The dilemma of transitional justice in Ethiopia
The peace agreement signed by the Ethiopian government and leaders of Tigray calls for transitional justice. The accord says that “the government of Ethiopia shall implement a comprehensive national transitional justice policy aimed at accountability, ascertaining the truth, redress for victims, reconciliation, and healing, consistent with the Constitution of FDRE [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework.”
Following on this, the Government of Ethiopia released a draft “Policy Options for Transitional Justice in Ethiopia” in January of this year. The purpose of this draft policy document is to invite feedback from stakeholders. While some see the draft as an important first step in national ownership of the process, others have serious reservations about the government’s commitment to transitional justice considering its unbending allegiance to federal sovereignty.
The policy document has three sections. The first examines the history of transitional justice in Ethiopia and its relevance to the current situation. The second analyzes options for institutional mechanisms to administer transitional justice. And the third proposes a range of institutional mechanisms for transitional justice specifically in Ethiopia. Each section includes reasonable arguments on the strengths and the risks of various options.
But a careful reading of the narrative reveals inherent biases and exposes the likely direction the federal government will take to achieve transitional justice. The authors of this document, under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, provide readers with enough of a road map to ascertain the government’s real intentions.
Although the draft document is replete with markers, there are three specific paragraphs that most clearly reveal the government’s position. The first, and most important, pertains to management of the transitional justice process. The document is unambiguous on this. “A transitional justice process is essentially a national process; it should be conceptualized, promoted, and led by domestic institutions and stakeholders. Only such method will ultimately guarantee a sustainable foundation for rule of law and institutional building in a country. Moreover, its adherence to and recognition of the principle of sovereignty makes the pursuit of any such process a matter of national dignity.” Yet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights calls this document a first step towards a locally owned transitional justice initiative.
If there is still confusion after the previous paragraph about the direction the federal government plans to take, this next paragraph clarifies that. “Ethiopia is not a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Moreover, other options availed by the international system are neither desirable nor feasible. The only rational alternative is to promote the adjudication of the crimes using domestic courts - with a caveat attached in terms of institutional reform; this includes the assignment of judges for this specific process, the establishment of a dedicated bench or court and the provision of training to judges and their assistants.”
During the war in Tigray, when some in the international community attempted to call out the Ethiopian government, naming war crimes and crimes against humanity, Addis waged a successful campaign to convince African states to claim western interference as an affront to its sovereignty. But now internationals are commending Ethiopia for a “locally owned process.”
There is one final paragraph that should be considered; it pertains to the temporal scope of transitional justice. “This does not… imply that a recent time frame should be selected which ignores serious human rights violations of the past - since such approach will then hamper the overall objective and effectiveness of transitional justice. The point is that in any setting, the temporal scope of the process must be determined carefully, and in Ethiopia, this should be pursued based on particularities of the national setting.” If there is any confusion about who will be put under the microscope, the policy document states that current problems began in 1991.
It therefore becomes clear in reading the draft “Policy Options for Transitional Justice in Ethiopia” not only who the federal government expects will carry out transitional justice in the country-- its own courts, not an international tribunal, it is well implied that those in power before Prime Minister Abiy’s administration-- the EPRDF coalition, and most specifically the TPLF in leading that coalition, could also be put on trial. Recent human rights violations by Ethiopian federal forces and their allies in Tigray could be sidelined in the midst of historical debate covering decades of accusations. Does this really make sense in the immediate aftermath of two years of armed conflict and horrific atrocities? Will the fox really be allowed to guard the hen house?
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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