Issue No. 212

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.