Sudan at the abyss: risks for the Horn
It has now been 6 days since fighting broke out between the government’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. The conflict could prove Sudan’s worst in decades; it risks plunging the country into deeper protracted civil war. It threatens to undo recent modest strides towards peace in the Horn and it threatens to draw in meddlesome regional powers.
Fighting erupted on Saturday 15 April, when paramilitary RSF units raided the Merowe Air Base in northern Sudan and seized control. The base is key to the SAF and it hosts Egyptian air force personnel and fighter jets. Under a new security agreement, Egypt can maintain a small military outpost and station some combat jets there. The raid on Merowe presented a brief propaganda victory for the RSF; pro-RSF social media saturated the Internet with footage of the ‘capture.’ The incident was designed to embarrass Egypt, dissuade involvement in support of Burhan, and provide the RSF with a bargaining chip. Instead, it ignited a civil war.
The last week has seen some of the worst urban warfare in Sudan in decades, with much of the fighting concentrated in Khartoum. The SAF has now deployed fighter jets and heavily armoured vehicles to dislodge the RSF. The latter is burrowing deeper into residential areas and deploying high-calibre machine guns and artillery from rooftops and courtyards, leading to massive civilian casualties.
A vicious urban war has begun; the death toll is mounting, now estimated at close to 300. In addition, water and electricity are erratic and, in some districts, completely unavailable. Key hospitals in the city are operating beyond their capacity and media reports suggest most have shut down. A serious humanitarian crisis is developing in Khartoum. And fighting is now spreading across Sudan. In Darfur, the stronghold of General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemedti,’ the RSF is consolidating. If the SAF dislodges it from Khartoum, it can retreat to Darfur and attempt a guerrilla campaign.
The RSF has also been increasing its ties with the Russian paramilitary group ‘Wagner,’ and has reportedly been using Wagner’s communications technology in the current conflict.
The violent showdown between Hemedti and Burhan was, in fact, foreseeable. The two men have been at odds for years; they have vied for control of the military, and the state. Hemedti is best known for his infamous militia then known as the janjaweed, now known as the RSF, which wreaked havoc on Darfur. Whereas Burhan’s military government has been slowly moving Sudan through its transition to civilian authority.
Both Burhan and Hemedti are tied to geopolitical players operating under the Saudi-Emirati axis. The Emiratis and the Saudis likely prefer to deal with Burhan. Still, in a context of fluid and shifting alliances, nothing is inconceivable, as the picture of who supports who remains untidy by design.
In recent months, Hemedti has travelled extensively-- to Israel, South Sudan, Chad and Kenya, in attempts to gain support and forge alliances.
He visited Eritrea in March, almost certainly seeking some form of help from the country’s dictator Isaias Afewerki. But Eritrea had deployed significant resources and manpower in Tigray over the course of the two-year war there; its support for Hemedti, if any, will likely be limited.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, is increasingly well-positioned to return to its past role as regional leader, to provide diplomatic support for a negotiated settlement in Sudan.
Chad is another country to watch. It has stakes in Darfur and its current military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, distrusts Hemedti. The RSF return to Darfur could also aggravate unresolved local conflicts there.
Today’s geopolitics affecting the Horn of Africa can be opportunistic and highly transactional. Regional powers tend to back the likely winner and support the status quo. Foreign actors are likely still hedging their bets in Sudan, before placing their fingers on the scale to tip it one way or the other. But this is not the way to help the people of Sudan.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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