Issue No. 825

Published 21 May 2025

Villa Somalia turns to destabilising Gedo, again

Published on 21 May 2025 18:26 min

Villa Somalia turns to destabilising Gedo, again

Three of the four main resolutions from May's National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting related to Villa Somalia's political agenda — and just one to Al-Shabaab. Though the forum was almost entirely derided by domestic opposition and international partners alike, one of the central resolutions pertained to unrepresented Jubaland. Backing Villa Somalia's renewed attempts to oust Jubaland President Ahmed Islam 'Madoobe', the Hawiye-majority NCC participants pledged to establish a ministerial committee to 'investigate' the Federal Member State's (FMS) constitutional status following his re-election in November 2024. The latest diminished NCC declaration appears to be a precursor to, and justification for, forming a rival Jubaland administration in Gedo — one loyal to the newest vehicle for Villa Somalia's programme of centralisation, the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP).

Last October, Madoobe disembarked from the federal government's floundering electoral and constitutional agenda, arguing that without Puntland's representation, among other issues, the NCC should not pursue such radical overhauls. Alarmed by the departure of the next Darood-majority FMS from the NCC, Villa Somalia dispatched federal troops to the coastal enclave of Ras Kamboni in southern Jubaland the same day Madoobe secured his re-election on 25 November 2024. But having failed to unseat Jubaland's long-serving Ogaadeen leader — and with hundreds of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers being humiliatingly routed over the Kenyan border in December — Villa Somalia's attention subsequently turned to the Mareehaan-dominated Gedo region.

For many, it appeared akin to a Gedo redux, with Villa Somalia offering a pale mimic of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's undermining of Madoobe's position in the region through cash and force in 2019, but without the crucial support of Addis. In early 2025, the Mareehaan-majority districts of Luuq, Dollow, Bardheere, Beled Hawo and Garbahareey all faced varying amounts of coercion to split from Kismaayo, with these efforts principally led by the unpopular Minister of Internal Security, Abdullahi 'Fartaag', who hails from the Reer Siyad sub-clan of the Mareehaan. Relations between the federal government and Jubaland have continued to deteriorate since, with the farcical Interpol Red Notice still in place for Madoobe despite the pleas from Somalia's international allies to rescind it.

Attempting to play on the divided Mareehaan's legitimate grievances with the distant Kismaayo administration, Fartaag and former Gedo Governor Abdullahi Abdi Shimbir made a series of developmental promises, such as rebuilding two key washed-away bridges in Gedo. Hand in hand, though, has been a return to Farmaajo's highly destabilising tactics that had opened the door for Al-Shabaab over five years ago. Clashes erupted in December in Dollow and in Bardheere in February between government troops and Jubaland Daraawiish, as Mogadishu sought to forcibly take control of these key Gedo towns.

It didn't work. Control of the towns remains currently divided between Mogadishu-aligned forces and Jubaland troops, with Garbahareey and Beled Hawo falling into the former, and Luuq, Eel Waaq, Baardheere and Dollow all remaining with the administration of Kismaayo. Despite the government's attempts, the various Mareehaan sub-clans loyalties remain more broadly arrayed between a mixture of Addis, Kismaayo, Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab. In fact, such is the unpopularity of Fartaag and Mogadishu's overreach into Jubaland that the Ogaadeen-dominated Kismaayo administration has arguably more sway than in several years amongst some Mareehaan sub-clans in Gedo. Neither has the sweeping advance of Al-Shabaab across central Somalia exactly endeared Jubalanders towards the federal government. Wielding SNA soldiers and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces against one of the few long-standing bulwarks against Al-Shabaab in Somalia was among the darkest points of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's second term.

On 12 May, PM Hamza Abdi Barre called Madoobe's re-election in November unacceptable, while reiterating that the Interior Ministry had been instructed to review the 'situation' in Jubaland. This is the same ministry that oversees the Independent National Electoral Commission, whose commissioner was given pride of place at the three-year celebrations for the President's second term last week. It is not just a hatred of Madoobe that appears to be driving Villa Somalia's attempts to unsettle Gedo, though, with the region also central to its gerrymandered one-person, one-vote (OPOV) agenda. Having ensured some barest Darood/Dhulbahante participation through co-opting the SSC-Khaatumo administration into the JSP, Gedo holds several towns where direct polls could theoretically be held and secure some Darood/Mareehaan representation. Senior government officials are increasingly warning of retribution for those who stand in the way of direct polls being carried out in Gedo, as well as more broadly against the JSP. On 12 May, several Mareehaan elders in Garbahareey who publicly rejected any new Jubaland administration being based in Gedo were arrested the next day by the Mogadishu-aligned authorities.

In turn, it is anticipated that more federal troops will likely be deployed to Gedo, justified as securing areas to conduct direct polls — not to fight an entrenched Al-Shabaab. With such heightened tensions between Jubaland and Mogadishu, any further deployments to the contested towns could well spark renewed fighting. Further clashes are a particular risk if Villa Somalia attempts to wield Ogaadeen forces to wrest district councils from Kismaayo in Mareehaan-majority areas. PM Barre, a former ally of Madoobe's, is unsurprisingly believed to favour an Ogaadeen leader taking the mantle in any parallel administration.

Much like his Puntland counterpart, Said Abdullahi Deni, Madoobe has heavily criticised the OPOV agenda, and the two Darood FMS leaders are now anticipated to meet in Nairobi in the coming days. Whether a pan-Darood opposition can be forged, absent SSC-Khaatumo, remains to be seen, but it is the first time in years that Madoobe and Deni have met one-on-one, having fallen out over the 2022 federal presidential election. But while the 'new Jubaland administration' plot continues to gather pace, it is not the only FMS facing active destabilisation.

In the past week, two senior members of the new JSP have grappled in Baidoa, the seat of the South West State administration. Following reports that the federal Livestock Minister Hassan Eelay had been tasked with mobilising militias against South West State President Laftagareen, the regional leader directed forces to surround Eelay's house in Baidoa. The details of the events are still murky, but it is symptomatic of the broader instability that is roiling the country. The JSP has forced together a whole host of competing interests and alliances from a cross-section of clans with no clear ideological ties beyond grappling for a finite supply of power and cash. The tensions within the Digil-Mirifle branch — which includes Parliament Speaker Aden Madoobe, the Livestock Minister, Laftagareen and others — may prove to be just teething problems, but they point to deeper-set issues within the new party. 

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud clearly once understood the dangers of undermining Gedo's stability. In an interview in 2020 amid Farmaajo's dangerous antics, he stated, "Gedo is part of Jubaland, and any issues need to be resolved through dialogue. The federal government's intervention and militarisation of the dispute is unacceptable." Today, though, the incumbent president has aped both Farmaajo and his own previous attempts to unseat Madoobe during his first term. With Al-Shabaab consolidating its hold on seized territory-- though it has again paused its serpentine embrace of Mogadishu-- the danger to the capital has not passed, epitomised by the jihadists' indirect shelling of Aden Adde and the deadly suicide bombing in recent days. Yet Villa Somalia continues to weaponise government funds and forces against its elected, secular, domestic opposition-- not Al-Shabaab on its doorstep or even in Gedo. If the national dialogue process had actually been launched as Madoobe has lobbied for, Jubaland could-- and should-- be a location from which joint forces push into Al-Shabaab's exposed rear in Lower Juba and relieve the capital. Instead, it appears another badly misplaced showdown is set for Gedo.

The Somali Wire Team

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