Issue No. 165

Amhara unrest and the pitfalls of disarming federal states 

Plans by the Ethiopian federal government to demobilise the Amhara Special Forces (ASF) has triggered large-scale violent unrest in northern Ethiopia’s Amhara Region – by some accounts the worst in 5 years. Protests have spread to nearly all major cities in the region. Catholic Relief Services has reported that two aid workers have died in the unrest. Angry residents of towns and villages in the region have barricaded most major roads. Towns like Gondar and Bahir Dar are deserted. There have been reports of multiple heavy clashes between ASF and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) concentrated in the Kobo-Raya area near the border with Tigray. 
 
The ENDF launched an operation to forcibly disarm ASF holdouts on 6 April. ENDF units threw up cordons around ASF camps throughout the region. In most of the camps, ASF units voluntarily surrendered and headed to designated assembly points.
 
ASF holdouts and the ENDF are now engaged on multiple fronts. There is a possibility Fano militia and other groups might join the ‘resistance camp,’ a development that would likely to worsen the situation. 
 
The first clash occurred in the town of Gobeye. ASF who were summoned from Kobo, Waja and southern Tigray refused to give up their arms and started firing on the ENDF. In response, the ENDF started firing back; more than 6 people were killed. The ENDF did manage to disarm the ASF in Gobeye, and things are now more or less stable there. 
 
Other fighting occurred near Debre Tabor. The ENDF tried to enter into an ASF camp near the town and disarm its fighters. But they refused to cooperate and there was a standoff; this temporarily closed the Bahir Dar-Gonder road. After negotiations, the ASF fighters finally agreed to surrender their arms. Some have reported more than 100 ASF  have deserted and joined Fano.
 
Fighting has been at its most intense in the vicinity of Kobo.  A division of the ASF has refused to give up arms near Gondar. At the same time, a faction of the ASF positioned in Lalibela and Sekota mutinied. The ENDF is moving into the area and senior regional leadership is trying to negotiate with them.
 
That a crisis was looming in the Amhara Region has been evident. That it would take a violent turn was predictable. The alliance between the Amhara and the Oromo (referred to as OROMARA) that underpinned Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s coalition had been under strain for over a year over a host of issues. It collapsed entirely following the peace deal signed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopia federal government in Pretoria in November 2022. Abiy made relations worse when he failed to endorse the Amhara state’s territorial claim to Western Tigray. In comments Abiymade to parliament earlier this year, he called for dialogue between the two sides, and hinted that parliament may ultimately be required to arbitrate the dispute. 
 
The Prime Minister also ordered the arrest of 1000s of Fano militia and their leaders, further inflaming tensions in Amhara. Attempts to mend relations and talks in Addis Ababa, Bahir Dar and Adama failed to bring Amhara and Oromoelites to common ground. In retaliation, the Amhara Region cut off its supply of teff (a grain that makes the national dishinjera).
 
In recent weeks, the Ethiopian government has been drip-feeding the media about alleged plots to destabilise the country,including Fano militia seeking to infiltrate Addis to carry out assassinations of high-level officials. Check-points now dotthe perimeter of  the city. There is heavy police and army presence on the main roads leading to the capital. Prominent Amhara journalists and academics have been arrested. The consistent message from Addis Ababa is now that the Amhara state constitutes a threat to the federal government. This seems to be aimed at preparing the public psychologically for some type of Tigray War-style ‘law enforcement operation’ in Amhara.
 
The disarmament of the Amhara is popular outside the region. The Oromo and Tigrayans, especially, are likely to relish this moment. Amhara forces have been Abiy’s most violent and zealous enforcers – blamed for many of the atrocities committed in Oromia and Tigray. 
 
The Prime Minister’s push to demobilise ethnic forces and integrate them into the national army may be well-intentioned,but the speed, scale and timing at which it is taking place is certainly questionable. There is reason to believe this could stoke even more tension and instability. Worse, it could foment wider insecurity. 
 
Abiy’s recentralisation agenda is not in doubt. Dismantling statutory and non-statutory ethnic state forces is designed to restore the central government’s monopoly on lethal military force. But there is a flaw in the logic: weakening the periphery does not automatically translate into a strong centre. More crucially, it is not necessarily a ticket to peace and stability. In the absence of local and national political settlements, territorial and resource contests and conflict can become militarised. There are always enough AK47 rifles, ammunition and RPGs to start the next insurrection. Some regional forces are much needed. In the Somali Regional State, the paramilitary special forces, the Liyu, have been instrumental in protecting the region from Al-Shabaab. At a time when Al-Shabaab is building cross-border structures, disarmament of the Liyu could prove disastrous for security.
 
For a country like Ethiopia, two-tier security, with a strong national army and police and robust and well-armed regionalforces, is preferable to the one Abiy envisions. Abiy seems to be going for the quick fix, again. 
 
Well-planned and coordinated disarmament conducted as part of a broader national political settlement is fine. An incoherent, disjointed and rushed process of demobilisation and disarmament will only lead to more problems for Ethiopia.

By the Ethiopian Cable team