Tigray’s Un-development and the Cost of Recovery
Transportation and communication have resumed in large parts of Tigray, and the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement is slowly moving forward. As Tigray opens, more information is beginning to emerge about the impact of the war on the region’s infrastructure, and the sheer number of resources that will be required for recovery and reconstruction. Estimating the exact cost of recovery is difficult. Nevertheless, publicly available data and costing can give a rough picture of the sizable need, and the level at which Tigray’s development was recently reversed.
Between November 2020 and November 2022, allied Ethiopian and Eritrean forces pillaged and destroyed a vast proportion of Tigray’s infrastructure. In addition to homes destroyed, armed forces targeted schools, universities, factories, health facilities, government buildings, agricultural centers, and water, energy, and transportation infrastructure. A recent assessment by the Ministry of Water and Energy in January 2023 found that 75% of motorized and 71% of non-motorized water infrastructure was damaged, leaving 3.5 million people still without sustainable access to clean water. This has left the region with access to water at levels comparable to the 1990s, with remaining functional boreholes suffering from over-use and close to collapsing.
Also returned to its pre-2000s state is Tigray’s health system. A 2022 assessment by Mekelle University found more than 80% of health facilities, 76% of health posts, and 50% of health centers were damaged. Invading forces looted or deliberately destroyed medical equipment, including ultrasound machines and monitors. Based on reporting from UNICEF, MSF, and the ICRC, most all ambulances found in the eastern, central, and north-western zones of Tigray were taken by armed forces. The WHO has said that this destruction, in addition to damage caused by the war’s expansion into the Amhara and Afar regions, has left close to six million in need of basic health services at the end of 2022.
In late 2021, the Ethiopian Ministry of Education reported that 7,000 schools had been damaged or destroyed during fighting to date. The UN said this month that 80% of Tigrayan schools were either partially or severely damaged during the conflict. Nearly 1.4 million children lost out on their education while hostilities were ongoing, and 3.6 million children are currently receiving emergency education assistance.
Perhaps most striking is the deliberate damage that was inflicted on Tigray’s economic infrastructure. The bombing of a section of the Tekeze Dam between Amhara and Tigray, a major source of electric power, left its energy production at half capacity. Major business institutions, like large manufacturing plants, were either damaged, destroyed, or rendered non-functional by armed forces. The Addis Pharmaceutical Factory in Adigrat, which had met 70% of the national demand for medicines, was looted and destroyed during the early months of the war.
Many of the factories damaged belonged to EFFORT, a party conglomerate that arose from early TPLF earnings but later disconnected from state control. A member of EFFORT’s senior management told the Addis Standard that during the war, factories of Almeda Textile PLC, Saba Stone, Ezana Mining Development PLC, and Sheba Leather Industry PLC were razed, their machinery removed and their buildings bombed or burned. Most other EFFORT subsidiary factories were looted or damaged.
These factories provided tens of thousands of jobs, representing hundreds of thousands of family members left without a reliable source of income. The Government of Ethiopia admitted to destroying manufacturing and industrial facilities in aerial bombardments, on the grounds that they allegedly supported the TDF in the war.
In early 2022, experts were already estimating the financial requirement for reconstruction in billions of US dollars. Already in March 2021, a Tigray interim official said 100 million birrs (USD 1.85 million) would be needed to repair EFFORT companies alone. 2023 estimates reported by the French development agency, Agence Française de Développement, place the cost of repairing Tigray’s energy infrastructure at five billion birrs (USD 90 million). The Ethiopian government has said the region’s water infrastructure will require another five billion birr.
The UN claims meeting humanitarian needs in education, agriculture, and health services is expected to require USD 161.4 million, 276.5 million, and 303.5 million, respectively, in 2023 alone. In late 2022, Ethiopia’s Ministries of Health and Education drew up a plan costed at USD 3.6 billion (194 billion birrs) to repair health and education infrastructure in 6 conflict-affected regions.
These numbers seem nearly insurmountable. Before the last phase of the war, the federal government had already estimated the cost of recovery from ongoing conflicts in Tigray, Afar, Amhara, and Oromia at USD 2.5 billion. To put this in perspective, Ethiopia received USD 4.68 billion in official development assistance in 2019 for the entire country. The UN places the cost of meeting humanitarian needs for 2023, across the country, which will require roughly USD 4 billion.
The federal government recently committed 5 billion birrs (USD 90 million) to the reconstruction of schools, health facilities, and other infrastructure in the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray regions. It is now looking to international partners to provide the funding to rebuild the country. While Ethiopia signed a USD 300 million contract with the World Bank for recovery efforts in late 2022, it still needs to make genuine progress against its peace agenda if it wishes to see more meaningful contributions in the near future.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.
Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.