Issue No. 202

A History of Ethiopia’s States of Emergency
 

On 9 October 2016, then-Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn declared a nationwide state of emergency (SoE) in response to spiralling Amhara and Oromo protests. As stipulated in Ethiopia’s Constitution, a 6-month SoE can be declared in the case of a “breakdown of law and order which endangers the Constitutional order.” That SoE was the country’s first in nearly 25 years.
 
SoE’s have a long, chequered history in Ethiopia. In April 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie’s government declared a SoE in amid rolling protests and heightened tensions. A curfew was imposed, thousands of police were deployed in Addis, and further demonstrations were prohibited. The declaration could not prevent the inevitable, however, and the Emperor was deposed just a few months later, in September 1974. Upon seizing power, the military Derg regime swiftly passed the Special Penal Code. The sweeping legislation covered a wide range of new crimes, from offences over “labour strikes” to vaguer crimes against “public order.” It was subsequently used to crack down on widespread opposition to military rule when the Derg declared another SoE in September 1975. Significant violence and repression followed in what was to become the ‘Red Terror.’
 
More recently, two SoEs have followed in relatively quick succession. The first was declared in November 2021 during the Tigray War, after the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) seized the strategic towns of Dessie and Kombolcha. The second was enacted at the beginning of August 2023, following a rapid intensification in violence between Amhara militia and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). While the three SoEs have significant differences, mass arrests, detention of journalists and human rights activists, cutting the internet, suppression of media, and extra-judicial armed operations have featured.
 
Still, the latest SoE is somewhat different. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) reported the mass arrest of Amhara in Addis Ababa soon after the declaration. Dozens have reportedly been jailed in the capital’s Kaliti prison, commonly known as ‘the Gulag.’ The prison has long been used to hold active or potential political opposition. Hundreds of members of the now-dissolved Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) were jailed in Kaliti following the contested elections of May 2005. Conditions in the prison have improved somewhat but are still grim; stories of overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and disease are common. Just last week, some of the Amhara prisoners announced they would soon begin a hunger strike in protest of the SoE and their prison conditions.
 
During the Tigray War, several waves of arbitrary arrests saw thousands of Tigrayan civilians held in internment camps. The vast majority have since been released. But, for many, detention under the most recent SoE has lasted months without trial. Hundreds are being held on tenuous connections to the rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Over 300 people accused of being OLA have reportedly been detained in the Kemise prison in the Oromia Special Zone for months without trial.
 
Despite the constitutional stipulation that an SoE should last no more than 6 months, its effect reverberates long after. While these declarations can be useful at restoring a semblance of stability, the effect of the SoE in 2021 during the Tigray War is more debatable. SoEs are drastic, and have unintended consequences. First, the imposition of draconian security measures has repeatedly coalesced support for opposition movements as these reinforce popular grievances. Second is the corrosion of human rights in Ethiopia. While SoEs are constitutionally based in the 1995 Constitution, they have run roughshod over basic rights. In particular, freedom of speech and association have suffered, and successive governments have violated these rights long after an SoE’s initial 6 months have expired.
 
The SoE has also undermined effective checks and balances. The restriction of internet access and media, as well as extra-judicial powers granted to security forces, has damaged accountability. The most striking example of an untethered military response to the Fano militia in Amhara was the air strike on a crowd in Finote Salem on 13 August. The strike seemingly targeted a group gathered in response to approaching federal forces, but the deadly strike reportedly killed several civilian bystanders as well. As was the case during the Tigray War, restrictions on media and the internet have made verification of the facts very difficult. Security forces have been able to operate with near-impunity under these blanket restrictions. While there is a very real threat of instability in Amhara, the declaration of an SoE follows a dubious trend of misuse of emergency powers.
 
Overall, the state of emergency has a tense relationship with democracy and human rights in Ethiopia. In a SoE, the Constitution fails to check the power of the federal government or its security forces. Civilians have been routinely caught in the previous SoE as security forces attempt to restore order. The ongoing SoE must be handled with the utmost care. While elements of the Fano militia may be able to be subdued militarily, a heavy-handed and lingering SoE could yet drive greater opposition to the regional and federal governments.