Irro in Djibouti - Keep Your Enemies Closer
In his first visit to an African nation, Somaliland President Abdirahman 'Irro' touched down in Djibouti City this week in a bid to repair badly deteriorated relations between the Red Sea neighbours. Following the abysmal ties in 2024 in the aftermath of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the new Irro government is no doubt seeking to telegraph goodwill and turn over a fresh leaf with Djibouti. While it is still perhaps too early to make a full assessment of the two-day trip's outcome, the optics were certainly encouraging, with the Somaliland leader accorded a warm reception befitting a recognised head of state.
Indeed, much to the chagrin of Somali nationalists, the Djiboutian PM Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed referred to Irro as "President of the Republic of Somaliland" in a Facebook post. So, too, did Djibouti's Finance Minister describe the country and Somaliland "as twins with a common ancestry who will always be brothers." Yet, despite the mutual warmth on both sides, it is abundantly clear that the two neighbours remain at odds over a whole host of strategic issues that will be difficult to overcome. Still, Irro's bid to restart high-level contacts and negotiations after escalated tensions constitutes a step in the right direction.
Since his inauguration in December, the Somaliland president has devoted much of his time to the polity's not-insignificant domestic issues and overseeing the Waddani party's transition from opposition to government. Having pledged to negotiate with the restive non-Isaaq clans in the east and west of Somaliland, Irro established a far more multi-clan inclusive government than his predecessors. He further dispatched elders to engage with the Gadabuursi in the Awdal, as well as the discontented clans to the east. Fighting nevertheless simmered in Eerigabo, and Laas Aanood remained a tinderbox-- one which was exploited by Mogadishu in April by dispatching PM Hamza Abdi Barre just ahead of proposed talks between SSC-Khaatumo and Hargeisa. Still, fighting has subsided in recent months, and some 6,000 clan militias drawn from these conflict spots have been integrated into the national army-- without international assistance. This was achieved by the Irro government despite having inherited empty coffers from the outgoing Muse Bihi Abdi government and being saddled with an estimated USD 81 million in debts.
With the domestic situation calmed, even though Laas Aanood presents a fresh set of challenges, the Somaliland president feels he now has more space to devote time to foreign policy. During the 18 May celebrations marking 34 years since Somaliland declared independence, Irro's speech was clear that he would waste no time pursuing international recognition, citing that he had written to over 130 heads of state and government. But the choice of Djibouti-- rather than Ethiopia-- as Irro's first stop in the Horn has surprised some. The Somaliland president has travelled to the Emirates twice this year, lobbying for some financial support and to maintain a close relationship with the UAE. And despite the more complicated relationship between Addis and the Irro government than its predecessor, Ethiopia remains Somaliland's pre-eminent ally, with Hargeisa highly dependent on Addis's strategic and economic support. Somaliland also remains eager to obtain recognition from Addis, even though the MoU's implementation has quietly stalled. But it appears that the visit to Djibouti is designed to mollify Djibouti's long-serving leader, Ismail Omar Guelleh, rather than upset Addis.
Somaliland and Djibouti have a long history of peaceful coexistence despite episodes of periodic tensions. Indeed, Irro's predecessor, Muse Bihi Abdi, shared a close relationship with Guelleh up until the MoU. The accord-- which promised Ethiopia a naval base in exchange for sovereign recognition of Somaliland-- was precipitated by attempts by the Djiboutian president and his Somali counterpart Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to browbeat Muse Bihi to accept a poorer position for renewed Mogadishu-Hargeisa negotiations in December 2023.
Subsequently, last year's MoU pitched Somaliland and Djibouti against one another, with Guelleh actively working to undermine the deal-- without antagonising Addis. One of Djibouti's key weaknesses is that its economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on facilitating the import-export business from landlocked Ethiopia, estimated to handle as much as 95%. The prospect of Ethiopia deepening ties with Somaliland and diversifying trade through the DP World-managed Port of Berbera in Somaliland, in which it had a latent stake of 19% that has since lapsed, spooked the Guelleh government. Consequently, Djibouti ramped up its support for Mogadishu while simultaneously hosting the insurgent Awdal State Movement (ASM) and SSC-Khaatumo representatives to unsettle Hargeisa. The emboldening of Mogadishu's belligerence further deteriorated relations and deepened mistrust amongst Somalilanders-- trust that will take time to repair. But with the implementation of the MoU seemingly on ice, Irro's visit should further diminish the prospects of economic competition transforming into broader militarised proxy conflicts.
Until fairly recently, Djibouti has maintained an ambivalent view of Somali unity. With the country split between Afar and Somali communities, it has felt threatened by militant pan-Somali irredentism-- just like Somaliland. In the eyes of pan-Somali nationalists, both are part of the 'shanta Somali,' the 5 Somali territories of the Horn that are symbolised by the 5-pointed star depicted on Somalia's blue flag. However, as it does not share a common border with Somalia, Djibouti remains more inoculated from the threat of Al-Shabaab in particular, as well as the destabilising instincts of Mogadishu's hyper-nationalist cliques. It has used resources and clout to cosy up to the pan-Somali jingoes to neuter direct threats to its autonomy and occasionally deflect them towards Somaliland. Every year, for instance, Djibouti hosts a meeting of Somali intelligentsia from across the Horn where irredentist sentiments are widely voiced. But even while hosting Irro so warmly risks incurring the wrath of Mogadishu, the innumerable mistakes of Hassan Sheikh's administration are hardly likely to endear Guelleh to Villa Somalia at this current moment, despite their close relationship.
But Irro also travelled to Djibouti at a delicate moment for the highly strategic nation, a country that hosts both permanent Chinese and American military bases, among others. The 77-year-old Guelleh, in power since 1999, is reported to be increasingly frail and, at the behest of his influential wife, grooming his son, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, as the next leader. Guelleh also inherited the presidency from his uncle, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who had ruled the country since its independence in 1977. One of the calculi for dispatching the veteran Foreign Minister Mohamoud Ali Youssef to contest, and win, the African Union Commission Chair position earlier this year was to help ease the pathway for Guelleh's son to take over the presidency.
Not all are happy, though, and it may be that Guelleh calculates he needs Somaliland to help facilitate a peaceful eventual transition. Elements of the influential Issa/Mamassan clan are discontented with Kamil as the heir apparent, and there are rumblings of dissatisfaction within the army as well. Like most of the Horn, which is dominated by gerontocracies, Djibouti could face a contested transition that polarises and destabilises the country, making Berbera a more favoured location for trade and investment. It is not inconceivable that Guelleh is searching for regional support for his own transition plan, perhaps even in exchange for standing aside in Hargeisa's quest for international recognition.
In his next stop during his regional tour, Irro is anticipated to travel to Kenya on Sunday for a several-day visit to inaugurate the new Somaliland mission and celebrate the country's national day, though it is unclear if he will meet Kenyan President William Ruto. But Ethiopia is still on Irro's itinerary, even though Addis had been aggravated with Hargeisa about the trip's order because Ethiopia was the first regional country to invite the Somaliland president. But it is highly likely that the decision to move Kenya up the list may have been necessitated by a genuine scheduling glitch, with Abiy and senior officials in France on a state visit this week. Still, the Irro team will need nimble diplomatic footwork and tact to gently explain to Addis that the Somaliland president is not 'downgrading' ties by design. In any case, though, Irro's first foray into the Horn as Somailand president presents several opportunities to introduce himself, reset relations and soothe any latent discontent with neighbours after months of heightened tensions.
The Somali Wire Team
