Sudan at the abyss: risks for the Horn
It has now been 6 days since fighting broke out between the government’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. The conflict could prove Sudan’s worst in decades; it risks plunging the country into deeper protracted civil war. It threatens to undo recent modest strides towards peace in the Horn and it threatens to draw in meddlesome regional powers.
Fighting erupted on Saturday 15 April, when paramilitary RSF units raided the Merowe Air Base in northern Sudan and seized control. The base is key to the SAF and it hosts Egyptian air force personnel and fighter jets. Under a new security agreement, Egypt can maintain a small military outpost and station some combat jets there. The raid on Merowe presented a brief propaganda victory for the RSF; pro-RSF social media saturated the Internet with footage of the ‘capture.’ The incident was designed to embarrass Egypt, dissuade involvement in support of Burhan, and provide the RSF with a bargaining chip. Instead, it ignited a civil war.
The last week has seen some of the worst urban warfare in Sudan in decades, with much of the fighting concentrated in Khartoum. The SAF has now deployed fighter jets and heavily armoured vehicles to dislodge the RSF. The latter is burrowing deeper into residential areas and deploying high-calibre machine guns and artillery from rooftops and courtyards, leading to massive civilian casualties.
A vicious urban war has begun; the death toll is mounting, now estimated at close to 300. In addition, water and electricity are erratic and, in some districts, completely unavailable. Key hospitals in the city are operating beyond their capacity and media reports suggest most have shut down. A serious humanitarian crisis is developing in Khartoum. And fighting is now spreading across Sudan. In Darfur, the stronghold of General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemedti,’ the RSF is consolidating. If the SAF dislodges it from Khartoum, it can retreat to Darfur and attempt a guerrilla campaign.
The RSF has also been increasing its ties with the Russian paramilitary group ‘Wagner,’ and has reportedly been using Wagner’s communications technology in the current conflict.
The violent showdown between Hemedti and Burhan was, in fact, foreseeable. The two men have been at odds for years; they have vied for control of the military, and the state. Hemedti is best known for his infamous militia then known as the janjaweed, now known as the RSF, which wreaked havoc on Darfur. Whereas Burhan’s military government has been slowly moving Sudan through its transition to civilian authority.
Both Burhan and Hemedti are tied to geopolitical players operating under the Saudi-Emirati axis. The Emiratis and the Saudis likely prefer to deal with Burhan. Still, in a context of fluid and shifting alliances, nothing is inconceivable, as the picture of who supports who remains untidy by design.
In recent months, Hemedti has travelled extensively-- to Israel, South Sudan, Chad and Kenya, in attempts to gain support and forge alliances.
He visited Eritrea in March, almost certainly seeking some form of help from the country’s dictator Isaias Afewerki. But Eritrea had deployed significant resources and manpower in Tigray over the course of the two-year war there; its support for Hemedti, if any, will likely be limited.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, is increasingly well-positioned to return to its past role as regional leader, to provide diplomatic support for a negotiated settlement in Sudan.
Chad is another country to watch. It has stakes in Darfur and its current military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, distrusts Hemedti. The RSF return to Darfur could also aggravate unresolved local conflicts there.
Today’s geopolitics affecting the Horn of Africa can be opportunistic and highly transactional. Regional powers tend to back the likely winner and support the status quo. Foreign actors are likely still hedging their bets in Sudan, before placing their fingers on the scale to tip it one way or the other. But this is not the way to help the people of Sudan.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
Yesterday, 15 April, marked three years of brutal, grinding warfare between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Wholly neglected by a fading international community, many grim landmarks have been passed; another genocide in Darfur, the weaponisation of rape and starvation, another famine, or the desecration of Khartoum, El Fasher, and other major cities. And with no ceasefire or settlement in sight, the war has continued to swell, drawing in each neighbouring African country as tussling Middle Eastern powers grapple for the upper hand-- leaving Sudan in tatters.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Most nights in a number of dimly lit bars in Addis Ababa, one can hear a vibraphone hum over a syncopated bassline. The sprightly rhythm is unmistakably jazz, but the scales are Ethiopian; pentatonic, looping and melodic. Five decades after its pioneering by visionary musician Mulatu Astatke, Ethio-jazz remains in full swing, with its renaissance from the late 1990s persevering despite tough political and cultural conditions.
Over the weekend, a flurry of viral posts on X (formerly Twitter) highly critical of Türkiye by the Ugandan army chief risked tipping the three-way relations between Somalia, Türkiye, and Uganda into a new tailspin. General Muhoozi - the son of Ugandan President Yoweri K. Museveni and the Chief of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) - accused Türkiye of disrespect, threatened to pull troops out of Somalia, and further demanded USD 1 billion in compensation from Ankara. Although the posts were deleted on Sunday, the storm the comments generated has not died down.
The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov: “Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.” In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
In September 2025, Feisal Mohammed Ali was arrested for possession and trading in two rhino horns worth USD 63,000. This was not the first time that this smuggler had seen the bars of a Kenyan prison cell. On 22 July 2016, Feisal - described as an “ivory smuggling kingpin” - received a 20-year prison sentence and fined USD 150,000 for dealing 314 pieces of ivory. Weighing over two tonnes, the ivory was estimated to have come from around 120 elephants. Hailed as a turning point in Kenya’s pioneering crackdown on Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT), Feisal’s incarceration became proof of the country’s commitment to safeguarding its wildlife. This frail pillar came crashing down in August 2018 when Feisal was released following the acquittal of his sentence due to alleged use of tampered evidence by the prosecution.
On Monday, a politician widely regarded as Ankara’s primary proxy in Somalia was inaugurated as a Member of Parliament (MP) under circumstances that Somali citizens and political observers are denouncing as a brazen institutional theft. This unprecedented case of electoral misconduct occurs in the twilight of the current parliament’s mandate, signaling a deep-seated crisis in legislative integrity.
The sparks from the Middle East's conflagration have set Ethiopia's laboured fuel industry ablaze, and the country is grinding to a halt. Ongoing geopolitical and fiscal shocks emanating from the US/Israel war with Iran—and the spill-over across the Gulf—have left few regions untouched. With no satisfactory end in sight, the decades-old—if creaking—US-underpinned security architectThe sparks from the Middle East's conflagration have set Ethiopia's laboured fuel industry ablaze, and the country is grinding to a halt. Ongoing geopolitical and fiscal shocks emanating from the US/Israel war with Iran—and the spill-over across the Gulf—have left few regions untouched. With no satisfactory end in sight, the decades-old—if creaking—US-underpinned security architecture in the Middle East has been upended, as have the globalised hydrocarbon networks that long served as the financial lifeblood of energy-importing states.