Issue No. 328

The TPLF versus the TIA-- again

Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray. While war — for now at least — appears to have been averted, the political temperature within Tigray is heating up once again.

In many ways, the latest grapple is a re-run of last year, with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) dissatisfied with the TIA's structure and legality. Its last-minute one-year extension—announced by the Prime Minister's Office on 8 April, a day after President Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede travelled to Addis—was received by the TPLF as a unilateral act, and a violation of the Pretoria agreement's stipulation that such arrangements be established through dialogue between the two signatories. The absence of elections after three years has deepened frustrations within the party's leadership, compounding the region's broader condition—under siege, deprived of resources, and without a clear political horizon. Thus, Addis's failure to consult the TPLF—amid an already deteriorated relationship—was taken by the party as further confirmation that the federal government has no serious intention of implementing Pretoria on terms it would accept, particularly on unresolved questions of power-sharing, security, and territory.

Consequently, the TPLF Central Committee met in Axum last week, with the forum intended to chart a course forward amid growing signs that the party would reject the TIA's extension. In the TPLF-affiliated Woyen newspaper, several TPLF officials asserted that the region could not be governed by a "puppet" government and that restoring the former pre-war administrative body was in Tigray's interest. It was little surprise, then, when the Central Committee announced on Sunday, 19 April, that it would reinstate the pre-war Tigray Regional Council, effectively sidelining the interim authorities and challenging the federal government's claims over the region. Reports further suggest that the TPLF has already endorsed Debretsion Gebremichael, the party's chair, to lead the Tigray regional administration. 

The TPLF has insisted that the reinstatement is intended only as a temporary measure to facilitate the peace process, and that the re-establishment of the executive body would be conducted in an inclusive manner. Both are doubtful. Power and influence in Tigray remain largely concentrated within the networks of the TPLF old guard, and though the federal government has been a willing aide to the polarisation of Tigray, the TPLF has hardly helped itself either, constraining the political space in turn. The confrontational stance toward the federal government is one matter, and perhaps understandable given the absence of the international guarantors of the Pretoria agreement. But giving no inch of political ground to the internal Tigrayan opposition — much of it legitimate — has been controversial as well, with reported arrests of journalists and a systematic compression of the political space available to non-TPLF actors.

Tadesse, for his part, has rejected the TPLF's opposition to the extension, leaving the interim administration in a contested position-- as it was under Getachew Reda. The commander has insisted that he has no intention of leaving the region, despite the TPLF's opposition to his presidency, but it is unclear how the coming days and weeks will play out. The arrayed Tigrayan opposition, too, has criticised the decision, including Addis-aligned and Tadesse's ousted predecessor, Getachew Reda, who has warned that it represents a voiding of the Pretoria agreement. The blurred boundary between civilian authority and the Tigray Defence Forces—of which Tadesse remains a leading figure—further complicates any political settlement, with the militarised nature of Tigrayan politics an enduring concern.

Any glimmer of greater cohesion among the Tigrayan interim government, the army, and the TPLF has now been expunged, though Tadesse's tenure had, in truth, waned months ago. A well-respected commander, many hoped that he could bridge the divide between Mekelle and Addis, and reset relations in the interest of implementing Pretoria. It was not to be, with initial optimism soon fading, the official trapped in the unenviable position between Addis—which has refused to see through the agreement's core provisions, not least the resolution of the Western Tigray crisis—and a TPLF old guard impatient with the interim arrangement.

Unable to militarily conquer Tigray, the federal government has instead choked the region in the years since November 2022, disregarding the words and spirit of the Pretoria agreement to stifle the region's recovery. This has taken on a number of forms, ranging from intermittent but persistent fuel blockades to the withholding of civil servant salaries, which has left the TIA governing in name only. The suffering of the Tigrayan people has not eased, with hundreds of thousands still displaced from their homes more than five years after the war erupted in November 2020. Southern Tigray, too, remains highly volatile, with the presence of the government-backed Tigray Peace Forces in the neighbouring Afar region posing an active threat. It is little wonder that so many of the region's youth have fled, with the spectre of renewed violence hanging over their heads and little in the way of an economy beyond the illicit, booming gold production.

In practice, it is unclear what the restoration of formal TPLF control will look like, with allied military architecture already in place across much of the region. But the party has been repeatedly more bullish about restoring authority over the fertile Western Tigray region bordering Eritrea and Sudan, as stipulated under the Pretoria agreement, with the territory still occupied by a morass of Amhara militias and the Ethiopian military, within a wider regional context in which Eritrea remains a critical, if opaque, actor in Tigray's security landscape. But brief clashes in Western Tigray earlier this year nearly precipitated a full-blown return to conflict, only staved off at the last minute.

It was always likely that the April deadline of the renewal or expiration of the TIA would prove contentious, not least because of the limbo that Tigray—and the TPLF—find themselves in ahead of the June polls. What the June national elections look like in Tigray remains unclear, with the dominant Prosperity Party fielding zero candidates in the northernmost region, over which the government can exercise no control. The TPLF, meanwhile, is nominally banned from participating, part of a longer struggle with the compromised National Electoral Board of Ethiopia over its reinstatement post-war, which has further sought to redistrict five areas from Tigrayan control. The echoes of the months before the last war — when Tigray boycotted the government's own postponement and held its own defiant election — are unmistakable. What has deterred the federal government's hand so far is not clear — be it the deteriorating security context in Amhara and Oromia, the fiscal and fuel crisis stemming from the wider disruption of the US-Israel conflict with Iran, or sufficient pressure from the remaining invested diplomats in Ethiopia. The current limbo, however unpleasant, is preferable to the alternative of renewed conflict.

The TPLF's trajectory over five decades — from Dedebit in 1975 to the fractured, embattled movement of today — is a familiar arc of liberation movements. Though the existential fight of the Tigray war papered over the cracks and fissures, the spoils of power and the messy business of governance have exposed them again in full. The militarisation of the region's politics, the alliance with a former enemy in Eritrea, the arrests of journalists, the refusal of internal accommodation; these are not the hallmarks of a movement confident in its political future-- even as it looks to reassert power over Mekelle. And how the TPLF manages its path through the morass—or slides into renewed confrontation—continues to be the central and unanswered question hanging over Tigray.

The Ethiopian Cable Team