Issue No. 206

The stagnant Pretoria agreement

On 4 August, exactly 9 months on from the signing of the ceasefire between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan leaders, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It was the 5th public communication between the two men, in person or by phone, since the Cessation of Hostilities agreements in Pretoria and Nairobi. After every meeting, the US State Department has called for their implementation. In spite of this, the specific elements of the agreements have varied between press releases without a clear logic regarding which have been concluded or prioritised.

Though last month’s readout barely made the news, it captured the failings of the international community and guarantors of the Pretoria agreement. It began by “not[ing] progress in implementing the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,” while raising “concern regarding the situations in the Amhara and Oromia Regions.” But any progress in northern Ethiopia has been lacklustre at best. One of the central reasons for this lack of progress has been the international community’s consideration of the frozen conflict as a sustainable peace, and underestimating the credibility deficit from not holding the parties to their words.

The Pretoria agreement was based on objectives which can be summed up as ensuring sustainable peace, security for all, a framework for accountability, fostering reconciliation and rehabilitation, respect for constitutional principles, protection of civilians, and unhindered humanitarian access. These objectives also included the withdrawal of non-Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) forces from Tigray and disarmament of Tigrayan combatants.

A framework for implementing these goals was partially provided in the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements. While the documents were incomplete and disputable, they could be rationalised as political documents and an outline for charting a course to peace. Hence, the signatory parties, as well as the international community, should have been actively engaged in deepening and the concretisation of the agreements. 

Yet the African Union (AU) Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism (MVCM), established by the Nairobi agreement, has held just two meetings and a handful of field tours. It has been months since the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or AU’s Special Envoy Olusegun Obasanjo travelled to Tigray or publicly commented on the agreement's implementation.

The lack of clarity on the timetable for “the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF forces” has not only made a backslide a possibility, but has also placed much of Tigray in limbo. For instance, the fact that dozens of schools are still doubling as internally displaced person shelters has impeded the resumption of proper teaching. In Tigray, polarisation and frustration are increasing due to the lack of progress made on the Pretoria agreement. It's continued failure is driving opposition parties to call for more radical change.

It was also the international community that dropped the ball on humanitarian assistance. Its implementation was already paltry, and in April, USAID and the World Food Programme suspended humanitarian aid to Tigray, alleging theft and diversion, before expanding the halt to the whole country in June. It was not made clear which party was primarily responsible for the misconduct, and hundreds of Tigrayans have since starved to death with no clear plan to restart aid in sight. In his latest phone call, Blinken “discussed establishing a humanitarian aid distribution system with strengthened oversight to meet the shared goal of restarting food aid as soon as possible.” He was practically re-negotiating a breakthrough achieved almost a year ago.

Any irony becomes more pungent when considering the international community's lukewarm stance on accountability for the gravest human rights violations. Extra-judicial killings, sexual violence, and forcible displacement have continued in Tigray, months after the signing of the agreements. Despite the lack of any significant progress, besides the insufficient goal of silencing the guns, the investigation by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was halted, while the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) investigation has been undermined by lack of diplomatic support. A purported transitional justice programme designed and operated by a party to the conflict, the federal government, is now being touted as Ethiopians’ best way to justice and peace.

Strikingly, Blinken’s statements had been conspicuously watered down from earlier demands for “access for international human rights monitors” to “an inclusive and comprehensive process of transitional justice.” The issue was entirely missing from last month’s readout. The details of the transitional justice framework, designed by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), remain obscure except for an summary of public consultations. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it clear in March that the process would “consolidate those [investigations] undertaken by the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce” during the war.

The delayed establishment of the ICHREE in late 2021 was partially attributable to several European countries who preferred a joint investigation by the EHRC and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. But this investigation made little progress, and could not force any tangible changes to violations on the ground.

The ICHREE released its latest report yesterday, 18 September, documenting human rights violations during the conflict and since the Pretoria agreement’s signing. Commission Chair Mohamed Chande Othman said that despite the general conclusion of fighting, it has “not resolved the conflict… nor has it brought about any comprehensive peace.” The UN Human Rights Council will vote on the extension of ICHREE’s term in the coming weeks. With countries such as Russia and Eritrea currently sitting on the Council, the ICHREE’s prospects are grim. If the ICHREE mandate is concluded, it would likely augment a sense of impunity among authoritarian governments in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

The failure to realise the Pretoria agreement has wider implications for Ethiopia's other armed conflicts in the Oromia and Amhara regions. By failing to ensure the already limited Pretoria agreement was delivered upon, the international community has further undermined the potential of other armed groups, such as the Oromo Liberation Army, entering good-faith negotiations with Addis Ababa. And without effective guarantors and oversight of the limited peace in northern Ethiopia, issues of justice, aid, and reconciliation will continue to stagnate. 

By the Ethiopian Cable team