At the airport, the two leaders exuded warmth towards one another. At a formal meeting to which the media was invited, the two leaders spoke solemnly about the need to strengthen peace, and the need for collaboration to reconcile the people of Tigray and Amhara.
“Whether we like it or not, we will always continue to live as neighbours. We are here today to make sure this neighbourhood is peaceful, neighbourly, and there is mutual love,” said Getachew. He emphasised that both sides were ready to “close the war chapter.” This message of peace, amity and kinship was echoed by Yilkal. The Amhara president appealed to both sides to “bury” mutually hostile propaganda, strengthen people-to-people relations and help families torn by war to reunite. He added, "The people of Tigray are our brothers and neighbours of the Amhara people. We are intermarried and will never separate.”
This is powerful rhetoric– unprecedented even – coming from leaders of two of Ethiopia’s most implacable foes whose history of mutual antipathy contributed to the Tigray War.
It is easy for cynics to dismiss the event as choreographed, the optics of camaraderie and bonhomie feigned. Some have even suggested that the trip was designed to distract attention from the political maelstrom resulting from the large-scale diversion of food aid in Ethiopia, which has implicated officials at the national and regional levels.
Assuming that these claims are inaccurate and that there is genuine interest in peace, it is still important to consider the reasons why reconciliation is necessary between Tigray and Amhara States, and what a sensible and viable peace-building process could look like.
There is certainly no downplaying the long-standing animus between Tigray and Amhara. The two neighbours may share a great many things– a Semitic language, an ancient form of Christianity, and the geography of the Ethiopian Highlands. But their history has often been turbulent and blood-soaked, as the two have fought wars on opposing sides. Both regions are also fierce competitors for central power and for territory. Today, contested borders and the ongoing occupation of western Tigray by Amhara forces are at the core of conflict between the two.
Amhara State played a key role in the rolling protests that pushed the Tigray People’s Liberation Front out of government, and catapulting Abiy Ahmed into power. The new Ethiopian Prime Minister rewarded the Amhara by forging a strategic partnership with their leadership. This was particularly apparent during the Tigray War, with Amhara State crucial in Abiy’s military strategy due to its proximity to Tigray. To prosecute the war effectively, Abiy needed a compliant neighbour. And Amhara’s support allowed the Federal Government of Ethiopia to sustain its siege on Tigray, with critical supply routes into Tigray through the Amhara region blocked.
The now-dissolved Amhara Special Forces and the local Fano militia were the most zealous prosecutors of the Tigray War. Needing little persuasion to fight, they ransacked towns and villages, burnt crops, summarily executed civilians, and gang-raped women and girls. The conduct of Amhara forces in Tigray has left great bitterness, deepening anger and resentment among Tigrayans towards the Amhara.
Today, Amhara forces still occupy western Tigray in breach of the November 2022 Pretoria agreement. Hundreds of thousands have fled ongoing atrocities against ethnic Tigrayans there. Land has been forcibly confiscated, and ethnic Tigrayans have been forced to take Amhara State identification cards – part of a systematic process of “Amharanisation.”
The interim administration of Tigray is under immense strain. It cannot cope with the large numbers of civilians fleeing western Tigray. In April 2023 alone, nearly 50,000 people were displaced from 10 woredas in western Tigray into crowded camps near Shire. And discontent over an unfulfilled Pretoria agreement is mounting, with several significant protests over the occupation of western Tigray in recent weeks. Mekelle’s outreach to Bahir Dar appears to be driven primarily by a desire to find an amicable settlement to the situation in western Tigray.
Post-war reconciliation and healing is a generational struggle. Getachew and Yilkal have overcome the first psychological hurdle. But much more will need to be done to sustain the momentum they generated and achieve real progress. The Federal Government of Ethiopia must also craft its own post-war reconciliation strategy. While lessons can be learnt from other contexts, there is no magical template for success.
First, there is a strong instinct in Ethiopia for a top-down ‘reconciliation.’ This would not be effective. Civil society must be empowered to lead grass roots reconciliation inTigray and Amhara. The federal government’s role should be limited and supportive, not domineering.
Second, a parallel mechanism for truth-telling and restorative justice should be established to complement reconciliation. Sweeping war crimes under the carpet in the interest of peace guarantees neither peace nor reconciliation in the long term.
Third, the humanitarian situation in northern Ethiopia remains dire. Hungry communities cannot reconcile. A resumption of aid, help for vulnerable communities, and investment in rebuilding livelihoods would all help to create conditions for reconciliation.
Finally, the issue of western Tigray remains potentially explosive. Until it is resolved no meaningful reconciliation is possible. Worse, it could yet trigger the next conflict in Ethiopia. Independent arbitration and external mediation must be tried, immediately.
The Ethiopia Cable Team
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