Transformation and Transition in Tigray
Since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) has surrendered its big guns and federal forces have resumed operations in the region. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in violence, improvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and progress in restoring public services.
These are essentially corrective measures designed to arrest the dynamics of conflict. The establishment of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) with Getachew Reda as its president is a forward-looking step that signals the beginning of rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Ethiopian prime minister has appointed Getachew Reda as president of the Tigray IRA and granted him full authority to form an inclusive regional government to administer the region.
When the Pretoria Agreement was signed, Tigrayan youth, diaspora supporters, and some TDF leadership viewed it as a capitulation by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Many publicly expressed disapproval of the agreement as a preemptive act that obviated a military victory. Some even accused the TPLF of signing the agreement simply to ensure its own political survival.
Five months later, the ceasefire is holding. The skeptics now see positive signs emerging and have decided to use the opportunity to push their priorities within the framework of the agreement rather than trying to undermine it. Tigray seems to be turning a corner after two years of death and destruction.
The election of Getachew Reda as president of the Tigray IRA signifies the beginning of a much-needed political transformation in Tigray. The TPLF, unpopular among Tigray’s youth two years ago, was given a new lease on life by a war many Tigrayans saw as an attack on Tigray, Tigrayans, and Tigrayan identity. Acknowledging that the TPLF was more experienced than any other group to organize resistance against the existential threat they faced, Tigrayans coalesced behind the party. The TDF then engineered the astonishing military feat by mobilizing and ejecting Ethiopian and Eritrean forces out of Tigray.
Following Pretoria, the TPLF’s legitimacy rapidly declined. Calls for changing its old guard grew louder and more forceful. The TPLF was faced with a choice-- to yield or risk Tigrayan fragmentation. Senior party officials who had been insisting on the lion’s share of representation in the IRA wisely chose to yield, acquiescing to Getachew’s accession to the presidency of the regional government.
PM Abiy Ahmed has approved Getachew's appointment as interim leader of the Tigrayan administration. Getachew is a member of the TPLF Executive Committee, was the ubiquitous spokesperson of the Tigray resistance, as well as the principal negotiator and signatory of the Pretoria Agreement,
Getachew Reda is considered a transient figure whose election indicates a political transition. He is not a fresh face by any means. That distinction would have belonged to the runner-up, Dr. Fiseha Habtesion, if he hadn’t lost by just one vote. Yet Getachew doesn’t come from the TPLF’s old guard either. He is more urbane, erudite, and cosmopolitan, someone who can relate to Tigray’s youth and respond to their aspirations. At the same time, as the ubiquitous spokesperson of the Tigray resistance, principal negotiator, and signatory of the Pretoria Agreement, he also represents continuity. A familiar face to the international community, Getachew was effectively endorsed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his 20 March 2023 press briefing when he went out of his way to recognize Getachew’s election as a fait accompli.
As the interim president, Getachew represents a new generation of Tigrayan leaders, contrasting with the TPLF stalwarts who many non-Tigrayans view as introverted, parochial, and resistant to change. With Getachew as the face of the Tigray transition, the negative campaign of blaming the TPLF for everything that’s wrong in Ethiopia over the past 5 years will likely dissipate. This removes the excuse invoked by non-Tigrayan Ethiopians not to engage Tigrayans and paves the way for all Ethiopians to work together for the birth of a new nation.
There are of course obstacles to the full implementation of the peace agreement and return to normalcy in Tigray. Western Tigray, which is constitutionally a part of Tigray and, according to the Pretoria Agreement, should revert back to Tigray, is still occupied by Amhara forces. All indications are that Amhara officials will not leave this region without a fight.
And there is no guarantee that the Prime Minister will remain loyal to the Pretoria agreement. His goal in signing it was likely to engage in the familiar politics of triangulation, to forge a temporary alliance with Mekelle to counterbalance the threat to his power posed by the Asmara-Amhara dyad. Addis Ababa’s unreliability renders the current agreement precarious.
Tigray can return to sustainable peace only if the rest of Ethiopia is also at peace. The Tigray war was waged to defend Tigray’s constitutional rights. The war in Oromia is being fought for the same cause. A peaceful settlement based on the same rationale of restoring constitutional rule and procedures would potentially end the war in Oromia. But there is as yet no evidence that the federal government is interested in building on the momentum for peace the Pretoria agreement has generated.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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