Issue No. 982

Loo Joojin Maayo – Somalia’s Runaway Train

Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.

The focus of this commentary, however, is a particularly fatal metaphor adopted by HSM as he began political manoeuvres to consolidate power through a proposed "one-person-one-vote" (OPOV) electoral system. The President famously equated his electoral roadmap to a moving train, declaring "cidna loo joojin maayo" (no stopping for anyone). 

For a leader eager to cast his administration as reformist, this imagery of unstoppable momentum initially seemed apt. Yet over the past two years, political cartoonist Amir Arts has reinterpreted this metaphor, consistently depicting HSM as a reckless driver steering a train at breakneck speed down a steep valley. In these visual commentaries, the train whizzes past critical "stop" signs where the Somalia Future Council (SFC) is huddled, hurtling instead towards a cliff edge and the abyss below.

New talks

HSM has remained remarkably consistent in his commitment "not to stop for anyone", despite a succession of talks aimed at breaking the electoral stalemate with the opposition. In a televised speech in late October, the President reiterated that his OPOV rollout was a major democratic success that would proceed unimpeded, subsequently issuing a new timetable for national parliamentary and presidential elections in April–May 2027. While he offered the opposition SFC a new round of dialogue, it came with a significant caveat: the final outcome would be dictated entirely on his terms. Invoking a Quranic verse, HSM maintained that while he would consult his rivals, the ultimate decision-making power rested solely with him as chief executive.

This conditional offer of dialogue has not only riled the SFC but has also sown strategic divisions within its ranks, leaving some members willing to engage in a last-ditch effort to negotiate a way forward. Meanwhile, the regional states of Jubaland and Puntland appear highly reluctant to accept HSM’s latest overture. Reports indicate that regional Presidents Said Abdullahi Deni and Ahmed Madobe see little merit in engaging with the federal administration, preferring instead to initiate a parallel electoral process and political transition. The two leaders are scheduled to meet in Garowe in the coming days to consolidate their strategy.

Converging crises

In recent days, the country's overarching polycrisis has significantly worsened. A newly proclaimed military offensive to reclaim territories in South West State, dubbed "Operation Banooda", ran into immediate headwinds after Al-Shabaab struck a Somali National Army (SNA) convoy between Jameeco and Leego, near Buurhakaba, inflicting a heavy toll on federal forces. While Al-Shabaab's claims of hundreds of SNA casualties may be exaggerated, there is little doubt that the national army has suffered a severe setback. The ambush has severely damaged morale, sown disarray and, for the moment, stifled any grand ambitions to claw back land from the insurgent group. Capitalising on the SNA's latest debacle, regional forces loyal to South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen continue to consolidate their positions in the Bay region – where they have seized five towns – and are currently advancing on Baidoa.

In Hiiraan, an armed insurrection led by Abdullahi Mohamed Ali (Sanbaloolshe), the former Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency (NISA), appears to be gaining momentum and traction. Hawaadle militias, who in 2022 formed the backbone of the local Ma’awiisley uprising against Al-Shabaab, have now seized Beledweyne, the chief town of Hiiraan. Sanbaloolshe's insurrection, though still in its incipient stages, marks a significant shift in regional political dynamics that is almost certain to restrict Villa Somalia's room for manoeuvre.

Elsewhere in the Shabelle Valley, the Ugandan military this week initiated a rapid withdrawal from key Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). This dramatic development, largely unforeseen by security analysts, has further destabilised the political and security landscape. It is highly likely to be seized upon by Al-Shabaab as an ideal opportunity to consolidate its presence in areas dangerously close to Mogadishu.

Pressure on HSM

The escalating sense of crisis and impending collapse has in recent days galvanised key actors close to HSM, prompting them to persuade the President to change tack and engage in substantive talks with the SFC to broker a new deal on future elections. These figures include trusted loyalists and senior bureaucrats keen to salvage their own political futures.

Though increasingly isolated, HSM remains resistant. Single-minded and renowned for rebuffing sound counsel – even from his closest allies – the President is keeping his cards close to his chest. Yet, weakened and under intense pressure, he may eventually be compelled to alter his trajectory and show greater willingness to accommodate the interests of the broader opposition. At this stage, however, that prospect remains highly uncertain.

Meanwhile, credible reports suggest that a number of Somalia’s Western allies are now mulling the possibility of pushing HSM to accept a transitional arrangement to break the constitutional deadlock. 

One proposal currently being floated is the establishment of a neutral “Transition Task Force” (TTF) to broker a swift settlement and prepare the country for a credible poll in 2027, potentially paving the way for a managed leadership change.

While such an initiative may be a long shot given HSM’s demonstrable inflexibility over the past year, it may offer the only viable path out of the current impasse, barring an unexpected last-minute breakthrough. 

Ultimately, Somalia faces a perilous polycrisis as a stalled electoral transition, a constitutional limbo, and deepening political fragmentation converge. This governance crisis now coincides with a critical security transition, as AUSSOM troop withdrawals steadily reduce external military support. The resulting intersection of political gridlock and security vacuums creates a perfect storm. 

If Mogadishu fails to reconcile with regional and opposition factions, the breakdown of a unified electoral and security architecture will provide Al-Shabaab with its most significant strategic opening in years. Highly capable and uniquely positioned, the group is certain to exploit these institutional fractures, seize contested territories, and reverse hard-won security gains.