Discontent in Southern Ethiopia
The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) was formed in 1992, through the amalgamation of 5 previous districts as part of regional council elections. Unlike the Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara regions, largely dominated by a single ethnicity or ‘nationality,’ the SNNPR was a melting pot of over 50 ethnic groups. Since the creation of the ethno-federal system in 1995, however, there has been frequent agitation for reform and self-determination in the region. Since 2018, 10 of its 13 zones have called for referenda on regional statehood.
Calls for greater devolution stemmed from the very origins of SNNPR, which failed to bear the complex demography and settlement of communities. Rather than upholding the 1995 Constitution’s founding principle of a ‘nation of nations,’ the SNNPR proved controversial, plagued by inter-communal clashes almost from the start. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), as the architects of the Constitution, repeatedly ignored calls for its restructuring.
Things changed, however, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in 2018. Although Abiy previously served in the EPRDF, the Prosperity Party appears far less wedded to an ethno-federal governance model. In fact, Abiy has typically avoided the term ‘ethnic federalism,’ simply using the word ‘federalism’ to describe Ethiopia’s overall system of government. In 2020, Abiy’s Prosperity Party established the Yeselam Ambasaderoch Committee to oversee ever-increasing calls for self-determination in Ethiopia, a right enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution.
In June 2020, the establishment of the Sidama region was ratified by the House of Federation after a referendum in which voters supported a split from the SNNPR. Another successful referendum split the South West region from the SNNPR in November 2021. And in July 2023, Ethiopia’s 13th regional state was formed after the House of Federation approved the formation of the Southern Ethiopia Regional State. This latest region is made up of 6 zones previously belonging to the SNNPR, as well as 5 special districts. It was agreed upon following a referendum in February 2023. That referendum, however, was tainted by allegations of intimidation and violence. A recent report by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has alleged that local officials repeatedly attempted to interfere with the election, including destroying voter cards to prevent some from voting.
The establishment of these three new regions since 2020 has transformed the structure of the SNNPR. There is some hope that restructuring the SNNPR could finally usher in a period of stability. The diversity of the SNNPR means that even these new regions formed from the old ones are far from ethnically homogeneous. But supporters of the restructuring argue it can solve some administrative and inter-communal problems.
Deadly protests and clashes have already marred the latest reorganisation in Ethiopia. In recent weeks, residents of the Shura kebele near the city of Arba Minch have been protesting, largely peacefully, over a plan to merge it into the city administration. Since 24 August, at least 17 people have been killed after violence intensified when residents burned the mattresses of security forces. This violence coincided with wider tensions over administrative decisions in the new Southern region.
Peaceful protests and strikes began in July in Arba Minch over an unverified document that appeared to suggest that Wolaita Sodo, not Arba Minch, would become the administrative capital of the Southern region. Frustration over capitals and administrative centres for the new regions is not new. In the first half of 2020, discussions emerged online and saw disagreements about the location of capitals in the new regions.
And this is not the first time violence has erupted over restructuring. In Sidama in July 2019, deadly clashes broke out over delays in the referendum to determine its autonomy. Sidama’s experience since its independence from the SNNPR highlights another dilemma accompanying the increase in regions. In 2021, Desta Ledamo, Sidama’s president, complained that the region’s budget could not “sustain… expenses and also allow us to answer piled up developmental needs of the people.” Those who agitate for devolution have argued that it would lead to greater investment in health, education and infrastructure in their communities. This has not been the case.
The disconnect between expectations and developmental realities has also proven deeply destabilising. A long-running inter-communal conflict over administrative borders in the SNNPR along the borders of the Konso, Amaro, Burji, and Derashe woredas saw several established as autonomous, zones. In Konso, restructuring of administrative boundaries saw thousands incorporated into the new administration, yet its budget was not increased accordingly. Konso has since struggled to provide services to its most impoverished communities that have faced prolonged drought, and inter-communal violence has repeatedly flared.
It is clear that the restructuring of regions is no panacea given the numerous challenges facing communities in southern Ethiopia. High levels of inflation and unemployment, as well as armed conflict and climate change, are placing immense pressure on citizens and administrations alike. A conscious move to build communities based on economic and political as well as ethnic ties would be a good start. More immediately, providing greater fiscal control to local administrations would help close gaps between expectations and reality. Most revenue streams in Ethiopia run through Addis before distribution to regional governments. Realising fiscal federalism is no longer just an option, it must become a primary goal.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
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A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.