The State of the State of Emergency in Amhara
The State of Emergency (SoE) in Ethiopia’s Amhara region since August has done little to quell instability there. While fighting has largely subsided in the region's major cities and towns, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) is yet to meaningfully subdue Amhara nationalist militias under the umbrella of 'Fano.' By the end of August, in a sign of city life regaining some normalcy, the temporarily banned 'bajaj,' a three-wheeled motor vehicle, is back on the streets in Gondar, Lalibella and Bahir Dar. But soon after violence flared again and has not diminished since.
Clashes between the ENDF and Fano militia have been particularly intense in the countryside surrounding the historic sites of Gondar and Lalibella, but in recent weeks fighting has also occurred in North and South Wello, North Shewa and West Gondar zones. Since the SoE was declared, on 4 August, parts of the Amhara region have seen near-constant shelling and other violence. Hundreds have been killed and at least 3,000 displaced. With tensions rapidly escalating between Addis and Asmara, there is also a possibility that Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki will throw more support to his Fano allies to further destabilise Ethiopia.
Some Fano militia have continued their guerilla tactics, targeting prisons to free jailed comrades, assassinating regional and federal officials, and ambushing ENDF convoys. On 24 September, the Tewodros Fano active near Gondar claimed to have attacked the city to "free hundreds of our imprisoned members." ENDF convoys weighed down with heavy weapons have struggled to respond quickly to Fano hit-and-run attacks, which have slowed federal forces along major highways. In Lalibella, ENDF forces have fired heavy artillery from the ancient town towards suspected Fano positions in the surrounding hills.
Reports of extra-judicial killings and heavy-handed responses by security forces and Fano targeting civilians continue to raise alarm. As in the armed conflicts in Tigray and Oromia, drone strikes and house-to-house searches have resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians since the escalation of hostilities in August. By the end of August alone, the United Nations had detailed the deaths of over 180 civilians.
The severing of connections and intermittent access to internet in Amhara has hindered attempts to document human rights violations since August. But in its latest report, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) revealed several cases of civilians being killed by both sides in the conflict. On 10 October, in Adet town, 12 civilians were killed in house-to-house searches by federal forces, while on 19 October, a drone strike killed 8 in Debre Markos. On 29 October, the European Union joined the calls for an immediate ceasefire.
The armed conflict and subsequent restrictions on the movement of people and goods are badly hampering the humanitarian response to an intense drought in Amhara. In mid-October, local officials reported the deaths of at least 18 people from drought-induced hunger in the Janamora and Sayemt districts in northern Gondar. They warned of a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation, with thousands urgently requiring emergency food aid. But with most food aid still suspended by USAID and the World Food Programme and transport limited, there is little hope that aid will reach these communities in the near future.
Armed violence is also exacting a harsh toll on Amhara’s economy. Estimates of infrastructure damage since August run into ETB billions, and several factories have been forced to close due to insecurity. Internet access and telecommunications remain inaccessible in most of the region.
On 25 August, Yilkal Kefale, the 5th regional president in Amhara since April 2018, resigned. The Regional State Council subsequently installed Arega Kebede, former head of the Amhara Region Militia Bureau, as the new president. Several security officials have since been moved into new posts. Dessalegn Tassew, who was head of the region's peace and security, and Temesgen Tiruneh, who was Ethiopia's spy chief and head of the command post overseeing the SoE, have assumed central authority over the region’s security. Others, like Sema Tiruneh, previously in charge of the region's security forces, have been ousted.
Opposition politicians have been imprisoned on unknown and spurious charges, such as the federal parliamentarian and National Movement of Amhara member Christian Tadele. The Prosperity Party Mayor of Bahir Dar has been removed, and Goshu Endalamahu has been appointed. Endalamahu has promised to prioritise "peace through dialogue." But outreach to local Fano commanders, a disparate group, through community and religious leaders has made little progress to date.
It now appears that some in Fano are seeking negotiations that are secured by international mediators, as happened with the Tigray War. But deep polarisation over several concerns, not least control over western Tigray, make the prospect of negotiations complex. Nor is Fano a unified armed group, unlike the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF). Who would represent the 'Amhara' or 'Fano' at negotiations would likely prove contentious in itself.
Current armed conflict in the Amhara region of Ethiopia is the latest iteration of broken political settlements in which violence is reached not as a last resort but as a first. Outside of its cities, Amhara is worn out by instability. Negotiations with Fano, however complex, are imperative. Both the federal government and Amhara militia must be compelled to seek an immediate cessation of hostilities. While a militarist response to Fano is understandable, Fano presents a grave threat to Ethiopia that requires more than armed conflict.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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