The divided Eritrean diaspora
Over the summer, young diaspora Eritreans have protested in several countries in defiance of Isaias Afwerki’s regime. These demonstrations have largely been in response to the organisation of ‘cultural festivals,’ essentially propaganda events used by Asmara to raise funds and try to whitewash the regime. Protests and counter-protests have erupted into violence in Sweden, Canada and the US as demonstrators have clashed. The latest violence in Tel Aviv on Saturday 2 September was particularly stark, with over 150 people injured.
Warnings that the festival would descend into violence went unheeded. Explicit threats were posted on social media, largely directed at those opposed to Asmara. In turn, dozens were injured as protestors clashed with pro-regime individuals armed with rocks and rudimentary weapons. An investigation has also been launched into the Israeli police’s use of live rounds on crowds.
Over 17,000 Eritreans live in Israel, but the vast majority have few rights as their cases for political asylum have gone largely unheard. On 3 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for all Eritreans involved in the violence to be immediately deported. The weekend’s chaos has coincided with the Israeli government’s tough postering on migrants and refugees. There is, however, a clear difference between Eritrean refugees in Israel and elsewhere who have fled mass conscription and state violence, and the Eritrean propagandists who continue to spout the regime’s rhetoric and intimidate the former.
These festivals date back to the Eritrean War of Independence, then used to gather support for the armed struggle. Today, they are typically organised by the Eritrean embassy and have repeatedly skirted close to, or broken, the law. In one festival held in Switzerland this summer, several individuals present wore Eritrean military uniforms. In July 2022, another event in Switzerland saw men reportedly dancing on a stage with AK-47s. The rally was held during the Tigray War and saw several speakers viscerally rail against Tigrayans.
With the regime under international sanctions, it uses every avenue of revenue that it can find to finance itself, including these festivals. But perhaps most infamous is the ‘Recovery and Rehabilitation’ tax, better known as the ‘diaspora tax.’ First imposed in the 1990s, it was originally heralded as a levy that would help rebuild Eritrea after decades of conflict. It was believed that it would be temporary, in place until the country stabilised and could better finance itself. This has not happened, and today, the tax is one of the key financiers of the regime. In November 2022, Members of Parliament in the UK raised concerns that the taxing of the Eritrean diaspora was funding the country’s participation in the Tigray War.
Asmara has also attempted to subdue any opposition within the diaspora. Since the increase in internal repression at the turn of the millennium, the regime has employed spies in the diaspora to collect information on dissidents and refugees alike. Vocal opponents of Isaias’s government have had their families in Eritrea threatened by security agents, and many Eritreans in the diaspora live in fear of reprisals. An Eritrean journalist based in London, Marymagdalene Asefaw, has said these festivals often feel like “a threat” to refugees.
The regime has also attempted to pin any of the blame for recent violence, without evidence, on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Asmara’s reaction to the violence this summer has been typically obfuscating and accusatory.
Different generations of the Eritrean diaspora also have markedly different relationships with their old country. Many who fled during the War of Independence either became vocal advocates of the current regime or members of an exiled opposition. The second generation who fled the country, often referred to as the ‘asylum generation,’ left post-1991. The flow of refugees from Eritrea dramatically accelerated following the Badme War of 1998-2000 and the crack down on freedoms that followed. Every year, tens of thousands flee the compulsory and indefinite military conscription introduced in 2003.
The younger generation, less associated with the War of Independence, has become increasingly vocal in their opposition to Asmara. Two organisations in particular have been influential in driving the resistance to the pro-regime events held in Europe and North America– Bright Future and Brigade Nehamedu. These organisations have managed to cancel festival permits on a number of occasions in recent months, including in Seattle in the US. For many young Eritreans, these grassroots movements are also about bringing change back home. Seltene Girmay, presenter of the pro-democracy talk show ‘Tefatewi,’ recently said that he hopes the movement would soon “leak into Eritrea.”
Whether or not this is the case, Asmara’s festivals have no place in liberal democracies. They serve as violent reminders of the regime’s repression, intimidate refugees, and raise funds for one of the world’s most brutal dictators. Governments should crack down on the intimidation and coercion that Asmara continues to exert over its diaspora. The diaspora tax and these festivals would be a good place to start.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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