The dilemma of transitional justice in Ethiopia
The peace agreement signed by the Ethiopian government and leaders of Tigray calls for transitional justice. The accord says that “the government of Ethiopia shall implement a comprehensive national transitional justice policy aimed at accountability, ascertaining the truth, redress for victims, reconciliation, and healing, consistent with the Constitution of FDRE [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework.”
Following on this, the Government of Ethiopia released a draft “Policy Options for Transitional Justice in Ethiopia” in January of this year. The purpose of this draft policy document is to invite feedback from stakeholders. While some see the draft as an important first step in national ownership of the process, others have serious reservations about the government’s commitment to transitional justice considering its unbending allegiance to federal sovereignty.
The policy document has three sections. The first examines the history of transitional justice in Ethiopia and its relevance to the current situation. The second analyzes options for institutional mechanisms to administer transitional justice. And the third proposes a range of institutional mechanisms for transitional justice specifically in Ethiopia. Each section includes reasonable arguments on the strengths and the risks of various options.
But a careful reading of the narrative reveals inherent biases and exposes the likely direction the federal government will take to achieve transitional justice. The authors of this document, under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, provide readers with enough of a road map to ascertain the government’s real intentions.
Although the draft document is replete with markers, there are three specific paragraphs that most clearly reveal the government’s position. The first, and most important, pertains to management of the transitional justice process. The document is unambiguous on this. “A transitional justice process is essentially a national process; it should be conceptualized, promoted, and led by domestic institutions and stakeholders. Only such method will ultimately guarantee a sustainable foundation for rule of law and institutional building in a country. Moreover, its adherence to and recognition of the principle of sovereignty makes the pursuit of any such process a matter of national dignity.” Yet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights calls this document a first step towards a locally owned transitional justice initiative.
If there is still confusion after the previous paragraph about the direction the federal government plans to take, this next paragraph clarifies that. “Ethiopia is not a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Moreover, other options availed by the international system are neither desirable nor feasible. The only rational alternative is to promote the adjudication of the crimes using domestic courts - with a caveat attached in terms of institutional reform; this includes the assignment of judges for this specific process, the establishment of a dedicated bench or court and the provision of training to judges and their assistants.”
During the war in Tigray, when some in the international community attempted to call out the Ethiopian government, naming war crimes and crimes against humanity, Addis waged a successful campaign to convince African states to claim western interference as an affront to its sovereignty. But now internationals are commending Ethiopia for a “locally owned process.”
There is one final paragraph that should be considered; it pertains to the temporal scope of transitional justice. “This does not… imply that a recent time frame should be selected which ignores serious human rights violations of the past - since such approach will then hamper the overall objective and effectiveness of transitional justice. The point is that in any setting, the temporal scope of the process must be determined carefully, and in Ethiopia, this should be pursued based on particularities of the national setting.” If there is any confusion about who will be put under the microscope, the policy document states that current problems began in 1991.
It therefore becomes clear in reading the draft “Policy Options for Transitional Justice in Ethiopia” not only who the federal government expects will carry out transitional justice in the country-- its own courts, not an international tribunal, it is well implied that those in power before Prime Minister Abiy’s administration-- the EPRDF coalition, and most specifically the TPLF in leading that coalition, could also be put on trial. Recent human rights violations by Ethiopian federal forces and their allies in Tigray could be sidelined in the midst of historical debate covering decades of accusations. Does this really make sense in the immediate aftermath of two years of armed conflict and horrific atrocities? Will the fox really be allowed to guard the hen house?
By the Ethiopian Cable team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.
On 5 September, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro arrived in the United States for an informal working visit designed to launch a new diplomatic push to cement Hargeisa's rising geopolitical profile. Monitored closely both regionally and internationally, the high-stakes trip carries immense domestic expectations. It represents an ambitious diplomatic outreach by Hargeisa to Washington, capitalising on the momentum generated by Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. However, translating this sudden diplomatic visibility into tangible strategic prospects remains a formidable challenge.
Turkey yesterday crossed a perilous threshold in Somalia when it used its military air assets not for counterterrorism purposes but as a partisan tool in local Somali political warfare.
The Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) strategy to assert central authority over federal states and enforce its brand of limited plebiscite – the so-called “one-person-one-vote” (OPOV) – appears to be going awry.
Delegates from Somalia's influential Darood clan family are currently gathering in Nairobi, Kenya, for a crucial "pre-conference" planning session. Driven largely by clan chiefs, the meeting is designed to formulate a unified strategy and coordinate responses to ‘fundamental issues’ (arrimo masiiri ah) within Somalia, principally centre-periphery tensions and the future of federalism. The anticipated culmination of these talks is a comprehensive Pan-Darood congress in Garowe. This development represents a rare and significant intervention, serving as a clear indicator of accelerating political polarisation and fragmentation.