Issue No. 184

Published 22 Jun 2023

Fano militia: Deadly and resilient

Published on 22 Jun 2023 18:39 min
Fano militia: Deadly and resilient
 
Wollega. North Shewa. Metekel. Western Tigray. All are areas bordering the Amhara region of Ethiopia, and all are claimed by the irredentist Amhara nationalist militia group ‘Fano.’ The group is named after those who historically fought against foreign invaders. Today it describes an ethnic militia infamous for ethnic cleansing in western Tigray. Despite several joint federal and regional attempts to subdue the group, Fano militia continue to attack and displace civilians across three regions of Ethiopia– Tigray, Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz.
 
Today’s Fano began as an Amhara nationalist movement in early 2017, protesting real and perceived marginalisation of Amhara under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Many Amhara saw the EPRDF’s ethnic federal model as a betrayal of Ethiopian identity that robbed them of their ancestral lands. During a brief respite from animosities toward the federal government, Amhara supported Abiy Ahmed’s ascension to power, trusting that it heralded a new era for them. Later Fano played a central role in the Tigray War, its numbers swelling dramatically as many young Amhara joined the armed group. Largely armed and trained by Eritrean forces, Fano was empowered to help seize and occupy western Tigray. Most recently, like their Eritrean ally, Fano and other Amhara have turned on Abiy’s Prosperity Party, accusing the federal government of betrayal when it made peace with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in Pretoria in November 2022.
 
Today, while the Amhara region is far more stable since regional unrest has abated, its neighbours are not. Western Tigray remains occupied by Amhara forces, with thousands still being forced into overcrowded internally displaced persons camps in Shire and elsewhere. In recent weeks, Fano militia have attacked several villages in Oromia, East Wollega and Huchu Guduro Wollega. On 16 June Fano fighters were accused of killing 8 civilians and injuring a further 13 in an attack on villages in Kiremu zone in East Wollega. Killing civilians, burning and looting their homes and farms, it was typical of Fano’s civilian attacks. By targeting unprotected villages near the Amhara border, they have regularly sought to displace those they perceive as occupying ‘their’ land. The common refrain “Amhara Tarikun Yadisal” (“the Amhara shall renew their history”) has been regularly used to justify this brutality.
 
One central plank of Fano ideology is to reclaim, as Fano leader Solomon Atanaw has put it, “stolen Amhara lands.” But this belief that Amhara borderlands were somehow ‘stolen,’ most assumed by imperial administrators, is misleading. Ethiopia has a long history of inter-ethnic settlement across its regions, regularly changing administrations. In Oromia, Fano attempts to ‘reclaim’ their land have left thousands dead and tens of thousands displaced. Further, retaliatory massacres of civilians by both alleged Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) fighters and Fano militia have fed a rapid deterioration in relations between Oromo and Amhara, once together aligned with Abiy Ahmed. This fighting was particularly intense in June and July 2022, when cyclical attacks killed hundreds of Amhara and Oromo civilians.
 
In May 2022, the Federal Government of Ethiopia turned on its former ally Fano due to fear of its increasing influence and autonomy, arresting more than 4,000 in a wide crackdown. Zola Moges, a member of the Amhara regional parliament, made the prescient comment that, “the government could succeed [in dismantling the group] or these militia could go underground. If that happens, it will be very difficult to fight them.” This has now come to pass. With the toxic rhetoric of Amhara nationalism unabated, the proliferation of weapons in Ethiopia, and the dispersed nature of the militant group, Fano has proved difficult to disband.
 
This situation is also partly due to the militarised manner in which the federal and Amhara governments have tried to subdue Fano. Mass arrests, shuttering internet access, and arresting journalists and activists have cemented perceptions of persecution against the Amhara. Every clash between Fano militia and federal forces is now framed as an existential threat, presumably drawing more support to the group. Eritrea too remains a deeply destabilising presence, reportedly maintaining close military ties with Amhara forces in western Tigray, as well as Fano militia. Eritrea’s continued presence is imperilling critical progress made under the Pretoria agreement, which stipulated the withdrawal of all non-Ethiopian National Defence Force fighters from Tigray.
 
Effectively tackling Fano’s malign influence on its neighbours requires a multi-pronged approach. While the current approach has proved itself able to crush elements of the militia, it has not been able to stamp it out entirely. To do so, Ethiopia cannot ignore the revisionist and exclusionary history propagated by Amhara nationalists. Tackling the pervasive rhetoric must go hand-in-hand with economic support for the underdeveloped region. Fano has been able to grow as an alternative source of power within the political cracks of Ethiopia due to the disillusionment of Amhara. But, most critically, Eritrea must be decoupled from Fano and its other Amhara allies immediately. The occupation of western Tigray threatens the still-fragile peace agreement. 
 
By the Ethiopian Cable team

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