Issue No. 827

Are we heading for Badbaado Qaran 2.0?

In March 2021, a group of predominantly Hawiye militias and civilians took to the streets of Mogadishu to protest former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's attempts to delay and rig the country's electoral system. Known as 'Badbaado Qaran' (National Salvation Forces), the opposition nearly overran Villa Somalia, forcing Farmaajo to come to the table and eventually cede much of his authority to a transitional PM. It was a pivotal moment for the country, with Somalia's political cycle ratcheting to violence before a negotiated settlement was eventually found. Flash forward to today, and many of the same cast of opposition characters are back in the capital and preparing to deploy to the streets as part of 'Badbaado Qaran 2.0.'

Last week, several senior opposition leaders assembled in Mogadishu, including former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, ex-PM Hassan Ali Khaire, and MP Abdirahman Abdishakur, for a renewed pushback against Villa Somalia's authoritarian agenda. Originally mostly Hawiye-led, the opposition alliance has swelled as the federal government has continued to pursue its hardline agenda, with former Darood Prime Ministers Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and Abdi Farah Shirdoon joining its ranks. And in a further nod to the original Badbaado Qaran alliance, which incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) was ironically party to, several leaders met at the famous Macalin Nur mosque in the capital before reiterating their concerns about a federal president seeking to gerrymander an electoral system. HSM's agenda, though, has aped Farmaajo's, pushing the political settlement further and faster towards a breaking point while similarly empowering Al-Shabaab to dictate the battlefield. And the national opposition-- once again-- has warned that there is an "urgent need" to rescue the nation and return to consensus-oriented politics. 

The federal government has responded as anticipated, attempting to clamp down on the opposition while issuing weak platitudes to its international partners. Following the opposition parade down the arterial Makka Al-Mukarama Road on Friday led by former President Sheikh Sherif, an increased security presence was reported throughout the city to ward off any potential marches. And on Saturday, 11 journalists affiliated with several media organisations were arrested in Mogadishu by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Disturbingly, this egregious politicisation of NISA comes just days after the 5th mortar attack by Al-Shabaab on Aden Adde International Airport this year, as well as a major suicide bombing carried out against young recruits registering at a military base. And as the political dance regarding Badbaado Qaran 2.0 continues to play out, Al-Shabaab appears to be constricting their snake-like embrace of the capital once more, with a fresh wave of clashes reported in the past day. Yet, while the federal government needs all the men it can get, as evidenced by the deployment of the Custodial Corps to the frontlines in March, dozens of Somali National Army (SNA) troops accompanying opposition leaders have now been reportedly told they would be removed from the army roster. But their presence alongside the opposition has merely reiterated the depth of the army's politicisation and that much of the SNA currently resembles little more than clan-affiliated militia in military garb. 

The rumblings towards a more explicit forming of Badbaado Qaran 2.0 come despite the best attempts of the federal government to deprive opposition-affiliated clan militias of resources. This, too, has had a deteriorating impact on the battlefield against the jihadists. In particular, Abgaal/Harti forces loyal to former president Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed have been mobilised in Middle Shabelle for several months but have been repeatedly denied newer weapons and technicals to fight Al-Shabaab from the federal government out of fear that they may mobilise against Villa Somalia. Despite claims of the contrary by the Ministry of Defence and assertions of high numbers of Al-Shabaab being killed on a daily basis, it is the ma'awiisley in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle that are continuing to bear the brunt of the fighting against the jihadists, many without the support of the deeply dysfunctional SNA. But the Hawiye clan core of the federal government also somewhat complicates the re-forming of the original Badbaado Qaran alliance, with former leaders such as former Police Commissioner Sadiq 'John' and former Dayniile district commissioner Mohamed Abuukar Jafar still allied with HSM. Conversely, Farmaajo hailing from the Darood meant there was near-universal opposition to the leader from the influential sub-clans of the Hawiye.

Unable to prevent the national opposition from mobilising, and under sustained pressure from international partners, HSM has again said that he is prepared to meet with opposition leaders directly and would announce plans for a more inclusive national dialogue before 15 June. And one of the more stringent defenders of HSM's administration, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar 'Bal'ad', has further stated that the president would convene a meeting next month with the national opposition leaders. But this is typical Villa Somalia: kicking the can down the road while continuing to constrict the political space and pursue its destabilising agenda. Weeks ago, during his Eid al-Fitr address, HSM promised something similar but has since done nothing to suggest he was serious about either dialogue or reconciliation. In fact, Somalia's political and security context has only continued to deteriorate, punctuated by Villa Somalia's reckless provocations and active destabilisations, such as the degradation of the National Consultative Council (NCC) into HSM’s political patronage platform, the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP).

Still, if the meeting between Villa Somalia and opposition leaders does take place, HSM’s opponents will likely emphasise three elements to prevent a total breakdown of Somalia’s fragile political settlement— legal, political, and procedural. They have repeatedly rejected the legal basis upon which Villa Somalia's electoral agenda has been built, citing the roughshod and unconstitutional manner in which the federal government has gerrymandered the electorate. But with Villa Somalia’s constitutional amendments and legislative changes considered null and void, a provisional political arrangement to negotiate and facilitate the transition, too, will have to be agreed upon. How that takes shape is up for discussion, but could include establishing a genuinely neutral and independent electoral body instead of the existing "Independent" Electoral Commission, which falls under the Ministry of Interior and is headed by an HSM ally.

For most, a return to the 'Afsiyooni tent' where previous federal presidential elections have been organised is also untenable. The past elections within this model have been unrepresentative and extraordinarily corrupt affairs, infamous for the vast amounts of cash on offer for votes. So, a hybrid procedural model will also have to be negotiated to broaden the electorate. While entirely direct polls remain unfeasible with such a short time available and the insecurity that prevails in much of the country, there may nevertheless be other consensus-oriented models that combine elements of direct and indirect voting. 

But Hassan Sheikh is also not Farmaajo, and the tying in of the OPOV agenda to his own political ambitions makes any prospect of a negotiated settlement far more complex. Backing away from its plans for gerrymandered polls would signal defeat for Villa Somalia, as well as undermining one of the only explicit talking points of the new JSP. The president also appears to feel he has the illusion of national consensus on his side, with Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and South West presidents all incorporated into the party, as well as SSC-Khaatumo and elements of the Dir in southern Somalia. Though the president has suggested he may be amenable to talks, as he has repeatedly - and disingenuously - done in the past, the possibility of genuine dialogue remains remote. The rise of Badbaado Qaran 2.0 and violence on the streets of Mogadishu, even as Al-Shabaab presses its advance on the capital, appears far more likely.

The Somali Wire Team