The suspension of aid and refugees in Gambella
Last week, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) detailed the deaths of dozens of refugees in the Gambella region since the suspension of international food aid to Ethiopia in June 2023. Most had died of starvation, but others were killed after being forced to “scavenge and steal” food outside their camps. The humanitarian situation is now reportedly rapidly deteriorating in the sprawling camps that host roughly 400,000 refugees from South Sudan. With malnutrition and hunger increasing across Ethiopia, and with little sign of international humanitarian agencies resuming widespread aid distribution, the situation is bleak.
The vast majority of these refugees are ethnic Nuer from South Sudan. Roughly equal in number to Gambella’s host population, they make up over 40% of Ethiopia’s total refugee population. Even before the suspension of aid to the country by the World Food Programme (WFP) and USAID in June, the refugee camps were over-populated and under-resourced. In the Jewi camp, a single health centre must serve over 60,000 refugees.
The suspension of food aid is further destabilising an already tense relationship between refugees and hosts. Like much of Ethiopia, Gambella’s internal politics are dominated by inter-ethnic tensions, particularly between the Nilotic groups of the Anuak and the Ethiopian Nuer. The Nuer are typically agro-pastoralists, while the Anuak are more settled in farming communities. Competition over land and resources regularly spills into violence, despite the relative abundance of natural resources in the region. Over 50 civilians were reportedly killed in escalating responses from Nuer and Anuak militia between May and July in the Anuak zone and Gambella city.
Many Anuak consider themselves the sole indigenous group in Gambella, with the other ethnic groups holding weaker territorial and political claims. The 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Agreement delineated the Ethiopia-Sudan border, placing most Anuak in Gambella and Nuer in Sudan. This agreement is still cited in rhetoric to depict the Nuer as ‘foreigners.’ The subsequent gradual migration of Nuer eastwards into Anuak territory was largely peaceful, however, and in the early 20th century, the Anuak-Nuer relationship was mainly characterised by trade and social cooperation.
The more recent often massive influxes of refugees from Sudan has changed this dynamic. The two communities have different forms of government, with Anuak typically maintaining a centralised leadership structure, while Nuer are more decentralised. The mass displacement of Nuer from Sudan’s civil wars into Ethiopia have hardened Gambella’s ethnic boundaries, as competition over land and political influence increase.
Ethiopia’s Derg regime (1987-1991) strongly preferred the Nuer, placing them in key positions in Gambella administrations, and supporting the presence of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the region. The Derg legacy of division between hosts and refugees has bled into Ethiopia today, where refugees face militia violence and other hostile actions when outside of camps. Several armed forces and diaspora groups have sprung up in recent years in protest of the Nuer population in Gambella, such as the ‘Gambella Nilotes United Movement/ Army.’
In addition, Gambella has been historically marginalised in Ethiopia; it reflects the highland-lowland divide that has seen the latter regularly excluded from influence and investment. The Derg forcibly relocated thousands of highlanders, largely Tigrayan, Amhara, and Oromo, into southern Ethiopia. Sixty thousand (60,000) were relocated to Gambella while northern Ethiopia was suffering drought in the mid-1980s. Anuak militia have also come in conflict with resettled Amhara and Tigrayan communities.
Militia from the Murle and Lou Nuer tribes raids go back years, with armed militia often stealing cattle in remote western Gambella. People are also regularly abducted. Between 2015 and 2022, 275 people were kidnapped by Murle militia, with 208 of them returned by Ethiopian National Defence Forces. In May 2023, Murle militia killed 10 civilians in the Nuer zone in the Gambella region and set several churches and homes ablaze. Such instability has driven frustration among many Anuak. In light of these tensions, the Federal Government of Ethiopia is now increasingly settling refugees in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of the country, instead of Gambella. But current and ongoing suspension of humanitarian aid has thrown ethnic divisions into stark relief in many parts of the country.
On 20 September, during his visit to Ethiopia, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi praised the country’s refugee policy. At one refugee camp on the Somali border, he said, “the host communities and refugees have also been remarkably open to work together in harmony.” But such praise must be set against the UN suspension of food aid to Ethiopia, which continues to drive violence between host communities and refugees on the other side of the country, and against country-wide starvation deaths and malnutrition. In Tigray this week, the Regional Health Bureau warned that mothers and children under 5 are dying at alarming levels, primarily due of starvation.
The EHRC has called on USAID and WFP to resume food assistance, warning that without it, more refugees will certainly die. Establishing a more secure and transparent form of aid delivery in Ethiopia is no doubt essential, and those responsible for the theft of humanitarian aid must be brought to justice. But refugees from Sudan are not the ones stealing aid and lining their pockets, they are the ones paying the highest price. And starvation is only the most horrific consequence of a wider, grimmer picture that leaves an indelible mark on many communities. Restoring humanitarian aid must happen immediately, but it will not alone undo the damage already done in Gambella.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.
On 5 September, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro arrived in the United States for an informal working visit designed to launch a new diplomatic push to cement Hargeisa's rising geopolitical profile. Monitored closely both regionally and internationally, the high-stakes trip carries immense domestic expectations. It represents an ambitious diplomatic outreach by Hargeisa to Washington, capitalising on the momentum generated by Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. However, translating this sudden diplomatic visibility into tangible strategic prospects remains a formidable challenge.