Saudi Arabia’s Policy of Lethal Counter-Migration
Yesterday, 21 August, the human rights organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a shocking 73-page report. Detailing the systematic use of lethal force by Saudi border guards to deter Ethiopian migrants on its Yemeni border, it revealed that in the last year alone, some 655 migrants may have been killed.
The report, titled ‘They Fired on Us Like Rain,’ makes for grim reading. Saudi border guards have used live ammunition at close range and heavy weapons, including explosives, to kill and deter migrants attempting to enter the Kingdom from Yemen. Children were not spared.
Saudi authorities have denied the claims, previously using the conflict in Yemen as justification for heavy-handed policing of its border. They have claimed Houthi rebels control the border and allow migrants through in an attempt to weaponise migration. HRW’s report, however, has debunked this dubious claim and revealed the scale of the border guards' deliberate violence.
There are an estimated 750,000 Ethiopian migrants in the Gulf state, largely undocumented. Women typically serve in the domestic sector, with men working in Saudi Arabia's vast construction industry. Authoritarian tactics to deter migrants are not new. In recent years, thousands of migrants have been detained in internment centres in Saudi Arabia in deplorable conditions, with some even starving to death. Saudi authorities regularly deport Ethiopians, a routine source of friction between Addis Ababa and Riyadh.
Two major migration routes are typically used by Ethiopian refugees and migrants– through Moyale city on the Oromia and Somali region border, Nairobi and onto Southern Africa. The other runs through Somaliland, Puntland and across the Gulf of Aden. The latter is deeply treacherous, with frequent deaths off the Yemeni coast. Just a few days ago, on 17 August, a boat sank near the coastal town of Obock in north-east Djibouti. Twenty-six people have been rescued, but dozens are still missing and are feared dead.
Like much of the rapid construction of the Gulf, MBS’s modernisation relies on cheap foreign labour. And much like other Gulf states, there is little protection for these workers in Saudi Arabia’s largely unregulated labour market. Thousands of quasi-legitimate ‘agencies’ act as brokers to deliver workers on massive construction projects. These middlemen care only about their profit and often use a variety of underhanded tactics to trap labourers in indentured servitude.
MBS is also rebuilding Saudi Arabia’s image abroad, seeking to expand its soft power. Through Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Kingdom has set upon a concerted campaign of ‘sports washing.’ Vast funds have been invested in golf, boxing, and football to endear the regime to western audiences. It has had some visible success. Saudi headdresses known as ‘ghutrah’ are now on regular display at St. James Park, the stadium of Newcastle Football Club that PIF bought in 2021.
Saudi Arabia was edging towards becoming an international pariah among many western countries just a few years ago. Fury at the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on Turkish soil, and the vast destruction in Yemen had partially sidelined the Gulf state. US President Joe Biden famously swore to make the Kingdom a “pariah” as a candidate in the 2020 Presidential Election. Less than three weeks after being sworn into office, Biden suspended a swathe of US weapons sales to the Kingdom.
Today, the situation could not be more different. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also thrown the Kingdom into fresh diplomatic light, with its vast supply of petroleum. Biden was forced to travel to the Gulf state in July 2022 in a bid to repair US-Saudi relations, hoping Saudi Arabia might release some to counter steeply rising prices. The rapprochement has not been straightforward, particularly with the surprise of the Chinese-mediated reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration, however, is now reportedly considering a new security pact with Saudi Arabia in the hope that it might bring Israel and the Gulf state together.
The harsh realities on its border and the image Saudi Arabia projects could not be starker. But it is also the tragic reality of the failures of state-building and development that is driving millions of migrants and refugees across the world towards the hope of a better future. To be killed on the doorstep of that hope is particularly heart-wrenching.
These migrations and refugee flows will only increase as the climate crisis intensifies. And these deaths fit into a wider pattern of danger facing migrants from the Darien Gap to the Mediterranean. It is yet to be seen whether these grim revelations on the Saudi border impact western policy towards the Gulf state, but it should serve as a brutal reminder of what faces migrants worldwide. Greater scrutiny along treacherous borders, and on the dangerous routes migrants are forced to navigate, is needed immediately to prevent future tragedies and crimes from occurring. Prosecuting those responsible must now happen in an open court, not merely a few token arrests and prosecutions.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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