Issue No. 179

Published 06 Jun 2023

Estimating civilian deaths in Tigray

Published on 06 Jun 2023 19:51 min
Estimating civilian deaths in Tigray
 
Estimating civilian deaths from the devastating two-year Tigray war has proven deeply complex. From June 2021, the Federal Government of Ethiopia’s blockade of Tigray established a near-total information blackout. Journalists and researchers were prevented from accessing Tigray and, within the region, civilians were prevented from accessing the outside world, as they faced shuttered internet and telecommunications. This information blackout frustrated the documentation of combat-related deaths, starvation, and human rights violations in Tigray, leading to a significant variation in civilian death estimates.
 
This dearth of information has made the Ghent University (GU) research into Tigray’s civilian deaths even more critical. GU’s research team on Tigray, led by Professor Jan Nyssen, has recently released new analysis re-evaluating the scale of civilian deaths. Following qualitative research in the region in January 2023, and broader data gathering, the team concluded that the widely-cited Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) overestimated hunger mortality during the conflict.
 
Largely rooted in data from the IPC and FEWS, GU’s previous estimate of Tigray’s civilian deaths had been between 300,000 and 600,000. With greater access to the region and increasing data, GU has since revised its estimates down to between 162,000 and 378,000 total civilian deaths.

In the Dogu’a Tembien district, GU investigated the war’s impact on social coherence and the natural environment, including issues of deforestation, in 10 villages. In January 2023, qualitative research carried out across these villages revealed civilian deaths ranging from those in Atsa from “lack of medicine and medical treatment” to those from airstrikes in Kolal. Eritrean forces in particular were highlighted as responsible for directly killing civilians. In Awulo a villager reported, “Eritrean soldiers killed 14 residents,” while in Gumuara a resident reported that Eritrean soldiers “encountered a priest who was going to the church and they killed him.” Hunger-related deaths also accounted for a significant number of conflict-related deaths in these villages.
 
Except for Aregen and Addilal, all of the villages in which the qualitative research was conducted are small, with only 100-200 households. The stories collected by the researchers are harrowing, but nothing to suggest that there was an overall decimation of the population, i.e. 10% of residents losing their lives. From the sample sites, reported numbers tended to indicate between 2 and 5% of civilians died per location. But this is only a small sample, and GU has noted several caveats to its conclusions based on the January research that largely relied on civilian tallies.
 
First, local administrators previously tallying death tolls may have missed deaths from hunger or inaccessibility to healthcare as these causes could have gone unnoticed. Second, at the height of the federal government’s blockade, many Tigrayan residents fled for settlements in Tigray, for the Amhara region, and even for Eritrea. The civilian death tolls would not necessarily have accounted for deaths while travelling or upon arrival in a new location. In Aregen in the Dogu’a Tembien district, residents reported that some 600 people, roughly 10% of the local population, had fled.
 
The GU research from Dogu’a Tembien also reflects relatively accessible areas in Tigray. The humanitarian situation is thought to have been and to still be worse in the drier low-lying woredas. These were often the sites of the most severe battles, such as Kola Tembien, Weri’i and Zana, and places such as Irob, which is still without humanitarian access. In addition, there is still no information coming from areas remaining under Amhara or Eritrean control. For many in these areas, the war has yet to end. A recent Human Rights Watch report from 1 June revealed ongoing atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, being committed by Amhara and Eritrean forces, particularly in western Tigray.
 
Overall, GU samples have led to an estimate of 2 to 5% civilian deaths of the local population per location, below its earlier estimate of 5 to 10%, which drew heavily on death tolls associated with the different phases of IPC classification. GU has applied a similar correction to their earlier calculation for Tigray, now resulting in an estimated 96,000 to 218,000 famine-related deaths. Adding 30,000 to 100,000 deaths due to lack of healthcare and 36,000 to 60,000 deaths from the direct killing of civilians, from massacres, military bombardment and related attacks, resulted in estimated civilian deaths between 162,000 to 378,000 Tigrayan residents.
 
This updated data and analysis from GU have revealed that the situation in Tigray may not be as bad as initially feared. Still, 162,000 to 378,000 civilian victims in the Tigray region is a vast number over two years. While recent steps taken by the Interim Regional Administration in Tigray and the Federal Government of Ethiopia are of course important to prevent future armed conflict, full documentation of the victims is crucial to begin reconciliation, transitional justice and healing. Understanding the precise scale and nature of civilian deaths is crucial to accountability and justice for Tigray’s survivors

By the Ethiopian Cable team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 967
Somaliland - The Return of the Prodigal Daughter
The Somali Wire

In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.


19:38 min read 22 Jul
Issue No. 966
A New Spring in His Step: How HSM Engineered His Rebound
The Somali Wire

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.


24:38 min read 16 Jul
Issue No. 965
The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake
The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.


6:03 min read 10 Jul
Issue No. 964
Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code
The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.


16 min read 08 Jul
Issue No. 963
Part I/The Fault Lines in Somalia’s Penal Reform
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).


16:49 min read 03 Jul
Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Scroll