Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Great Destabiliser
In November 2022, the Ethiopian government and the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a “permanent cessation of hostilities” agreement in Pretoria, ending the two-year conflict in the north that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. The agreement took place as Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), together with Eritrean troops and militias from the Amhara region, was once again advancing on Tigray. The Eritrean forces, despite having played a key role in the conflict, and being accused of appalling human rights violations, were not mentioned in the agreement. Since then, they have failed to withdraw their troops from Tigray; to this day they continue to commit atrocities against the Tigrayan people.
This is no secret. Eritrean soldiers have been photographed looting and killing civilians. There are reports of Amhara militias receiving military training in Eritrea. The continued presence of Amhara forces, supported by Eritrea, in Western Tigray has raised serious concerns about the extent of Eritrea’s involvement in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.
The contested part of Western Tigray is a rich agricultural area. The newly appointed President of Tigray’s regional interim administration, Getachew Reda, told TigraiTV that, “Western Tigray, Southern Tigray, as well as Tselemti, which is part of North-western Tigray, are not only under occupation but also witnessing the continuation of genocidal crimes and displacement of civilians.”
Welkait in Western Tigray was extra-constitutionally annexed by the Amhara regional state, with military support from Eritrea during the war in Tigray. Amhara leaders justified this action, and the removal of Tigrayan residents from the area, by arguing the land had been illegally subsumed by Tigray following the collapse of the Dergue. Welkait, which shares a border with Eritrea and the Amhara region, has been a historically contested area.
But the relationship between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and Eritrea has soured since the signing of the Pretoria agreement. Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, once the heart of a tripartite alliance with Somalia, have in the past 6 months reportedly ceased direct communications with one another. Eritrea has also been ignoring requests made by Ethiopia to fully withdraw from Tigray and has continued to overtly support Amhara militias and special forces.
Last week Abiy announced that all regional forces in Ethiopia are to be disarmed and integrated into the federal army or police force. The current protests are an indication that the Amhara public, as well as the special forces, as well as the fano militia, are rejecting the Prime Minister’s plan. The protests have been marred by violence. Attempts to forcibly disarm Amhara militia are likely to further escalate this violence.
Moreover, reports over the past two years have described some Amhara militias and special forces trained by Eritrea as hyper-nationalists. These may include new recruits, soldiers, and senior leaders, and may well form an armed opposition to the ENDF. The Amhara special forces have been allied with Asmara for much of the war in Tigray, and their relationship remains strong.
A high-level Eritrean military delegation visited Addis Ababa two days before Abiy’s announcement to dismantle regional forces. As an ostensible gesture of continued goodwill between the two countries, both sides engaged in superficial diplomacy. The absence of Abiy Ahmed’s presence was not mentioned, nor were there any meetings with high-level Ethiopian army commanders. Sources privy to the meetings reported that the Eritrean delegation advised against the demobilisation of the Amhara special forces and pressed for the TPLF to be dissolved.
Eritrea has no constitution, parliament, or independent judiciary. The United Nations has accused Eritrea of committing crimes against humanity against its own peoples, and war crimes during the conflict in northern Ethiopia. Asmara’s current involvement with Amhara militias and special forces and its continued presence in parts of Tigray show that it is not yet done meddling in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. Asmara’s destabilising influence should not be underestimated, nor should its ability to derail peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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