Salaam, senior OLA commanders, including Jaal Marroo, are seeking to return to the battlefield, potentially aided by the talks' facilitators, including the US. But with neither side able to land a decisive military blow for more than 5 years now, it is all but certain that another grinding and bloody stalemate will follow. With the humanitarian crisis spiralling in southern and western Oromia, it is Oromo civilians who will continue to suffer.
 
As the talks in Dar es Salaam collapsed, the umbrella of Amhara nationalist militia known as 'Fano' gained ground in several areas of the Amhara region last week. Led by Mire Wedajo, the East Amhara Fano division's guerilla tactics are proving problematic for the ENDF. Last Thursday, 23 November, Wollo Fano successfully freed more than 1,200 detainees from a prison in Woldiya town. While several assaults on major prisons in Amhara have been thwarted by the ENDF, this time Fano militia freed hundreds of civilians, former militia, and former Amhara Special Forces.
 
Over 300 km west of Woldiya, another Fano division seized Addis Zemen. The strategic town lies on key roads between Gondar and Bahir Dar, and between Wereta and Woldiya. Capturing Addis Zemen will hamper the manoeuvrability of ENDF brigades across Amhara, and could open them up to fresh ambushes by Fano militia, which also nearly surround the historic town of Lalibela in northern Amhara.
 
The FGE is now stuck between a rock and a hard place of its own making. The deep polarisation roiling the country continues, with Amhara and Oromo nationalist movements growing in popularity. Placating one movement is complex enough, but any FGE step towards concessions is perceived as treacherous and a confirmation of a hidden agenda. When it emerged that the FGE was negotiating with the OLA, pro-Amhara commentators on social media lambasted Addis, claiming this confirmed their suspicions that the ENDF was working alongside Oromo militia.
 
There is also fundamental disagreement between the political vision of many Oromo and Amhara. While Oromo resented the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) application of ethnic federalism, as witnessed by the Qeerroo protest movement, they generally support devolution and greater recognition of Ethiopia's ethnic diversity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s concept of 'medemer' (roughly, ‘coming together’) and his lukewarm position on ethnic federalism are often perceived as just a continuation of an oppressive legacy of the Ethiopian state in relation to Oromo culture. On the other hand, Amhara elite have tended to support the unifying approach to the Ethiopian state that Abiy previously espoused. 
 
The further the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia slide, the deeper polarisation between ethnic elite and communities becomes. There have been several deadly flare-ups between ethnic militia in the Oromia special zone in Amhara, most recently in mid-November killing 18 people.
 
The ENDF is currently unable to subdue Ethiopia’s two escalating insurgencies, and neither will be solved by pouring new recruits into rural areas hostile to federal presence. But the window for peace in Oromia is not yet closed, particularly with OLA leaders caught in Tanzania. The FGE could offer greater concessions to the armed group, particularly regarding power-sharing in Oromia, however distasteful that may be. And in Amhara, with Fano growing in influence and capacity, the sense that the ENDF could crush the armed group has all but disappeared.
 
Far more must be done to tackle deep-seated resistance to Addis, as well as strong inter-communal distrust. A competent and credible transitional justice mechanism is therefore also needed, along with a comprehensive national dialogue and reconciliation design to allow those who have been long-marginalised to re-imagine themselves as integral parts of the Ethiopian state. Further, reconstruction of areas that have suffered from years of cyclical violence should become a priority. But none of these policies are likely to gain traction if the ENDF continues to try to change realities on the ground.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

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