Issue No. 180

Published 08 Jun 2023

The China-Eritrea Connection

Published on 08 Jun 2023 16:31 min
The China-Eritrea Connection
 
In his recent visit to China, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki was welcomed by a 21-gun salute, red carpets, and a state banquet. The four-day trip, from 14-18 May, celebrated 30 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping exulted in the relationship, stating that the two countries “share a deep bond of friendship [in] an uncertain and unstable world.” During his visit, Isaias also showered praise on China while calling for a restructuring of the world order. Echoing similar sentiments in a state visit to Russia just a couple of weeks later, Isaias said that the “unipolar world order [of the US]” had driven a “spiral of crises and destruction.” Reflective of Eritrea’s support of China, and Russia, on the international stage, these comments also reveal an antipathy towards western countries that have repeatedly sanctioned the Eritrean regime.
 
African nations are facing increasing pressure from and being courted by China, Russia, and the west, in what has been dubbed a ‘New Cold War.’ But one country that needs no courting is Eritrea, as Asmara has repeatedly and vocally backed Chinese positions in recent years. In June 2020, Eritrea vocally supported China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong at the United Nations. And in a rare press release in August 2022, Eritrea condemned the visit of former US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan. The press release called the visit “deplorable as it is in contravention of international law… as well as the ‘One-China; policy.” Since the outbreak of armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023, 35 Chinese citizens evacuated, through Eritrea, perhaps the only foreigners to have done so.
 
Isaias’ recent visit to China was not the first time an Eritrean leader has met with senior Chinese officials. According to Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) records, Djiboutian politician Mohammed Harbi introduced the rebel group to the Chinese in the 1960s. Gradual relations developed, and in 1966 ELF leaders Idris Mohamed Adem and Osman Saleh Sabbe visited China to request military support. Then-Secetary General of the Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met with the two, agreeing to provide military training to five cadres. In 1967 the first group was dispatched with a young Isaias among them.
 
In the 6–8 months the ELF fighters lived in China, they were taught a mix of guerrilla tactics and communist ideology. Their Chinese instructors even provided draft bylaws for a proposed Communist Party in Eritrea. Their ideological training emphasised the importance of a vanguard party to lead the ‘people’s struggle’ against their oppressors. This likely informed the creation of the ELF’s clandestine ‘Labour Party’ in 1968, and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s internal ‘Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party’ in 1971. Despite this influence, the EPLF quickly became Isaias’ personal machine used to crush dissent and consolidate power.
 
In more recent times, the ‘hermit kingdom’ has deepened its economic relationship with China, joining China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ in 2021, and elevating ties to a strategic partnership in 2022. Previously Asmara had been largely excluded from China’s Initiative due to a preference for other African nations. But since the COVID-19 pandemic, Eritrea, along with the wider region, is increasingly perceived as providing important trade routes into Sub-Saharan Africa and as a reliable Chinese partner in a shifting global order.
 
Like much of Eritrea’s politics, the country’s economic relationship with China is largely a mystery. Between 2000 and 2018, Eritrea reportedly received 10 loans from China, totalling some USD 631 million, according to the China Loans to Africa Database. While China is the single largest lender to Eritrea, the details of its loans are unknown. Awet Weldemichael, a researcher of political economy in the Horn, recently said, “We don’t know when or if at all Eritrea will get to a point of defaulting as have others like Zambia.” While recent talks in Beijing apparently included no formal mention of debt relief or restructuring, some have suggested that Isaias was seeking to shore up support for Eritrea’s struggling economy.
 
Chinese investment in Eritrea now touches several sectors of its economy, particularly natural resources, and Red Sea infrastructure. One recent investment included the purchase of a 50% stake in the Colluli potash sulphate project by the Sichuan Road and Bridge Group. This project is considered one of the world’s largest low-cost sources of premium-grade fertiliser, with estimated reserves of 1.1 billion metric tonnes. And in 2019, the China Shanghai Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation began construction on a 500 km stretch of road connecting Ertirea’s Massawa and Assab ports.
 
There are also reports that China may have provided Eritrea with weapons and surveillance equipment. Annual Chinese aid to Eritrea, however, is estimated to be far less than its investments and is largely used to boost Chinese exports. Eritrean exports to China, on the other hand, are negligible but tariff-free.
 
When compared to trade with its neighbour Ethiopia, Chinese trade with Eritrea wanes in comparison. China’s exports to Eritrea were estimated at USD 71 million in 2020, while its exports to Ethiopia came in at an estimated USD 2.8 billion in 2021. Further, Ethiopia exported USD 148 million in goods to China that same year. This may be the reason Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Demeke Mekennon was invited to China immediately following Eritrea’s presidential visit.
 
For Eritrea, this is also about seeking closer ties with Russia and China to secure alternative alliances to strengthen its position in the context of growing tensions with Ethiopia. But as is the case with many of China’s allies, the relationship between Eritrea and China is far from equal. With Eritrea seeking a closer relationship with Asia’s superpower, it is not yet clear how China will balance itself amidst the complex dynamics of the Horn.
 
Ethiopian Cable Team

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