War on Two Fronts
Last Tuesday, 21 November, peace talks between the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) and the rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) collapsed. Initial optimism, buoyed by the arrival of Ethiopia’s National Security Adviser Redwan Hussein and Justice Minister Gedion Timothewos in Dar es Salaam, stalled with the two sides divided over power-sharing and structural political reform. Condemnatory statements soon followed, with the OLA accusing the FGE of attempting to "entice the OLA leadership with offers of power… while failing to address the underlying issues," and the government pinning responsibility on the "obstructive approach and unrealistic demands" of the OLA. The day before the talks concluded, 20 November, intense clashes between government forces and the OLA in the Sulula Fincha district of the Horru Guduru Wollega zone erupted, killing four civilians.
Redwan Hussein's statement that the FGE was "primarily… motivated by its desire to silence the guns" was telling. During the talks, the FGE sought to replicate a Pretoria-style agreement for Oromia, with senior military and political posts offered to OLA leaders in exchange for disarmament and demobilisation. A Pretoria-style agreement was always unlikely to be accepted by the OLA, however, considering the now 'frozen conflict' in Tigray and the major political concessions the OLA had sought in earlier talks. But the OLA's proposed "shift in governance," including a power-sharing agreement in Oromia that incorporated "all political parties," was clearly unacceptable to the FGE. Instead, the FGE now seems set on launching another offensive in another attempt to change the dynamics on the ground.
The collapse of the peace talks is grim news for Oromia, and for Ethiopia as a whole. Both sides are manoeuvring their forces in anticipation of renewed conflict. Freshly graduated Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) divisions are being deployed to Western Wollega, Central Shewa, and Southern Oromia in expectation of a large-scale offensive against OLA forces. Back in Dar es Salaam, senior OLA commanders, including Jaal Marroo, are seeking to return to the battlefield, potentially aided by the talks' facilitators, including the US. But with neither side able to land a decisive military blow for more than 5 years now, it is all but certain that another grinding and bloody stalemate will follow. With the humanitarian crisis spiralling in southern and western Oromia, it is Oromo civilians who will continue to suffer.
As the talks in Dar es Salaam collapsed, the umbrella of Amhara nationalist militia known as 'Fano' gained ground in several areas of the Amhara region last week. Led by Mire Wedajo, the East Amhara Fano division's guerilla tactics are proving problematic for the ENDF. Last Thursday, 23 November, Wollo Fano successfully freed more than 1,200 detainees from a prison in Woldiya town. While several assaults on major prisons in Amhara have been thwarted by the ENDF, this time Fano militia freed hundreds of civilians, former militia, and former Amhara Special Forces.
Over 300 km west of Woldiya, another Fano division seized Addis Zemen. The strategic town lies on key roads between Gondar and Bahir Dar, and between Wereta and Woldiya. Capturing Addis Zemen will hamper the manoeuvrability of ENDF brigades across Amhara, and could open them up to fresh ambushes by Fano militia, which also nearly surround the historic town of Lalibela in northern Amhara.
The FGE is now stuck between a rock and a hard place of its own making. The deep polarisation roiling the country continues, with Amhara and Oromo nationalist movements growing in popularity. Placating one movement is complex enough, but any FGE step towards concessions is perceived as treacherous and a confirmation of a hidden agenda. When it emerged that the FGE was negotiating with the OLA, pro-Amhara commentators on social media lambasted Addis, claiming this confirmed their suspicions that the ENDF was working alongside Oromo militia.
There is also fundamental disagreement between the political vision of many Oromo and Amhara. While Oromo resented the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) application of ethnic federalism, as witnessed by the Qeerroo protest movement, they generally support devolution and greater recognition of Ethiopia's ethnic diversity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s concept of 'medemer' (roughly, ‘coming together’) and his lukewarm position on ethnic federalism are often perceived as just a continuation of an oppressive legacy of the Ethiopian state in relation to Oromo culture. On the other hand, Amhara elite have tended to support the unifying approach to the Ethiopian state that Abiy previously espoused.
The further the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia slide, the deeper polarisation between ethnic elite and communities becomes. There have been several deadly flare-ups between ethnic militia in the Oromia special zone in Amhara, most recently in mid-November killing 18 people.
The ENDF is currently unable to subdue Ethiopia’s two escalating insurgencies, and neither will be solved by pouring new recruits into rural areas hostile to federal presence. But the window for peace in Oromia is not yet closed, particularly with OLA leaders caught in Tanzania. The FGE could offer greater concessions to the armed group, particularly regarding power-sharing in Oromia, however distasteful that may be. And in Amhara, with Fano growing in influence and capacity, the sense that the ENDF could crush the armed group has all but disappeared.
Far more must be done to tackle deep-seated resistance to Addis, as well as strong inter-communal distrust. A competent and credible transitional justice mechanism is therefore also needed, along with a comprehensive national dialogue and reconciliation design to allow those who have been long-marginalised to re-imagine themselves as integral parts of the Ethiopian state. Further, reconstruction of areas that have suffered from years of cyclical violence should become a priority. But none of these policies are likely to gain traction if the ENDF continues to try to change realities on the ground.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate