Issue No. 185

Published 27 Jun 2023

Disbarring the TPLF could undermine the Pretoria agreement

Published on 27 Jun 2023 19:04 min
Disbarring the TPLF could undermine the Pretoria agreement
 
Prospects for Tigray elections are threatening the shaky relationship between Addis and Mekelle and deepening fissures within Tigray. The September 2020 Tigray elections were a trigger for the destructive Tigray War. Today, hope for fresh elections that might leave behind division between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) already appear compromised. In January 2021, the NEBE cancelled the TPLF’s official registration as a political party and seized its assets, citing the ongoing armed conflict. The refusal of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to reinstate the TPLF as a political party is now intensifying internal party and regional fissures. With western Tigray still occupied by Amhara and Eritrean forces, millions internally displaced, and the suspension of aid amplifying Tigray's humanitarian crises-- this decision could undermine Tigray’s Interim Administration (TIA), and even the Pretoria agreement.
 
On 10 May, NEBE Deputy Wubishet Ayale declared that elections would be held in locations where the 2021 federal election could not occur, including Tigray, sometime between September 2023 and September 2024. Yet the TPLF will supposedly play no part in these elections. The NEBE has twice turned down applications to reverse its January 2021 decision, justifying this in part by saying there was a party called the TPLF, but to reinstitute it under the same name would only “confuse voters.” The main crux of NEBE’s refusal, however, is that there are “no provisions… to restore the legal personality to the party.” Leaving aside this argument, refusing to acknowledge the TPLF as a party is worryingly contradictory to the Pretoria agreement that concluded the Tigray War in November 2022. The Pretoria agreement clearly recognised the TPLF's status as a legal entity. The agreement stated that it would de-list the party from Ethiopia’s roster of terrorist organisations, ratified by the House of Representatives in March 2023. Indeed, throughout the war, the FGE defined the conflict in relation to the TPLF, not Tigray’s regional administration.
 
The NEBE's decision throws the Pretoria agreement into fresh contention, as Tigray Interim Administration President Getachew Reda attempts to build on it. Senior TPLF and TIA leaders have condemned the NEBE’s decision as a betrayal of the Pretoria agreement and politically unacceptable. On 22 May, TPLF Chairperson and former Tigray President Debretision Gebremichael said the party would “continue to exist unless it dissolves on its own in another way.” He called the NEBE decision “destructive to all.” The party also submitted a complaint to the African Union.
 
The NEBE’s decision also reveals growing cracks between reformist-- epitomised by TIA President Getachew Reda, and hardline elements of the TPLF-- such as Debretsion Gebremichael. Getachew represents the younger wing of the party, seemingly less wedded to the TPLF’s Marxist-Leninist origins. As president, he has met with numerous diplomats in recent months, manoeuvring international support for Tigray and the Pretoria agreement, while at the same time seeking a more stable relationship with Addis. Debretsion has been critical of the process that established the TIA and has called for an accelerated electoral timeline to dissolve it, in opposition to both TIA and NEBE positions.
 
These divisions threaten to undermine the complex work of the TIA as it struggles to improve Tigray's desperate humanitarian situation, rebuild its devastated infrastructure, and negotiate an end to the occupation and abuses of Amhara and Eritrean forces. Accelerating the electoral timeline is also deeply unrealistic. Tigray’s capacity to hold an election was devastated, and the TIA does not control districts held by Amhara and Eritrean forces.
 
The NEBE's refusal to readmit the TPLF party is just one pressure among many facing the TIA. Recent protests by internally displaced persons calling for their return to their homes in western Tigray generate further pressure. The pro-Tigrayan independence opposition parties have garnered significant support, with some opposition leaders calling for an early referendum on potential secession. While many Tigrayans may support the idea of an independent Tigray, there are more pressing issues at hand, including people’s very survival and the enormous task of rebuilding their decimated homeland.
 
The motivations for the NEBE's refusal to reconsider the TPLF remain unclear. Pursuing a narrow interpretation of Ethiopia's electoral law by denying the TPLF party recognition serves no one well. Some have argued that the FGE is seeking to draw greater concessions from the TPLF, while others have suggested it reflects unresolved divisions within the ruling Prosperity Party over the future of its relationship with the TPLF and Tigray. Whatever its cause, the NEBE’s decision is impacting a fragile peace, threatening to reopen fault lines that drove the Tigray War.
 
Balancing reconciliation, accountability for numerous and ongoing human rights violations, and democratic prospects is a complex and delicate process. Mekelle needs as much support as it can get, not more pressure from the NEBE. Shoring up the Pretoria agreement must start with all parties working to end the suspension of humanitarian aid, and to end starvation in the region. Compelling Eritrean and Amhara forces to leave Tigray, as stipulated in the Pretoria agreement, would also support the TIA. Despite international attention now focused on Sudan, the Tigrayan transition should not be left by the wayside.
 
By the Ethiopian Cable team

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