An Ethiopian minority calls for international justice
A minority within a minority state is calling for greater recognition and protection following the stuttering conclusion of the brutal Tigray war. The Kunama, a minority faction in the Tigray-- region, the population of which comprises just 6% of Ethiopia’s population-- has been endangered by the armed conflict that broke out in November 2020. The indigenous Kunama are primarily situated around the Gash and Setit rivers on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, particularly in the areas of Adi Goshu, Sheraro and Adyabo in Western Tigray. Practising both Islam and Christianity, the Kunama speak a Nilo-Saharan language and, in contrast with the majority of Tigrinya-speaking Tigrayans, live in a matriarchal society. With an estimated 10,000 members or 0.002% of Tigray’s and 0.00009% of Ethiopia’s population, the Kunama are under particular threat following the large-scale atrocities and devastation of the last two years.
Unless significant efforts are undertaken to protect minorities like the Kunama by leaders in dominant ethnic groups, minorities often suffer from chronic neglect, oppression, and under-representation. By acknowledging these groups' needs for specific protection and, in turn, implementing international law, including the United Nations Minorities Declaration for protecting minorities, the degree of marginalisation they experience can be lessened.
Ahmed, a young ethnic Kunama who left Tigray in January 2020, spoke about the difficulties he faced as a child in a minority group in Ethiopia. "We weren't taught in our language growing up…. The majority of our peers were Tigrinya-speaking. I started school at 9 years old, and I didn’t understand a thing. One day, I was in pain in class, I put my hand up to tell the teacher, and I couldn’t even communicate it. With this limitation, we couldn’t understand important matters taught at school that would help us contribute to society at a later date. This systematically keeps the minority’s standard and level of education low.”
Ethnic minorities in Tigray have repeatedly called for the right to study in their own language, alongside the national languages of Tigrinya and Amharic, a call eventually answered by the TPLF administration. This led to a better standard of education for the Kunama, which had continued to improve until conflict broke out in November 2020.
Tigray’s geographic proximity to Eritrea has made its minorities particularly susceptible to harm since the 1998-2000 Badme border war; that war caused extensive destruction, and included extrajudicial killing, looting of livestock and enforced disappearance. The more recent conflict saw these atrocities occur on a far more devastating scale.
The Kunama were attacked by a combination of forces, including Amhara Special Forces, Fano militia, Eritrean forces, and Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), who all committed numerous atrocities. Kunama women were made victims of conflict-related sexual violence, houses in Sheraro were systematically burnt, and civilians were slaughtered with machetes. Kunama community leaders who fled to Sudan said two of their representatives from Adebay, Chekol Abasa and Tesfay Ramadan, were forcibly disappeared, reportedly taken in November 2020 and not heard from since.
Since the Pretoria Agreement and following considerable pressure from the international community, particularly the US, the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE) has agreed to assemble a comprehensive transitional justice mechanism. This mechanism, in theory, would address the significant and wide-reaching issues of justice and accountability for all victims and survivors of the brutal war in Tigray.
Members of the Kunama community have expressed their views on possible justice in Tigray. Ahmed said, “Let alone justice mechanisms, the areas in Tigray that are traditionally inhabited by the Kunama are still occupied by forces that are against the peace agreement, namely, Amhara special forces, Fano militia and also Eritrean intelligence.” Returning refugees and internally displaced persons are included in the Pretoria Agreement, but with Eritrean and Amhara forces still occupying parts of Western Tigray meeting their needs remains impossible. Refugees like Ahmed explain that the marked lack of safety and security in communities in Tigray continues to prevent a return home for many.
In relation to a transitional justice process, there is a widespread belief among the Kunama refugees in Sudan that the FGE cannot deliver real justice. They perceive the FGE and the ENDF as perpetrators of the violence against their people. Therefore, for them, an international mechanism is paramount to bring legitimacy to any transitional justice process in the post-conflict environment.
Minorities are often among the most marginalised communities in states; this is particularly true in Ethiopia. They are often excluded from participation in socio‐economic life and rarely have access to political power due to the systemic oppression they face. Minority issues are often excluded from the priorities of administrators, who instead focus on the priorities and needs of the majority. In an extreme humanitarian catastrophe as now in Tigray, minorities like the Kunama can easily be overlooked by their regional leaders as well as the FGE.
Despite the federal government’s resistance to external investigations, it is vital for the Kunama to be heard and included in the justice system, particularly in the transitional justice process in Tigray. An independent, international mechanism like the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE), is necessary and critical for minority communities affected by the conflict to move forward. These mechanisms must be supported and empowered to act, and their human rights experts must have unhindered access to investigate the extent of the abuses that took place, in all communities.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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