The Hiiraan Insurrection – A Crisis Foretold
Months of simmering tensions in the Hiiraan region and escalating political rifts with Mogadishu have morphed into a full-blown armed insurrection this week. This development compounds the widening revolt across Somalia's periphery against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) administration, deepening its political isolation.
The situation remains highly fluid, though it is clearly not evolving in Villa Somalia's favour. Last week, former National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Director-General Abdullahi Mohammed Ali ‘Sanbaloolshe’ crossed overland from Ethiopia into Hiiraan with armed fighters and technicals. He has since established a headquarters in Beledweyne, acting as the de facto leader of Hiiraan with the active backing of local clan elders. Meanwhile, hundreds of Hawaadle soldiers serving in the Somali National Army (SNA) continue to abandon frontline positions. They are swelling the ranks of a new clan self-defence force massing in Beledweyne in response to a clarion call from Ugaas Yusuf Ugaas Hassan Ugaas Khalif, the paramount chief of the Hawaadle.
"You must defend your honour and your existence, and the soldiers who come from the Hawaadle must gather in Beledweyne and stand with me as their Ugaas," declared Ugaas Yusuf at a public rally welcoming the SNA mutineers and other armed militiamen. On social media, Hawaadle activists have adopted the slogan “no more abti” – a pointed reference to the clan severing kinship ties with President Mohamud, who is their maternal cousin.
Simultaneously, another contingent of Ma’awiisley fighters, drawn primarily from the minority riverine Afar Makane clan, abandoned crucial frontline positions along the Mahaas–Mataban corridor to bolster the burgeoning, so-called Hiiraan Self-Defence Force in Beledweyne. Seizing upon this security vacuum, Al-Shabaab swiftly captured Coomaad midweek. The militant group now appears poised to seize further territory as SNA unit cohesion collapses and Ma’awiisley forces willingly cede ground. Elsewhere, certain Hawaadle sub-clans are actively coordinating with Al-Shabaab, viewing the militants as a temporary tactical ally against a Villa Somalia perceived as distant, untrustworthy and treacherous.
Ali Jeyte, army promotions
In a bid to quell the growing insurrection, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has reverted to a familiar Siyad Barre-era playbook for co-opting clans: groom, elevate and deploy figures from the targeted community to project a sense of political favour. To this end, Ali Jeyte Osman, the former governor of Hiiraan, and Petroleum Minister Dahir Shire Mohammed were dispatched to Beledweyne to mollify Ugaas Yusuf. By all accounts, the mission failed. Jeyte’s motorcade was blocked, his bodyguards came under fire and there are no confirmed reports that he even managed to secure an audience with the Ugaas.
Simultaneously, Villa Somalia announced a wave of politically motivated army promotions, elevating Hawaadle officers to senior ranks in an effort to stem the tide of desertions. Jeyte himself was promoted to the rank of major-general, while Somali media reports indicate that more than 70 Hawaadle officers have been elevated to mid-level and senior command positions.
Jeyte’s relationship with HSM has long been fraught, despite his appointment as presidential coordinator for the Ma’awiisley campaign in October 2023. Consequently, his current position as HSM's point man in Hiiraan rests on shaky ground and appears unsustainable. Jeyte seems to be angling for a post within the administration of Ali Gudlaawe, the president of Hirshabelle. Yet prospects of reclaiming his former governorship under Gudlaawe – the very leader who dismissed him – remain slim. Ultimately, the Hawaadle rebellion is voicing the exact grievances Jeyte himself championed for years. Given the overwhelming popular backing and combined political weight wielded by Ugaas Yusuf and Sanbaloolshe, Jeyte will find it exceedingly difficult to peel away local support, let alone fracture or weaken Hawaadle unity.
While HSM may temporarily co-opt certain Hawaadle notables, offer patronage such as military promotions and marginally improve Hawaadle representation within Hirshabelle, the underlying structural grievances will not disappear. At the heart of this discontent is the perceived dominance of the Abgaal clan in both national and regional politics. Three successive administrations in Hirshabelle have been led by the Abgaal, representing a direct breach of the foundational power-sharing agreement for a rotational presidency. Furthermore, Jowhar, a town in the Middle Shabelle valley, remains the regional capital despite a broad consensus to relocate it to Beledweyne.
Flawed strategy
Hiiraan’s current ferment is symptomatic of a deeper systemic malaise and an inherent flaw in HSM’s consolidation strategy. Attempting to homogenise politics, turn the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) into a hegemon, erase deep-seated clan identities and impose a top-down electoral model and leadership on the periphery does not create peace. Instead, they generate the very turmoil now unfolding in Hiiraan. By eliminating legitimate political outlets, this approach turns regional stakeholders into enemies who feel compelled to operate outside the system – or, worse, forge local and external alliances that Villa Somalia deems unacceptable.
In a fragile state, foundational power-sharing pacts such as the 4.5 formula, alongside clan and regional affiliations, are not merely backward obstacles to be dismantled; rather, they remain the primary collective identities through which citizens achieve representation, security and a sense of belonging.
Deploying selective clan co-optation and coercion to force through a centralised, "post-clan" state creates a self-defeating paradox. When Mogadishu rewards compliant clan elders or dispatches troops against recalcitrant ones, it signals to citizens that clan affiliation remains the primary currency of power and protection. Far from dismantling the clan system, coercive tactics compel communities to retreat further into clan solidarity for their own defence.
It is clear that the HSM administration’s ongoing campaign of coercive consolidation – designed to suppress legitimate clan grievances, override local concerns and manufacture a national consensus – is backfiring. More regions are peeling away from Mogadishu. Discontent and disillusionment are mounting and the risk of renewed political violence and instability across the country’s periphery continues to grow. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that the incumbent is deterred by the turmoil, or that he recognises how his own policies are directly fuelling it.
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Months of simmering tensions in the Hiiraan region and escalating political rifts with Mogadishu have morphed into a full-blown armed insurrection this week. This development compounds the widening revolt across Somalia's periphery against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) administration, deepening its political isolation.
In a landmark ruling last week, five senior judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court declared incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) May 2026 term extension unlawful and held that Parliament’s mandate had expired in April 2026, thereby rendering Villa Somalia’s "one-person, one-vote" (OPOV) electoral process illegal and its outcome invalid. Consequently, the judges directed all Somali political parties to agree on a new electoral framework within 30 days and conduct a credible poll within 90 days.
Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.
Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.