Issue No. 186

Published 04 Jul 2023

Disturbing Developments in Amhara

Published on 04 Jul 2023 20:59 min
Disturbing Developments in Amhara
 
On 29 June 2023, Foreign Policy magazine reported that the Biden administration had quietly informed the US Congress that Ethiopia is no longer engaged in a “pattern of gross violations of human rights” and that it, therefore, intends to lift its human rights violations designation. Human rights organisations immediately condemned the decision. Robbie Gramer, the author of the Foreign Policy article, noted that the decision was made despite “evidence of ongoing abuses,” while congressional intent was to clear “the way to new economic aid.” In addition, a US National Security Council spokesperson acknowledged that human rights abuses continue elsewhere in Ethiopia, while the situation in northern Ethiopia has markedly improved.
 
Indeed, armed violence has noticeably declined in Tigray; at the same time, it has increased dramatically in other regions of Ethiopia, and the overall human rights situation in northern Ethiopia has not yet improved. The Amhara region offers one example.
 
The Tigray War left behind a highly militarised civilian population. Various armed groups roam Amhara. The Fano paramilitary, having fought against the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) and alongside Ethiopian federal forces, expected they would keep the territories they had captured from Tigray and continue to advance their political agenda. The Fano and other Amhara militia fought in the Tigray war to reclaim ‘Amhara land.’ But the Pretoria agreement is anchored to the Ethiopian Constitution. This means that territories Amhara annexed by force in western and southern Tigray should now revert to the status quo ante.
 
When the federal government announced its decision to integrate regional special forces and the Fano paramilitary into the federal military and police in early April, Amhara activists, Fano leaders, and members of the Amhara Special Forces resisted. Leaders of the Wollo Fano accused the federal government of disarming the Amhara while keeping the Oromia Special Forces intact. They called on members of the Amhara Special Forces to resist and encouraged the local population to support them.
 
On 8 April 2023, the federal government moved against the North Wollo Fano. Security forces surrounded the Fano camp with the aim of apprehending its commander. Fano forces then blocked all roads leading to the town of Kobo and encircled federal security forces there. The two sides exchanged gunfire. Ethiopian soldiers were captured. The targeted Fano commander escaped. 
 
In the following months, Ethiopian federal security forces also launched several operations against the Gondar Fano in Ajire, Ibnat, and Gondar, and the North Shewa Fano in Shewa Robit, Ataye, Majete, Jihur, and other locations. The operation in the North Shewa zone intensified following the 27 April assassination of Girma Yeshitila, an Amhara regional state official. On 29 April, the federal army attempted to capture the Gondar Fano commander but failed. Fighting continued, and casualties were suffered by both sides. Some federal forces were captured. Fano asked the public for help. Elements of the Amhara Special Forces, armed militia, and civilians joined Fano. Subsequently, the federal army negotiated for the release of its captured soldiers.
 
In Gojjam, the federal military conducted operations in Dembecha, Finote Selam, Mertolemariam, Goncha, Debrework, and other towns. Only in the monastery of Debre Elias did the government succeed in defeating Fano. In Dega Damot, Fano appealed to local civilians, many of whom closed their businesses and came out to the streets to protest the military presence. Finally, elders intervened and arranged a ceasefire, and the federal army retreated. Fano publicly thanked the people for protecting them and went on to patrol the streets, armed.
 
Wherever the federal government intervenes, Fano fallaciously warns the people that they are being attacked by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). They say the reason Fano fought the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) was to recover Amhara land, and allege that the Oromo are trying to dislodge the Amhara from their land. Gondar Fano commander Mesafint Tesfu put it this way: “We didn’t rob banks or tanks, we didn’t oppress civilians or target our country. We are fighting for our rights.” This is supposedly in contrast with the OLA and the TPLF.

A pattern has emerged in clashes between Ethiopian federal forces and Fano in the four areas of Amhara. Federal forces move in to disarm Fano. Fano resists and seeks popular support. Local people intervene and federal forces withdraw. The greatest effect is that Fano gains recruits.
 
The US had placed the violations determination on Ethiopia following the observation that all parties to the conflict in northern Ethiopia had committed war crimes. While peace is being restored in parts of Tigray, the conflict in Amhara highlights the complicated nature of human rights violations still taking place. When a people support a local armed movement, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate the wrongdoers from the innocent. In effect, the government finds itself fighting its own people. Removing Ethiopia’s designation, with ongoing reports of violations taking place, and no clear steps ensuring a commitment to justice and accountability, projects impunity to victims of serious human rights abuses in the country.
 
By the Ethiopian Cable team

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