Issue No. 970

Published 12 Aug

Somalia’s Reform-Induced Malfunction

Published on 12 Aug 20:51 min

Somalia’s Reform-Induced Malfunction

Technicians and engineers have long been familiar with a paradoxical problem: how the repair of a specific defect often triggers a secondary malfunction. "Repair-induced malfunction" is a widely recognised dilemma across technical professions, with awareness and mitigation deeply woven into standard training. 

If you have ever tried to fix a leaky pipe only to crack the main water line and flood your basement, you have experienced this dynamic first-hand – how the very act of intervening to fix a broken component introduces a completely new, often more serious defect into the system.

This concept has real-world utility and application beyond machines, and can be readily extrapolated when one looks at the fractious politics of Somalia’s ongoing, government-led and bitterly contested reform. 

A rapid succession of developments in recent weeks has brought to the fore the volatility inherent in President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) top-down reform agenda, highlighting its destabilising potential and the heightened risk of further instability.

Entebbe

This dynamic was starkly evident when UK- and US-sponsored talks aimed at narrowing differences between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the opposition Somali Future Council (SFC) broke down in July. The intra-Somali dialogue was likely undercut by Turkey’s parallel mediation, but also by an increasingly inflexible chief executive self-assured about the merits of his reforms and determined to enforce his will. 

Villa Somalia’s hypersensitivity to external mediation deepened further during a summit meeting of Somalia’s African Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs) in Entebbe in late July. There, the Somali president openly clashed with his Ugandan hosts for urging him to craft a political roadmap towards an inclusive political settlement. 

HSM’s reaction leaves little room for doubt about his intentions and calculus: as far as the incumbent administration is concerned, international security partners have no mandate to pronounce themselves on Somalia’s domestic affairs. More importantly, it signals an implicit stance that the core politics of reform have already been resolved, reducing the ongoing, acrimonious elite haggling to mere procedural and 'technocratic' friction. 

Elections and the periphery

Electoral modernisation is a central plank of the FGS’s reform agenda. However, the rollout of the so-called "one-person, one-vote" (OPOV) system in the federal states, far from democratising the periphery and strengthening Mogadishu’s legitimacy and credibility, is generating renewed unrest. This situation best illustrates practically how an ostensibly progressive reform can backfire, resulting in a stark case of reform-induced failure.

Galmudug is the latest Mogadishu-aligned federal state to conduct the contested (OPOV) system, a poll hailed as a historic milestone by the FGS. Yet, the aftermath of the 30 July ballot has instead produced another contested outcome, serving as a troubled repeat of the highly tarnished South West State polls. Just as those previous elections were plagued by a fiercely disputed result, the Galmudug process has equally raised fundamental questions about electoral integrity, management and the risky precedent of using state machinery to engineer results, a recipe for further political divisions and regional instability. 

On paper, the official results published by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC) depict a commanding sweep. The federal government's ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) emerged as the dominant political force, capturing 63 out of 89 parliament seats and 115 out of 243 local council seats. This overwhelming majority effectively consolidates Mogadishu’s influence over the state assembly and municipal councils. In doing so, it secures a definitive launchpad for the presidency’s preferred candidate, Liban Shuluq, ahead of the upcoming regional executive race.

However, beneath this veneer of democratic consolidation lies a fierce political dispute that threatens regional stability. The runner-up Towfiiq Party, led by the powerful Sufi scholar Sheikh Mohamed Shakir Ali Hassan, did not merely object to the outcome: it rejected the electoral narrative entirely. Countering the commission’s figures, Towfiiq published its own internal polling data showing an entirely different reality: a total turnout of 98,529 votes, containing 987 invalid and 97,542 valid ballots. Within this independent ledger, Towfiiq claims it received 53,054 votes. If true, this tally would alter the legislative balance of power, entitling the opposition party to a 47-seat majority in the 89-member parliament rather than the meagre 12 seats officially assigned to them. 

This massive discrepancy between the two sets of numbers points to a structural crisis, backed by grave opposition allegations of systematic vote manipulation and direct voter intimidation by federal security forces.

The growing pattern of OPOV gridlock exposes a vulnerability in HSM’s brand of electoral democracy: the complete absence of a credible arbiter. Under normal circumstances, a dispute of this magnitude would trigger an independent judicial review or be referred to an impartial electoral tribunal with the authority to audit ballots and issue a binding ruling. Somalia possesses no such institution that commands both absolute independence and public trust. Left with no institutional mechanism to resolve grievances, the mounting electoral disputes in the regional states are doomed to rot in limbo, subsequently deepening public cynicism and eroding the credibility of the entire direct-voting roadmap. 

Reform and the “Cobra Effect”

Why do well-meaning political repairs backfire? 

The simple answer is that political systems are not predictable, static machines; they are complex, living ecosystems driven by human actors who adapt. 

When reformers drive top-down policies – failing to anticipate unintended consequences, stubbornly pushing ahead and mechanically implementing changes even in the face of a mounting crisis – they exacerbate the problem. This dynamic is what scholars term the "Cobra Effect."

The term originates from colonial India, where the British government sought to reduce the number of venomous cobras in Delhi by offering a cash bounty for every dead snake. On the surface, the policy seemed effective, but the public quickly adapted. Enterprising citizens realised they could breed cobras in captivity, kill them and collect an easy payout. When the government caught on and cancelled the bounty, the breeders simply released their now-worthless snakes. Ultimately, the final cobra population was significantly higher than before the "repair" began – a classic case of a fix exacerbating a systemic problem.

Consensus

To hold a true direct election, a country requires a nationwide political settlement, consensus on the electoral model, agreements on process and management, and a stable, secure environment. This is currently impossible in Somalia. Because these structural milestones cannot be met on time, the OPOV mandate was instead weaponised to justify a controversial parliamentary vote extending presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years. Just like the cobra breeders, political elites have used the "democracy goal" as a tactical tool to entrench themselves in power.

Consequently, the bulk of the opposition and powerful Federal Member States (FMSs) – most notably Puntland and Jubaland – view this top-down rewriting of the electoral rules as an authoritarian power grab by the federal government. Instead of unifying the nation under a democratic banner, the reform has fractured the federation.

Crucially, these escalating electoral disputes are actively distracting the state from its existential war against Al-Shabaab. Instead of channelling every ounce of military, financial and intelligence capital towards defeating the insurgency, the federal government is entirely consumed by managing the intense internal political standoffs now aggravated by the OPOV rollout.

Somalia’s current deadlock is a stark reminder that in the realm of political reform, democracy cannot be manufactured through executive fiat and a top-down process. When a well-meaning structural repair ignores the fragile, consensus-driven reality of a complex political system, it ceases to be a solution and becomes an operational hazard. 

To overcome this malfunction, the FGS must urgently shift political discourse and effort away from rigid, top-down electoral design timelines and return to the unglamorous work of forging a genuine national consensus on a vote model that is modestly inclusive, implementable and does not risk imperilling the very state it was intended to save.

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