Issue No. 157

 

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken will visit Ethiopia tomorrow, 15 March – the first trip by a high-ranking US official to the country since the peace accord was signed in November 2022. A statement by the US State Department says the aim of the trip is to “discuss implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement to advance peace and promote transitional justice in northern Ethiopia.” It added that he would meet “humanitarian partners and civil society actors to discuss humanitarian assistance delivery, food security, and human rights.” Blinken is also scheduled to meet AU Chair Moussa Mahamat Faki in Addis. It is not clear if he will meet PM Abiy Ahmed, but sources in Addis suggest a meeting between the two is highly likely.
 
The trip by the US Secretary of State comes at an interesting stage in the implementation of the peace accord. Eritrean troops are still present in large pockets of Tigray in defiance of the terms of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). Amhara State forces still occupy Western Tigray – an area the state now claims as its own. Crimes and other predatory conduct associated with these troops continue to be reported daily. These include illegal detention, torture, execution, sexual violence, and looting. In one incident documented by the UN in February 2023, Eritrean soldiers raped 120 women at the village of Kokob Tsibah, then rounded up and killed over two dozen men.
 
The humanitarian situation in Tigray remains dire. Aid agencies warn the region is rapidly slipping into another potentially catastrophic famine-like situation. A large chunk of Tigray is either hard to access or inaccessible to relief organisations. No independent media is allowed into the region. Aid agencies self-sensor or under-report the grim situation to maintain access. In some instances, daily bulletins from OCHA or UNHCR containing crucial data on atrocities are reportedly quickly expunged from records. Since 6 February, aid – mainly food and fuel – has been trickling in, but not enough to cover the massive humanitarian requirements.
 
The Tigray People’s Liberation Army (TPLF) has in the last two months been focused on re-configuring the region's politics to create an interim authority. The aim is to ensure its continuity, survival, and relevance. Its overall response to a messy implementation of the CoHA and continued atrocities has been somewhat muted. TPLF elites are desperate to keep PM Abiy on side, in the process feeding local discontent with the peace process. The TPLF’s posture on accountability for war crimes now seems unsteady and unsure. It is weakened, struggling to control a region now fragmented, partially controlled, and hemmed in by hostile forces. The TPLF’s strength, and its ability to control and impose functional order, and foster cohesion and development, has been badly dented. It is likely to come under intense pressure to govern what is left of Tigray.
 
The Abiy regime’s direction of travel remains inscrutable. The prime minister is at the helm of a feeble and dysfunctional state, and an increasingly conflicted nation. The PM’s alliance has disintegrated. He has no core constituency. The conflict in Oromia is still raging, and there is little interest in Addis to seek a peace settlement. Ethnic cleavages continue to grow; they have even spread to the hallowed bastion of national unity - the Orthodox Church. The economy is on a downward spiral.
 
But Abiy is a skilled tactician. He knows how to play the West and to schmooze foreign dignitaries. Since November, he has been trying to woo western partners. Luck and geography are allies in his quest. Ukraine and the resurgence of big power rivalries in the Horn has made Addis a pivotal capital. Proximity to the African Union and influence over its institutions lend Abiy gravitas, and crucial levers to pull. In recent months, France and Germany have taken the lead in making tentative overtures to normalise relations.
 
Abiy capitalises on the perception that peace is taking hold. The fragility of that peace, and Eritrea’s destabilising role, tends to be ignored. Addis has adroitly out-manoeuvred the West and neutered the UN’s probe on war crimes and crimes against humanity. Addis’ position on using its own judicial system and ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms to achieve accountability is now receiving some international buy-in – including from the US, it would seem.
 
History, geography, and proximity to the AU allow Addis great strategic advantage to impose a victor’s peace on Tigray. Abiy has to date fended off international pressure, outflanked domestic adversaries, and set a course towards some type of international rehabilitation.
 
Blinken is likely harbouring no illusions about Ethiopia and his trip. He knows prospects for the peace agreement are modest at best. Perhaps he hopes that his presence, and the symbolism of the US pushing for progress at such a high-level, will produce benefits that may at least ameliorate what otherwise should be considered an abysmal political and humanitarian situation.
 
Every step toward modifying or changing regime behaviour in Addis has been the outcome of concerted international pressure, sanctions, or threats of sanctions. But that international unity has collapsed. Abiy senses that western commitment to stay tough on Ethiopia is flagging. He sees western vulnerability and insecurity in the current geopolitical climate. Ethiopia, he calculates, is in demand, more than ever, notwithstanding its current crises and fragility. This is the unaccommodating psychological and political terrain US Secretary of State Blinken will find when he lands in Addis Ababa.