Tigray’s Troubled Transition
On 7 September, police in Mekelle, Tigray’s regional capital, violently dispersed a peaceful protest organised by a new opposition coalition, the ‘Alliance for Radical Change.’ The crackdown, which left dozens injured, triggered a howl of protest from many Tigrayans and condemnation from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Close to 30 protest leaders were arrested, among them senior officials of the Tigray Independent Party (TIP), Salsay Weyane Tigray (SeWaT) and the National Congress of Great Tigray (Baytona).
The three parties organised the march to protest against what they called the “authoritarian tendency” of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its “ineptitude” in managing the transition from war to peace. They accused the interim administration of failing to deliver on the Pretoria agreement, and demanded the setting up of a new inclusive national government in Tigray.
For many, the protest was also to highlight the crises plaguing the region since the conclusion of fighting in November 2022. Despite the Pretoria agreement’s stipulation that all non-Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) forces must withdraw, western and parts of northern Tigray are still occupied by Amhara militia and Eritrean forces. They have continued a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing, displacing thousands more Tigrayans into overcrowded and underfunded internally displaced person (IDP) camps. The suspension of international food aid to the region since April has also compounded an already dire humanitarian crisis. Between the suspension and mid-August, at least 1,400 people starved to death.
Police declared the rally could not proceed, citing a lack of adequate personnel to ensure safety. Organisers defied the directive and proceeded with their rally. Mekelle’s police subsequently moved against the marchers before they made it to Romanat Square, arresting the ringleaders and beating others with batons. Several opposition leaders are still being detained despite a court order on 8 September demanding their release. Following the incident, President of Tigray’s Interim Administration (TIA) Getachew Reda accused the opposition parties of fomenting instability and denied claims the administration was intent on stifling dissent.
The violent crackdown on protesters does not cast the TPLF in a positive light. It is simplistic, however, to see the incident as simply a manifestation of the TPLF’s alleged authoritarian impulse to crush a burgeoning democratic opposition. Tigray has never been a monolithic state, and there remains a diversity of political views within the region. But fraying peace and widespread social discontent are stoking polarisation and adversarial politics.
In February 2023, the three opposition parties objected to the process of selecting members of the interim administration. They accused General Worede Tadese’s committee that established the interim administration of sidelining the opposition, and instead favouring the TPLF. The opposition parties further claim the current administrative set-up flouts Article 10 of the Pretoria agreement, which envisages “inclusive” regional administration “settled through political dialogue between the parties.”
The 27-member cabinet appointed in April is undoubtedly dominated by the TPLF, even though an attempt was made to bring in some opposition members. The aim of the interim administration, however, was to conduct an orderly transition rather than give the TPLF a new lease of life. The idea that the party should have ceded power in April is unrealistic. First, its leaders are signatories to the Pretoria agreement and are under direct obligation to implement the accord. Second, the TPLF was still functionally in charge of the Tigray Defence Forces, the bulk of whom have since been demobilised. Maintaining the integrity of the command by retaining some military commanders in leadership positions was a sensible measure to ensure law and order.
The Tigray War has taken a heavy toll on the TPLF, however, and the ongoing refusal to reinstate the party by the National Election Board of Ethiopia has thrown its future into question. But while its brand is arguably less appealing, it still has no high-profile political competitor in the region. This is not an argument for TPLF to continue to exert political hegemony; rather, an acknowledgement that it has the responsibility to deliver on the peace and manage an orderly transition to a more inclusive political settlement.
Any draconian crackdown or monopolisation of power would be a grave mistake. The TPLF remains Tigray’s most influential party and owes a traumatised region, at the very least, politics of empathy and accommodation, not coercion. The images of Tigray in conflict with itself are deeply troubling after the horrors of the Tigray War. Reconciliation and compromise must be the priority for Tigray to navigate its numerous humanitarian and political crises. Freeing all detained opposition leaders and opening discussions with the discontented parties would be an important signal of the TPLF's commitment to a more pluralist political settlement. Greater discontent is something the region can ill afford at this critical juncture.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
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