Peace for Oromia?
Last week, some positive news emerged from Tanzania. On 7 November in Dar es Salaam, for the first time, senior Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) commanders and federal military officials met face-to-face for the resumption of long-overdue peace talks. For nearly 5 years, the Oromia region has faced major upheaval and the ebbs and flows of armed conflict. Thousands have died, and many more have been displaced, largely in western and southern Oromia. An influential rebel group, the OLA controls a swathe of rural Oromia despite repeated military offensives.
A series of private meetings in the preceding weeks laid the groundwork for more substantive negotiations. This time around, the OLA is being represented by several high-ranking commanders, including the OLA Western and Central Commander Kumsa Diriba, known as Jaal Marroo. The Head of Military Intelligence, General Getachew Gudia, is leading the negotiations for the federal government, among others. And on 12 November, two senior federal politicians also reportedly joined the talks in a sign they are progressing well– Redwan Hussein, the national security adviser to PM Abiy Ahmed and lead negotiator in the November 2022 Pretoria talks, and Minister of Justice Gedion Timothewos. Their presence is leading to a growing optimism that these new talks might produce tangible results for Oromia.
The talks are being facilitated by senior figures in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with Dr Workneh Gebeyehu, who hails from the Oromia region, seemingly playing a central role, as well as officials from the US, Norway, and Kenya. In recent months, the federal government has faced increased pressure from the US and other allies to resolve the conflict in Oromia. On the anniversary of the signing of the Pretoria agreement on 3 November, the US again highlighted its concern about the conflicts that "threaten Ethiopia's fragile peace." Its participation in these talks, led by US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer, is important.
Though the Zanzibar talks in May made little progress, the ongoing negotiations in Dar es Salaam have a different timbre. Today, Ethiopia faces escalating conflict in the Amhara region as well as the looming threat of war with Eritrea. Forces on both sides of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border are seemingly readying themselves for the possibility of armed conflict, with major troop manoeuvres near Zambalessa ongoing and significant deliveries of weapons. Part of the rationale behind seeking peace in Oromia is that Addis may be seeking to avoid war on three fronts—Amhara, Oromia, and the Eritrean border. Freeing up thousands of Ethiopian National Defence Force soldiers stationed in Oromia, though unlikely to happen overnight, could prove pivotal in the federal government's attempts to subdue the Amhara nationalist militia 'Fano' or in the event of war with Eritrea.
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.