What has the African Union delivered to the Tigray peace deal?
On 23 April, amidst celebratory fanfare that saw several Tigrayans honoured for their contributions to peace, a message that the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (MCVM) may conclude its monitoring of peace in Tigray emerged. This was not a total surprise; the Federal Government of Ethiopia has long suspected perceived interference in its domestic politics. The recently formed Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) led by Getachew Reda seems to have agreed to end the MCVM mandate. The FGE and IRA should be commended for their conciliatory gestures, which are gradually helping to rebuild a political foundation and improve the dire humanitarian situation in Tigray.
But the MCVM can serve as an important element of a still-fragile peace, and its suggested withdrawal raises questions plaguing the African Union, most significantly a drift from its founding norms and principles. Kenyan President William Ruto, at the Mo Ibrahim Governance Conference, held on 29 April in Nairobi, commented that Africa has, “the wrong architecture in the management of the African Union.” He said, “the AU Commission Chairman can do very little because we have retained all the powers.” For example, AU Chairman Moussa Faki declined to intervene in the conflict in Tigray, framing the conflict as a domestic concern, disregarding wider international concerns about refugees and spiralling violence.
The suggested withdrawal of the MCVM comes at a critical juncture. The Pretoria Agreement, an amalgamation of peace accord and a cessation of hostilities, is threatened by several potential spoilers that look to undo the recent progress made by the FGE and IRA. Humanitarian aid is still not reaching parts of Tigray, many ex-Tigrayan forces still languish in prison, and rebuilding the devastated region is yet to begin. Most significantly, Eritrean and Amhara forces still occupy swathes of western Tigray and continue to displace many. While elite politics continues to mend between the TPLF and Prosperity Party, the situation in Tigray remains potentially volatile. With independent media still lacking unfettered access to Tigray, the MCVM could be particularly relevant. It was involved in the initial steps that began the disarmament of the Tigrayan Defence Forces, and it was present when these forces surrendered their weapons in January 2023. But it has since barely visited Tigray and has been virtually silent on violations of the Pretoria Agreement, such as the continued occupation of parts of Tigray by Amhara militias and the Eritrean military.
President Ruto’s recent comments call to mind the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility,’ conceived by South Sudanese politician Francis Deng. A concept formed in the wake of state-driven atrocities in the 1990s, it centres on the treatment of civilians by governments, arguing that governments should be accountable both domestically and internationally. The Organization of African Unity (precursor to the AU) articulated a similar norm in the “principle of non-indifference” in the wake of the Rwandan genocide. It stated that the international community, particularly African states, should not be silent in the face of mass atrocities. This principle was enshrined in some of the foundational documents of the AU in the early 2000s, including its Constitutive Act. Atrocities committed by all sides in the conflict in Tigray, and subsequent silence on the part of many nations and the AU contravene those founding principles.
The AU should use this current opportunity in the wake of war in Tigray to reassess and re-evaluate its commitment to its powerful founding principles. While the Pretoria Agreement was critical to ‘silencing the guns,’ another AU principle, the organisation is now failing to fulfil its commitments to the agreement. As accountability and transitional justice remain unsettled with minimal pressure exerted by the AU on this count, the MCVM could be helping to ensure a proper environment for future justice mechanisms.
With conflict escalating in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, now is the right time for the AU to reclaim its position as Africa’s moral authority, and exert necessary pressure where it can. In Ethiopia, AU leaders can call out those attempting to spoil future peace dividends emerging from reconciliation between the FGE and IRA. They can also argue that the MCVM should remain active, and they can empower it to monitor the implementation of the Tigray peace accords more effectively.
It is, of course, also important to acknowledge the institutional restrictions that limit the scope and influence of the AU. Ruto’s recent comments included reference to financial restrictions imposed on the AU and their damaging consequences. The AU depends heavily on others, particularly the European Union, to provide significant financial support amid mounting armed conflicts and political crises across the continent. In an address to the UN Security Council in 2021, Former South African President Thabo Mbeki called for conflict resolution “not be driven simply… by security considerations.” He said instead, “it must address the vital matter of the root causes of the conflict.” Without sufficient resources, the AU will continue to struggle to realise this vision for sustainable peace. Reclaiming the principles of its Constitutive Act could be a very long process, but it can begin today in Ethiopia.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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