The High Cost of Ignoring Crisis in Ethiopia: Oromia
Ethiopia has been ambling from one crisis to another. The conflict in Oromia has grown deadlier. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have been regularly reporting that government security forces and non-state armed groups operating in Oromia, specifically in the Welega region, have committed egregious human rights violations. These have included extra judicial execution, arbitrary arrests and detentions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and the burning of homes, farms and crops. The region has been under military administration since early 2019, ostensibly to conduct counter-insurgency operations against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Thus far, command post rule has only succeeded in furthering human tragedy.
In October 2023, OCHA issued the final report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE). While Tigray was the main focus, the report also documented human rights violations and indiscriminate violence against civilians in Oromia. And ICHREE issued a blunt warning that the commissioners found strong evidence indicating the likelihood of further atrocities being committed in Oromia and other regions.
In September 2023, the Centre for Development and Capacity Building (CDCB), a local think tank supported by USAID, had issued a policy brief underscoring the human tragedy unfolding in Oromia. According to that report, ongoing conflict in Oromia has led to the destruction of lives and livelihoods, the disintegration of social norms and social cohesion, the displacement of populations, and the collapse of institutions and communities. Thousands of children are now orphaned, and local communities are exposed to robbery, gender-based violence and physical injury. The region’s administrative structure is disintegrating.
This conflict and its repercussions have produced an estimated 1.3 million displaced persons in Oromia, of which nearly one million are in the East Welega, Qelem Welega, West Welega, and Horo-Guduru zones. About one third of those displaced are now living in shelters. The rest have dispersed among already-distressed host communities, which are themselves in need of assistance.
Conflict and displacement have created severe food scarcity and hunger in Oromia. Prevented by impossible conflict-induced circumstances, some farmers have not planted or harvested crops for years. Private initiatives that responded to drought-induced hunger in Borena last year have not been mobilized, perhaps suspecting reports of food shortages in what many consider a land of plenty. Meanwhile, children, the elderly and other vulnerable groups have been suffering from extreme hunger. The severity of this situation started to sink in after pictures of malnourished mothers and children began circulating on social media. Prosperity Party officials had dismissed reports of hunger saying they were intended to undermine the good news that Ethiopia was exporting surplus wheat. When reality could no longer be ignored, they blamed the OLA for the armed conflict that has led to food crisis.
Hunger has been followed by malaria and cholera outbreaks. Malaria had been kept in check for many years by spraying chemicals in mosquito breeding river valleys. But for the past 5 years, the federal government has discontinued this practice, citing armed conflict in these areas. This has led to the resurgence of malaria-infected mosquitoes. Malaria has exacerbated existing public health problems, including acute malnutrition and anaemia. The presence of large numbers of displaced persons and the disruption of regular patterns of everyday life have also created fertile ground for cholera.
Data obtained from the local Oromia Health Bureau, UN OCHA, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Oromia Physicians Association (OPA) show western Oromia is the site of humanitarian disaster. OCHA reported in January 2023 that 750,000 malaria cases had been registered and hundreds had died in West Welega and Qelem Welega zones. While all the districts in West Welega, East Welega, Qelem Welega and Horo Guduru have been affected, Qondala and Begi in West Welega have been hardest hit.
Oromia cannot cope with this level of crisis. Since 2019, command post rule has weakened the region, blocking the movement of people, and the delivery of essential supplies and basic services. According to the CDCB report, quoting the Oromia Health Bureau, thousands of health facilities have been damaged or destroyed. Ambulances and health-delivery vehicles have been stolen, burned and otherwise damaged, hampering the distribution of medical care and supplies.
Just a few years ago, malaria did not mean imminent death in Ethiopia. But escalating armed conflict and concomitant insecurity have since crippled economic activities in Oromia and other regions, rendering residents unable to pay the USD 45 (ETB 45,000) needed to purchase malaria treatment. Conflict-induced poverty has increased the ranks of the unemployed, further deteriorating the capacity of households to cope with ever-mounting challenges.
This dire situation is a microcosm of larger Ethiopia. As Professor Alex de Waal has described, “the crisis [in Ethiopia] is a failing state and a disintegrating empire-nation.’ The international community cannot stand by and watch as Ethiopia drifts from crisis to crisis.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
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'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
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