Amhara Region: The Time for Dialogue Is Now
On 27 April, the head of Amhara’s Prosperity Party and ally of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Girma Yeshitila, was killed in an attack with four others. A few days later, the regional government released a statement blaming Fano militia for the attack. On 1 May, the Joint Security and Intelligence Task Force announced the detention of 47 ‘terror’ suspects in Amhara, after being found in possession of bombs, weapons and communications equipment. The suspects include individuals who, according to the Task Force, reportedly plotted to seize control of the Amhara regional government and overthrow the Ethiopian Federal Government (FGE).
The assassination of this key figure in the Prosperity Party should be eye-opening for observers of Ethiopia’s peace and stability. Despite the recent successes in disarming the Amhara Special Forces, the deep social and political divisions among the Amhara public mean the risk of escalation to armed conflict still remains.
Girma’s killing follows violent protests in early April over the government’s initiative to dissolve regional special forces and integrate their members into the federal security architecture. Many Amhara, perceiving continued threats from Tigrayan forces to the north and from Oromo militia to the south, seem to believe that the dissolution of special forces targeted Amhara Special Forces and not those from other regions. Accusations of federal attempts to weaken the Amhara, amid the FGE’s renewed ties with Tigrayan leadership, have blossomed across social media and regional news outlets. Emotive rhetoric across social media has played a central role in disseminating suspicions and conspiracies of Oromo plans for an independent nation-state.
The recent intensification of tensions in Amhara is the latest in a narrative that, for some, began with FGE withdrawal from Tigray in mid-2021. Some Amhara saw the departure of federal forces at that time as a betrayal of initial joint success against Tigray.
By early 2022, the federal government was growing increasingly concerned about risks posed by mass militarisation in Amhara, particularly the lack of federal control over Amharan regional security forces. Citing the unconstitutionality of regional militia, the government cracked down on Fano, arresting more than 5,000 men and sending commanders into hiding.
There were heightened worries among the Amhara public about youth openly carrying weapons on village streets, a sentiment confirmed by low turnout to protest the crackdown against Fano. Still, a significant percentage of Amhara’s population saw the crackdown as the federal government reneging on its promise to support Amhara interests, a promise initially made in return for the region’s support for the new prime minister in 2018. Violent clashes between Fano and federal forces followed the militia arrest.
Powerful narratives of victimization amongst many Amhara are rooted in perceived marginalisation under the 27-year, Tigrayan-dominated leadership of the EPRDF. Some Amhara regard the entire ethno-federal model as a betrayal of an Ethiopian identity based on Abyssinian culture, Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic language. Such rhetoric of aggrieved victimhood, while not new, is worrisome, and could provoke armed escalation, especially in the presence of a trigger – such as the assassination of prominent political elites. On 8 April, federal forces moved into Amhara to support the closure of regional special forces. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported the use of heavy weapons against protestors by security forces in North Shewa in Amhara in early May, resulting in civilian deaths. Fano is now directly implicated by the federal government in the killing of Girma Yeshitila.
This situation also requires the attention of the federal government and international supporters of the peace processes in Tigray and Oromia. The combination of inflammatory rhetoric and government crackdown still threatens renewed armed conflict. Fano militia still occupy much of western Tigray, with reports of further displacement of Tigrayan communities continuing into late April. The Amhara region also requires significant humanitarian and reconstruction support, hosting thousands of displaced people due to the effects of neighbouring conflicts. Starting to tackle these issues may go someway toward addressing the divisive narratives amongst the Amhara.
International observers would be remiss to ignore the situation in Amhara, which risks efforts to mediate peace for its neighbouring regions. The time for dialogue is now, not just in Oromia but also in Amhara.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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