Issue No. 972

Baidoa’s Burgeoning Insurgency

The Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) strategy to assert central authority over federal states and enforce its brand of limited plebiscite – the so-called “one-person-one-vote” (OPOV) – appears to be going awry.

In South West State, the forcible removal of the regional executive in late March – followed by a manipulated electoral process to install an FGS loyalist – shattered the delicate elite and clan consensus and fomented wider divisions. Rather than consolidating federal control, Mogadishu’s heavy-handed intervention has triggered a distinct mutation in regional violence: a proto-insurgency fuelled not by jihadist ideology or extremist theology, but strictly by perceived political disenfranchisement and anger towards Mogadishu.

The capital of SWS, Baidoa – restive for the last five months – witnessed the outbreak of heavy, intense fighting on 17 August. Forces loyal to ousted South West State (SWS) President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen advanced into several neighbourhoods before federal government forces staged a counter-attack and regained them. The assault reportedly involved two Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) targeted at bases belonging to the Gorgor, the federal government’s special forces unit.

Fighting has since subsided, though the situation in and around the city remains fluid. Reports suggest that dozens of fighters from Laftagareen’s Daraawiish militia were captured in the skirmishes; casualties among civilians and combatants on both sides have been reported but remain unverified. In addition, the battle resulted in considerable civilian displacement, with some residents of Baidoa allegedly moving towards Al-Shabaab-held villages on the city’s outskirts instead of pursuing safety within federal-held Baidoa.

Ouster of Laftagareen

The confrontation traces back to March 2026, when disagreements between Baidoa and Mogadishu over federal authority, regional autonomy, electoral management, and constitutional reforms hardened into open conflict. Laftagareen announced he had secured an additional term through a regional parliamentary process; the FGS rejected the result as illegitimate and sent troops into Baidoa, effectively deposing him from office. He frames the ouster as a tactical withdrawal rather than a definitive defeat.

His forces, estimated at 700 to 800 fighters with around 20 pickup trucks, now operate from positions roughly 30 kilometres outside Baidoa, near Saydheelow and Eeldoon—villages close to Gof-Gaduud Buurey and Awdiinle. They relocate regularly to evade federal attacks and carry out hit-and-run raids on government positions in the city. 

Reports that the fighters pass freely without obstruction through Al-Shabaab areas of influence, alongside unverified claims that Laftagareen pays Al-Shabaab a dollar per soldier per month to guarantee access, cannot be corroborated independently and may belong to the information war between the two camps. However, neutral observers offer a simpler explanation: Al-Shabaab puts up with the arrangement because the fighting ties down federal forces that would instead be used against it.

The government installed in Baidoa is struggling with its own legitimacy dilemma: Sheikh Aden Madoobe assumed power after what critics described as a stage-managed vote. Somali opposition groups have expressed discontent with Villa Somalia’s deployment of federal forces in SWS to install preferred candidates rather than facilitate a transparent election, alongside an electoral committee whose members were reportedly hand-picked by Villa Somalia without regional consensus. SWS’s first president, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, reportedly commanded the largest bloc of regional MPs before being bypassed, prompting his subsequent boycott. Consequently, an administration that began its tenure contested by the very legislature meant to endorse it has little to no baseline to claim a mandate for the region.

Clan divisions escalate

Roughly 80% of Laftagareen’s forces are drawn from his own Hariin clan of the Digil and Mirifle, with additional backing from the Jilaal of Waajid who oppose Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur Jama, the federal parliament’s lower house speaker. Other smaller contingents are drawn from the Shanta Caleemood, Yantaar, Leysaan, Gelidle, and Eelay communities. Madoobe, for his part, established his own coalition comprising the Hadaame, Luway, and some Leysaan clans, reinforced by the Somali National Army, including the Gorgor unit, meaning the struggle for Baidoa runs as much along clan lines as it does along the federal-versus-regional axis it is officially contested over.

Laftagareen’s supporters describe the federal intervention as a repeat of “Sal-Balaadh” – the 1995 campaign in which General Mohamed Farah Ayidid’s Hawiye militias seized Bay and Bakool from the Rahanweyn and imposed their own administration. The comparison, whether or not it holds historically, carries immense weight locally: it casts the current president, who is also Hawiye, as orchestrating another Mogadishu-led intervention against Rahanweyn self-rule. It is also language that resonates strongly among Rahanweyn politicians and civil society figures who already view their political rights as being overridden by the capital.

Meanwhile, Ethiopian troops stationed in Baidoa under an African Union mandate – which does not extend to arbitrating internal Somali politics – have stayed out of the fight despite reported unease over civilian casualties. That restraint has not stopped Hawiye-aligned media from accusing Ethiopian forces of collaborating with Laftagareen, a narrative that has run alongside Ethiopian forces’ own confirmation that they will withdraw from Buur Hakaba, a town central to the wider campaign against Al-Shabaab.

Wider fallout

The strategic and humanitarian costs of the violence in SWS are rapidly accelerating on multiple levels. Politically, the 17 August conflict introduced a new dimension to the core-periphery contestation: federal-aligned officials point to the VBIED tactics used against Gorgor bases, alongside a captured armoured vehicle they claim belongs to Al-Shabaab rather than Laftagareen’s Daraawiish, as proof of collaboration between the two forces.

No independent source has confirmed Al-Shabaab’s direct involvement in the assault. Still, if this argument gains traction within the federal government, it could impel Mogadishu to officially designate Laftagareen’s militia as an Al-Shabaab-aligned force. Such a move would harden the conflict further rather than resolve it. 

Over the coming weeks, security disruptions such as checkpoints, road closures, flight cancellations, and restricted humanitarian access are expected to persist alongside active hit-and-run raids.

Mogadishu’s approach in Baidoa is being watched closely well beyond South West State. Jubaland and Puntland – both cautious of an expanding federal footprint – have apparently maintained informal contact with Laftagareen’s camp. A federal government prepared to remove a regional leader by force and subsequently blur the line between political opposition and Al-Shabaab affiliation sets a precedent those administrations are unlikely to overlook. 

Treating a fight over federal authority as a campaign against extremism carries an apparent appeal for Mogadishu, as it recasts a political rival as a security risk. However, it carries an equally obvious threat: Laftagareen’s fighters, whatever their putative ties to Al-Shabaab today, may be pushed closer to the group by the label itself, while other Federal Member States start reading Baidoa less as an isolated dispute than as a preview of how Mogadishu intends to handle federalism disagreements in general.

Retaking Baidoa was never the difficult part; Mogadishu has yet to demonstrate it can govern SWS rather than simply occupy it. Until this is regarded as a political problem rather than a security one, Baidoa will continue to produce fighting, displacement, and prisoners instead of a credible settlement.