Issue No.522

Al-Shabaab won’t be defeated by Magical Thinking
 

In December 2024, the last African Union troops are scheduled to exit Somalia, leaving the nation’s security firmly in the hands of Somali security forces. By that time, if all goes according to plan, Al-Shabaab will have become a distant memory, or at least been sufficiently degraded on the battlefield that it can be contained and defeated without the help of foreign troops. Somalia will finally be at peace with itself, able to focus on national healing, reconstruction, and development.
 
The script leading to this happy ending reads like this: In the coming months, Operation Black Lion, a joint offensive of the Somali National Army (SNA) and militaries of neighbouring ‘Front Line States’ will drive Al-Shabaab from its remaining strongholds. At the same time, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) will embark on an accelerated programme of “force generation,” training some 12,000 troops in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The goal is to attain a force level of 30,000 SNA soldiers sometime in 2024 – a level sufficient to defeat Al-Shabaab and enable the total withdrawal of ATMIS. In parallel, the removal of the United Nations arms embargo will permit Somalia to import more powerful and sophisticated armaments to over-match the jihadists. Some 40,000 police officers will support the military effort and, over time, assume responsibility for Somalia’s internal security. Problem solved.
 
Somalia’s federal government counter-insurgency strategy is in grave danger of falling victim to such magical thinking. The art of war generally defies simplistic causality, and as any combat veteran well knows, “No plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Indeed, Villa Somalia’s planned campaign against Al-Shabaab appears to be unravelling even before the first shot in the coalition offensive is fired.
 
Military planners from the Front Line States are already in Mogadishu, working away at a Concept of Operations for Black Lion. But this will require time and complex consultations among members of the coalition to translate into a detailed operational plan. Meanwhile, fresh Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) troops have already begun entering Somalia independently of ATMIS to assume control of forward operating bases in Gedo, Bay, Bakool, and Hiiraan regions. Senior Kenyan officials, on the other hand, have indicated that it will take months to properly plan and prepare any new military intervention in Somalia – pouring cold water on hope for a coordinated coalition offensive in the immediate future.
 
Somalia’s own internal planning process appears to be similarly disjointed and overly ambitious. Force generation targets for the SNA were fixed even before the FGS and the federal member states (FMS) leaders inked an agreement on a new National Security Architecture (NSArch) last week in Baidoa. This latest blueprint for Somalia’s security sector envisages at least 80,000 personnel on the payroll – excluding the Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force, which will almost certainly push the total over 100,000. Where the money will come from to finance this enterprise is a matter of speculation.
 
During President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) first term in office (2012-17), his national security team laid the foundation for a comprehensive Security Compact, in which the FGS, FMS, and foreign donors jointly committed to supporting a reformed NSArch. This posited an SNA strength of 18,000 and 32,000 police officers, to be distributed between the FGS and the FMS. Special forces, air, and Anaval personnel were excluded from this calculation, and no figures were indicated for NISA or the Custodial Corps. The Security Compact and its component parts were adopted by the administration of HSM’s successor Mohamed Abdillahi Farmaajo in London in May 2017.
 
Realistic and well-thought-out, the 2017 NSArch included a relatively lean SNA leading the way, clearing territories that would subsequently be held by FMS police – principally the paramilitary Daraawiish. Somewhat reassuring, the plan’s estimated costs dovetailed on the most optimistic scenario for security expenditure (including donor contributions) envisaged by the 2017 Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review (SSJPER) compiled by FGS line ministries and the World Bank. In other words, Somalia could bear the burden of 18,000 soldiers and 32,000 police – with a lot of help from its international partners, but only just. 
 
The 2023 NSArch surpasses the 2017 version by more than 20,000 security personnel, without identifying from where additional funds will come. Indeed, recruitment and training of these new forces has already begun, with Somalia’s National Security Adviser announcing in January that some 12,000 new troops will be trained in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda before the end of this year. Force generation without assured financing is an accident waiting to happen.
 
Sending new recruits for short basic training courses abroad is unlikely to generate the kind of cohesive, professional military force needed to fight Al-Shabaab. Soldiers trained by Eritrea, who returned to Somalia last year, have become notorious for poor discipline, ‘blue on blue’ clashes with other SNA units, and defections – notably to Al-Shabaab. Likewise, the quality of training that Ethiopia can currently offer to Somali recruits is questionable at best; the ENDF is struggling to fill its own ranks with poorly trained conscripts, having been eviscerated by the recent war in Tigray and a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in Oromia. And when Somali trainees return home and are assigned to combat units, they are joining a force that is desperately short of qualified, seasoned officers, as well as non-commissioned officers – the backbone of any army.
 
Most concerning, however, is that Villa Somalia’s current planning process is narrowly focused on the SNA and its Black Lion military allies. Past experience from combat operations in Somalia emphatically reveals that battlefield successes cannot be sustained in the absence of appropriate ‘holding forces’-- a role for which federal and foreign troops are demonstrably ill-equipped. Areas of central Somalia recently liberated by the much-touted “Macawiisley Offensive,” have already fallen back under Al-Shabaab influence or control, as SNA ‘clearing forces’ move on to new objectives.
 
The obvious solution is to train and equip FMS Daraawiish forces, who are familiar with local conditions and have ties to different communities in their respective FMS. But over the past 6 years, there has been no investment in FMS Daraawiish by the FGS or its international partners – a situation that the current administration in Mogadishu shows little inclination to change. 
 
It's not too late for the FGS to make a course correction that allows strategic planning to be synchronised with battlefield realities and available resources. Counter-insurgency is not simply a numbers game. Much more important are state legitimacy, political accommodation, and an integrated, ‘whole-of-government’ campaign plan. Sound, timely intelligence is a far more valuable asset than firepower. And saturation of liberated areas with military forces is no substitute for sustained, systematic policing. 
 
Unless Villa Somalia heeds these lessons, it seems doomed to repeat recent history, earning spectacular, short-lived victories in one of the world’s most intractable, interminable “forever wars.”