Discontent in Southern Ethiopia
The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) was formed in 1992, through the amalgamation of 5 previous districts as part of regional council elections. Unlike the Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara regions, largely dominated by a single ethnicity or ‘nationality,’ the SNNPR was a melting pot of over 50 ethnic groups. Since the creation of the ethno-federal system in 1995, however, there has been frequent agitation for reform and self-determination in the region. Since 2018, 10 of its 13 zones have called for referenda on regional statehood.
Calls for greater devolution stemmed from the very origins of SNNPR, which failed to bear the complex demography and settlement of communities. Rather than upholding the 1995 Constitution’s founding principle of a ‘nation of nations,’ the SNNPR proved controversial, plagued by inter-communal clashes almost from the start. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), as the architects of the Constitution, repeatedly ignored calls for its restructuring.
Things changed, however, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in 2018. Although Abiy previously served in the EPRDF, the Prosperity Party appears far less wedded to an ethno-federal governance model. In fact, Abiy has typically avoided the term ‘ethnic federalism,’ simply using the word ‘federalism’ to describe Ethiopia’s overall system of government. In 2020, Abiy’s Prosperity Party established the Yeselam Ambasaderoch Committee to oversee ever-increasing calls for self-determination in Ethiopia, a right enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution.
In June 2020, the establishment of the Sidama region was ratified by the House of Federation after a referendum in which voters supported a split from the SNNPR. Another successful referendum split the South West region from the SNNPR in November 2021. And in July 2023, Ethiopia’s 13th regional state was formed after the House of Federation approved the formation of the Southern Ethiopia Regional State. This latest region is made up of 6 zones previously belonging to the SNNPR, as well as 5 special districts. It was agreed upon following a referendum in February 2023. That referendum, however, was tainted by allegations of intimidation and violence. A recent report by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has alleged that local officials repeatedly attempted to interfere with the election, including destroying voter cards to prevent some from voting.
The establishment of these three new regions since 2020 has transformed the structure of the SNNPR. There is some hope that restructuring the SNNPR could finally usher in a period of stability. The diversity of the SNNPR means that even these new regions formed from the old ones are far from ethnically homogeneous. But supporters of the restructuring argue it can solve some administrative and inter-communal problems.
Deadly protests and clashes have already marred the latest reorganisation in Ethiopia. In recent weeks, residents of the Shura kebele near the city of Arba Minch have been protesting, largely peacefully, over a plan to merge it into the city administration. Since 24 August, at least 17 people have been killed after violence intensified when residents burned the mattresses of security forces. This violence coincided with wider tensions over administrative decisions in the new Southern region.
Peaceful protests and strikes began in July in Arba Minch over an unverified document that appeared to suggest that Wolaita Sodo, not Arba Minch, would become the administrative capital of the Southern region. Frustration over capitals and administrative centres for the new regions is not new. In the first half of 2020, discussions emerged online and saw disagreements about the location of capitals in the new regions.
And this is not the first time violence has erupted over restructuring. In Sidama in July 2019, deadly clashes broke out over delays in the referendum to determine its autonomy. Sidama’s experience since its independence from the SNNPR highlights another dilemma accompanying the increase in regions. In 2021, Desta Ledamo, Sidama’s president, complained that the region’s budget could not “sustain… expenses and also allow us to answer piled up developmental needs of the people.” Those who agitate for devolution have argued that it would lead to greater investment in health, education and infrastructure in their communities. This has not been the case.
The disconnect between expectations and developmental realities has also proven deeply destabilising. A long-running inter-communal conflict over administrative borders in the SNNPR along the borders of the Konso, Amaro, Burji, and Derashe woredas saw several established as autonomous, zones. In Konso, restructuring of administrative boundaries saw thousands incorporated into the new administration, yet its budget was not increased accordingly. Konso has since struggled to provide services to its most impoverished communities that have faced prolonged drought, and inter-communal violence has repeatedly flared.
It is clear that the restructuring of regions is no panacea given the numerous challenges facing communities in southern Ethiopia. High levels of inflation and unemployment, as well as armed conflict and climate change, are placing immense pressure on citizens and administrations alike. A conscious move to build communities based on economic and political as well as ethnic ties would be a good start. More immediately, providing greater fiscal control to local administrations would help close gaps between expectations and reality. Most revenue streams in Ethiopia run through Addis before distribution to regional governments. Realising fiscal federalism is no longer just an option, it must become a primary goal.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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