Issue No. 169

Next steps in Tigray’s DDR: Using the 1990s blueprint

The effective and sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of a force is one of the most complex aspects of navigating a post-conflict society. A failed DDR can have terrible consequences and can lead to reverberating and fragmenting conflict just as a country attempts to move on. One example was the failure of the US 'de-Ba'athification' of the Iraqi security architecture post-2003.
 
Ethiopia is currently facing several extremely complex DDR processes which require both a nuanced approach and careful timing. The most significant of these is the current process of demobilizing the sizeable Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), which fought the federal government and its allies in the recent two-year war. Recent weeks have seen this process framed as part of a larger push to centralize Ethiopian armed forces, which sparked protests across the Amhara region.
 
In Tigray, while there is little appetite for a return to conflict on either side following such extreme devastation, a painful limbo and an absence of political foundation persist. The sheer scale and brutality of the conflict that concluded in November 2022, makes this DDR process both sensitive and logistically challenging. Two hundred and fifty thousand TDF fighters were estimated to be engaged in the final months of the conflict between August and the November cessation of hostilities. These soldiers will need a range of support-- from care for life-altering injuries and disabilities to help to find jobs in a region devastated by war. 
 
There have been some positive signs in recent weeks on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the TDF. Most notably, the handing over of TDF heavy weapons to the government in early January, and the inclusionary comments of Ambassador Teshome, Chair of the newly created Rehabilitation Commission. But progress has been slow, and a clear implementation matrix to reassure former TDF fighters remains absent.
 
Still, there is a useful blueprint that the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) and the Interim Regional Administration (IRA) of Tigray could call upon; the successful DDR process of the Derg forces in the 1990s. Following the capture of Addis Ababa in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) set about demobilizing the scattered but sizeable Derg forces. Indeed many of the key TPLF figures involved in the 1990s DDR process, like General Tsadkan Gebretensae, now face a similar process under the Prosperity Party.
 
Ambiguity has been a prominent feature of the Abiy government, but clarity of goals is critical for a DDR process to succeed. In the 1990s, while the DDR Commission in Ethiopia was initially limited by insufficient financing and technical capacity, it still had clear objectives that allowed it to steer through necessary improvisation and implementation. In Ethiopia today, there are still several active spoilers that threaten to overwhelm tentative steps towards peace-- the most notable being the continued occupation of western Tigray by Eritrean and Amhara forces. The DDR process, and wider transition towards sustainable peace, need both clarity and flexibility to incorporate and react to these ongoing challenges.
 
Part of the clarity of the 1990s DDR Commission was to help establish trust, crucial for fighters to sustainably demobilize and reintegrate into society. Ex-fighters on both sides of the conflict, Amhara militia forces and TDF alike, need to trust that their families and communities will be safe, post-DDR, to limit the risk of re-mobilization. But rebuilding trust will require a complex balancing act, with no political foundation in place between Tigray and the FGE, and no transitional justice mechanism. Tigrayans will also need to build trust in the new IRA, headed by Getachew Reda, and a belief that it can steer them through this troubled period to rebuild a relationship with the FGE and protect them from Amhara and Eritrean forces.
 
The Tigray war saw brutal violence and war crimes committed by all sides; a recent US report also highlights crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Tigrayan people. An inclusive and comprehensive transitional justice mechanism, and full investigation into human rights abuses, overseen by an established independent authority, would go some way towards assuaging the deep anger of survivors, and victims' families.
 
Another key lesson that can be drawn from the 1990s DDR process is the importance of responding differently to the distinct needs of fighters as they reintegrate. In March 2023, there was a demonstration by disabled TDF fighters in Mekelle, protesting a lack of support from both the FGE and TPLF. While the protest was quickly cooled by discussions with Getachew Reda, it revealed the scale of the reintegration challenge, and the damage done by slow progress and limited funds.
 
Technical support for those fighters from rural communities will also be critical as they return to an environmentally degraded landscape after several missed planting seasons. Meanwhile, ex-fighters with technical skills have returned to cities and towns in the wider context of a country facing economic and financial crises, even as trade slowly returns post-war. Specific and targeted aid, like what the EPRDF provided in the 1990s to ex-Derg fighters, is necessary to rebuild devastated areas.
 
The international community can be of particular support; it should increase humanitarian aid to help recovering communities. The pledge of USD 331 million from the US in March came at a critical juncture, with aid not yet reaching large swathes of Tigray.
 
Several key differences to the 1990s process, however, complicate the TDF’s DDR. First, the fragmentary and contested nature of Ethiopian politics and institutions today, with numerous competing axes of legitimacy, threatens to undermine the process. For DDR to be effective as it was post-Derg, there needs to be an inclusive political process with a unified, legitimate centre, currently a long way off. Second, the greater ethnicization of Ethiopian society and politics has generated division and frayed social dynamics since the 1990s. This has, in turn, led to a divided and chaotic security architecture, with a lowered bar for ethnic mobilization in conflict.
 
Ambassador Teshome signalled in his recent comments a willingness to look back to the successes of the previous DDR projects, including those post-Derg, and post-Badme War. This should be welcomed. The FGE and the IRA of Tigray should consider drawing on the expertise of those directly involved in the previous processes to inform the current situation. Legitimacy and trust must be the cornerstones for the DDR process to succeed, and greater funding to support fighters and their families to return to a semblance of normalcy is essential to that legitimacy and trust. 

By the Ethiopian Cable team