Issue No. 164

Published 06 Apr 2023

Tigray’s Un-development and the Cost of Recovery

Published on 06 Apr 2023 16:46 min

Tigray’s Un-development and the Cost of Recovery

Transportation and communication have resumed in large parts of Tigray, and the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement is slowly moving forward.  As Tigray opens, more information is beginning to emerge about the impact of the war on the region’s infrastructure, and the sheer number of resources that will be required for recovery and reconstruction. Estimating the exact cost of recovery is difficult. Nevertheless, publicly available data and costing can give a rough picture of the sizable need, and the level at which Tigray’s development was recently reversed.
 
Between November 2020 and November 2022, allied Ethiopian and Eritrean forces pillaged and destroyed a vast proportion of Tigray’s infrastructure. In addition to homes destroyed, armed forces targeted schools, universities, factories, health facilities, government buildings, agricultural centers, and water, energy, and transportation infrastructure. A recent assessment by the Ministry of Water and Energy in January 2023 found that 75% of motorized and 71% of non-motorized water infrastructure was damaged, leaving 3.5 million people still without sustainable access to clean water. This has left the region with access to water at levels comparable to the 1990s, with remaining functional boreholes suffering from over-use and close to collapsing. 
 
Also returned to its pre-2000s state is Tigray’s health system. A 2022 assessment by Mekelle University found more than 80% of health facilities, 76% of health posts, and 50% of health centers were damaged. Invading forces looted or deliberately destroyed medical equipment, including ultrasound machines and monitors. Based on reporting from UNICEF, MSF, and the ICRC, most all ambulances found in the eastern, central, and north-western zones of Tigray were taken by armed forces. The WHO has said that this destruction, in addition to damage caused by the war’s expansion into the Amhara and Afar regions, has left close to six million in need of basic health services at the end of 2022. 
 
In late 2021, the Ethiopian Ministry of Education reported that 7,000 schools had been damaged or destroyed during fighting to date. The UN said this month that 80% of Tigrayan schools were either partially or severely damaged during the conflict. Nearly 1.4 million children lost out on their education while hostilities were ongoing, and 3.6 million children are currently receiving emergency education assistance.  
 
Perhaps most striking is the deliberate damage that was inflicted on Tigray’s economic infrastructure. The bombing of a section of the Tekeze Dam between Amhara and Tigray, a major source of electric power, left its energy production at half capacity. Major business institutions, like large manufacturing plants, were either damaged, destroyed, or rendered non-functional by armed forces. The Addis Pharmaceutical Factory in Adigrat, which had met 70% of the national demand for medicines, was looted and destroyed during the early months of the war. 
 
Many of the factories damaged belonged to EFFORT, a party conglomerate that arose from early TPLF earnings but later disconnected from state control. A member of EFFORT’s senior management told the Addis Standard that during the war, factories of Almeda Textile PLC, Saba Stone, Ezana Mining Development PLC, and Sheba Leather Industry PLC were razed, their machinery removed and their buildings bombed or burned. Most other EFFORT subsidiary factories were looted or damaged. 
 
These factories provided tens of thousands of jobs, representing hundreds of thousands of family members left without a reliable source of income. The Government of Ethiopia admitted to destroying manufacturing and industrial facilities in aerial bombardments, on the grounds that they allegedly supported the TDF in the war. 
 
In early 2022, experts were already estimating the financial requirement for reconstruction in billions of US dollars. Already in March 2021, a Tigray interim official said 100 million birrs (USD 1.85 million) would be needed to repair EFFORT companies alone. 2023 estimates reported by the French development agency, Agence Française de Développement, place the cost of repairing Tigray’s energy infrastructure at five billion birrs (USD 90 million). The Ethiopian government has said the region’s water infrastructure will require another five billion birr. 
 
The UN claims meeting humanitarian needs in education, agriculture, and health services is expected to require USD 161.4 million, 276.5 million, and 303.5 million, respectively, in 2023 alone. In late 2022, Ethiopia’s Ministries of Health and Education drew up a plan costed at USD 3.6 billion (194 billion birrs) to repair health and education infrastructure in 6 conflict-affected regions. 
 
These numbers seem nearly insurmountable. Before the last phase of the war, the federal government had already estimated the cost of recovery from ongoing conflicts in Tigray, Afar, Amhara, and Oromia at USD 2.5 billion. To put this in perspective, Ethiopia received USD 4.68 billion in official development assistance in 2019 for the entire country. The UN places the cost of meeting humanitarian needs for 2023, across the country, which will require roughly USD 4 billion. 
 
The federal government recently committed 5 billion birrs (USD 90 million) to the reconstruction of schools, health facilities, and other infrastructure in the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray regions. It is now looking to international partners to provide the funding to rebuild the country. While Ethiopia signed a USD 300 million contract with the World Bank for recovery efforts in late 2022, it still needs to make genuine progress against its peace agenda if it wishes to see more meaningful contributions in the near future.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Scroll