Issue No. 159

Al-Shabaab: Transnational threat requiring a transnational solution
 

The leaders of Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti recently joined forces in a regional partnership to defeat Al-Shabaab. On 1 February,  leaders of the four countries agreed to execute a military campaign across southern and central Somalia. They also agreed to send an undisclosed number of additional troops outside of the African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS). Dubbed Operation Black Lion, the precise details of the collaboration between the four countries are not yet known. What is known is that Ethiopia is the only country to have already started deployment, having sent more troops into Somalia on 6 March.
 
The announcement of this regional ‘search and destroy’ operation against Al-Shabaab comes over one year after Somali President Hassan Sheikh declared “total war” on the terrorist group. The first phase began in August of last year with an offensive in southern and central Somalia. The offensive seems to have decreased in intensity over the past month. When asked about this in an interview with VOA's Somali Service on 1 March, National Security Adviser to the President, Hussein Sheikh-Ali reassured listeners, saying: "It is the calm before the storm… We are preparing the second phase … and with the support of the extra non-ATMIS forces from our neighbouring countries joining the fight, it is planning time, that's why it looks quiet." 
 
It is natural for Ethiopia to want to take the lead in attacking Al-Shabaab forces, having suffered from its first cross-border attack by the group in July of last year. In a large-scale attack, which lasted several days, an estimated 2,500 Al-Shabaab fighters struck Ethiopian border posts, and up to 1,500 militants are believed to have entered and remained in the country. The attacks were planned inside Somalia and Al-Shabaab operatives in Ethiopia remain dependent on the command structure in Somalia. It makes sense, then, to hit Al-Shabaab in its stronghold. At the same time, it seems ill-advised for Ethiopia to concentrate on Al-Shabaab in Somalia while the insurgents are simultaneously establishing a base inside Ethiopia’s borders. 
 
The July incursion allowed Al-Shabaab to break through the Ethiopian cordon. Despite government claims that Al-Shabaab was defeated, local reports indicate that the group succeeded in fulfilling its long-held goal of breaking into Oromia. Al-Shabaab forces broke through into Bale, which shares a long border with the Afdheer zone of the Somali Regional State (SRS) of Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab also strengthened and expanded its presence in several areas of the SRS, including Afdheer, parts of Waardheer, Gode, Shabelle, and the Dawa-Liban zones bordering Kenya.  
 
Al-Shabaab’s efforts to establish a physical base in the eastern and southeastern parts of Ethiopia do not mean that the group is content to remain on the periphery of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government announced a string of arrests of Al-Shabaab operatives at different times last year. Al-Shabaab suspects reportedly planned to attack hotels, religious festivities, and public gathering places in Addis Ababa, and areas of Oromia and the SRS. 
 
The current absence of the announced additional Kenyan and Djiboutian forces, however, casts doubt on the level of planning that has gone into the movement of Ethiopian troops. In an interview with VOA earlier in March, Security and Political Analyst Matt Bryden said that "counterinsurgency operations should be intelligence-led, with clearly defined objectives such as dismantling specific Al-Shabaab bases and neutralizing high-value jihadist leaders." 
 
The success of Ethiopia’s current engagement with Somali security forces depends on the availability of troops to secure newly recovered territory. Recent losses of liberated territories in central Somalia suggest that Somalia does not yet have the necessary troops. This could require Ethiopia’s commitment until the end of 2024, when ATMIS is projected to leave Somalia, or even beyond if Al-Shabaab has not been defeated by that time. 
 
While Ethiopia has begun its deployment of additional troops inside Somalia, Al-Shabaab troop movements indicate that the group has been planning its own second offensive into Ethiopia. In the past few months Al-Shabaab fighters, and IEDs, have been moved to border areas, and senior Al-Shabaab leaders have met several times since November 2022 to discuss a second phase of their attack on Ethiopia. On 18 March, Al-Shabaab claimed to have attacked the Ethiopian base near the Bardheere airport in the Gedo region in Jubaland. 
 
While Ethiopia appears ready to ‘cut the head off the snake’ by sending its troops into Somalia, waging war against Al-Shabaab, this might not be enough. Al-Shabaab is a transnational threat, and counter-terrorism efforts cannot be contingent on the efforts of one single country in one single country. Vanquishing Al-Shabaab requires coordinated and integrated transnational and national responses. 
 
Al-Shabaab’s expansion into Ethiopia, beyond the SRS, shows that the group wishes to establish more than an Islamic Caliphate in ‘Greater Somalia.’  Its disquieting ambition is to reach beyond ethnic Somalis. Al-Shabaab will not be stopped if regional security forces look only to Somalia while ignoring the growing threats in their own countries.