After the Derg regime was overthrown, the subsequent Constitution established an ethno-federal state governed by a parliamentary system. Establishing 9 ethnically-based federal regions, the Constitution granted Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups considerable independence. According to Fasil Nahum, who was involved in drafting the Constitution, this was intended to transform a “prison of nations” into a “nation of nations.” Uniting ethnic groups, including those long marginalised, lay at the heart of this radical re-thinking of the Ethiopian nation-state. The Constitution also explicitly recognised the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, alongside other liberal democratic norms. Ethiopians were promised total freedom of expression for the first time - at least in principle.
The PSI study maintains that the “majority of the respondents (54%) advocate a reform to the ethno-territorial system.” This reflects with the views of many Amhara who believe the Constitution is both the root of Ethiopia’s current conflicts, and a betrayal of the ‘Abyssinian identity.’ But the study’s methodology is facing heavy criticism. For example, Girma Gutema, a member of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress, cited PSI’s extraordinary claim of a reversal of near-universal support for Sidama as a new region since 2019.
PSI pointed out one potential amendment of the contentious Article 39.1, which stipulates, “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.” The study noted that most of the respondents expressed support for reform to the “unconditional right to self-determination” due to its potential to fragment the nation state. While this is not a fresh issue, controversy surrounding this article has intensified in recent years, as calls for independence have spread across much of the country, most particularly in Tigray, during the two-year armed conflict.
The 1995 Constitution is certainly not perfect nor infallible.
One issue regularly overlooked in Ethiopian political discourse regards its rigid theoretical concepts and frameworks. The 1970s student revolutionary movement’s Leninist interpretation of ethnicity was incorporated into the Constitution. Ethnicity was conceived as the ‘natural’ structure of political organisation through a strong central government. But this concept contains an internal contradiction between the fundamental idea of a nation and an understanding of nation as created through historical process. This has yielded several profound consequences. A lack of subtlety in the Constitution has left little room for the complexity of ethnicity in Ethiopia, leading to rigid ethnic identities. This preference for ‘absolute’ ethnic identity has encouraged parochialism, with people favouring ethnic boundaries over loyalty to the nation state.
Another issue that has plagued Ethiopia’s Constitution is the divergence between original intentions and its application. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, former member of Ethiopia’s Constituent Assembly, described the Constitution as “stagnant,” a tool used to further elite interests rather than address “historical injustices and inequalities.” Elias Tesemma of the Sidama Federalist Party has insisted that the source of Ethiopia’s current ethnic divisions lies in the state’s failure to implement the Constitution as it was intended. This view is widely shared by many in Ethiopia, particularly Oromo.
Despite important critiques, the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia was an essential departure from its predecessors. Ethiopia’s 1931 Constitution enshrined Emperor Haile Selassie’s divine right as monarch. In 1987, the military Derg paid lip service to freedoms and liberties in a constitution it quickly cast aside.
Many Ethiopians do not oppose the idea of amending Ethiopia’s Constitution. But there are moments for such significant changes. Significant groundwork must be laid, and national consensus must be found before Ethiopia reconsiders the content of its core document, particularly concerning self-determination.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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