Three years in, Somalia at odds with itself and the world
At his inauguration three years ago, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) reiterated his campaign promise to deliver a Soomaali heshis ah, oo dunidana heshiis la ah (A Somalia at peace with itself and the world). When he returned to office in May 2022, hopes were high that HSM's leadership would reverse the authoritarian drift and stagnation of the Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmaajo' era. But three years in, there is little to celebrate. Judging the government by its own objectives, far from delivering peace with itself or the world, Hassan Sheikh's administration has veered towards a more centralised, authoritarian posture – and further from both its own peripheries and foreign partners. With only a year left before elections in May 2026, the extent of the country's security setbacks and political fragmentation raises the question: will HSM even make it to a fourth anniversary?
By his own measure, HSM's principal political achievement is the creation of the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP), launched this week with himself as both chairman and the presidential candidate for the May 2026 polls. The reforming of the Union and Development Party (UPD), however, is the culmination of two years of Villa Somalia's centralising and anti-federal project. While cloaked in the rhetoric of democratic electoral reform, its structure and function mirror a one-party state model, having co-opted both federal leaders and the presidents of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West State. And those on the outside are facing explicit threats from senior federal officials, including Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail 'Fartaag', who has warned of unspecified "consequences" for those who dare oppose it. Rather than a genuine political body to contest elections, the JSP's real function appears to be constructing a new vehicle for political patronage alongside blurring the lines between state and party.
But while Villa Somalia seeks to consolidate its grip through the new JSP, the country's federal system has unravelled further under HSM's watch. His appointment of Ogaadeen PM Hamza Abdi Barre was intended to entice Jubaland back into the fold, but the government's unilateral agendas have prompted both Darood-majority regions—Puntland and Jubaland—to withdraw their recognition of Mogadishu's authority in the past two years. The principles of Somalia's transitional devolved government, particularly resource-sharing and federated security architecture, have further been cast aside by Villa Somalia's brazen attempts to monopolise foreign and domestic rents. Meanwhile, key institutional checks and balances have been eroded or sidelined, such as the national parliament through the co-opting of its leadership. In turn, bills like the Turkish-Somalia hydrocarbon extraction agreement—which cedes Somalia's sovereignty over valuable natural resources—have been rushed through without scrutiny or debate. Even the Federal Member States still within HSM's camp are on shaky ground, with serious divisions amongst the Digil-Mirifle over the country's future, for instance. Nor have Mogadishu-Hargeisa relations improved under HSM. Following Villa Somalia's outsized reaction to the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding in 2024, Somalia-Somaliland ties reached their lowest ebb in years, which were then further accentuated by PM Hamza Abdi Barre's visit to Laas Aanood in April, which definitively ended the possibility of returning Puntland to the National Consultative Council (NCC).
In turn, a broader cross-clan opposition coalition now appears to be massing in explicit rejection of Villa Somalia's agenda and the direction of the country. In a blistering statement this week, 16 influential opposition leaders, including former presidents and prime ministers, asserted that the JSP had transformed the NCC into a political extension of Villa Somalia and that the state has been weaponised to support partisan consolidation. The JSP/NCC-excluded regional leaders of Jubaland and Puntland have also castigated HSM's crowning political achievement, having faced months of active and weaponised attempts to destabilise their polities. Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni has denounced the party as a repackaging of the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing formula, warning that the JSP represents not democratic reform but an existential threat to national cohesion. His Jubaland counterpart, Ahmed Madoobe, similarly likened the party to Siad Barre's regime, calling it "toothless" and devoid of popular legitimacy while reiterating his call for a genuine national dialogue. Today, the political settlement—already frayed—appears closer to breaking point than at any point in recent years, hardly indicative of Somalia being 'at peace with itself.'
The JSP and the flawed one-person, one-vote (OPOV) agenda go hand-in-hand, with the latter essentially working to restrict the prospect of direct elections to a handful of towns in areas under the federal government's leverage. This includes Banaadir, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle, as well as South West State and SSC-Khaatumo—which have been incorporated to ensure it is not reduced to a Hawiye-only exercise. In this vein, the federal government has resurfaced its attempts to wrest districts in Mareehaan-majority Gedo away from the Madoobe administration through a mixture of cash and force. The emerging electoral map is thus one of three Hawiye blocs, plus some Dhulbahante, Mareehaan, and Digil-Mirifle participation—and the deliberate exclusion of dissenting administrations. Some token opposition parties may be allowed to compete, but the gerrymandering of Somalia's electoral map and the limited nature of those expected to contest it are readily apparent.
But perhaps nowhere else is Villa Somalia's weakening grasp more evident than in the security sector. Having first attempted to co-opt and then abandoned the early promise of the central Somalia offensive in 2022—spearheaded by the organic uprising of the Hawaadle and Abgaal clans against Al-Shabaab—the auspices today are the worst in years. The jihadists now control more territory than at any time in the last 5 years, re-establishing dominance over Lower and Middle Shabelle in recent weeks while remaining entrenched across Bay, Bakool, and Lower Juba. But Al-Shabaab is only as strong as the federal government is weak, and the politicised and absent military leadership has allowed the extremist group to step into the vacuum. Three years into HSM's administration, despite innumerable pledges that the extremists were on the brink of defeat, the country is facing the all-too-real possibility of Al-Shabaab seizing Mogadishu. Even this threat, to which the government has exposed the capital, has not prompted a reconsideration of its agenda, and the weaponisation of the security services to destabilise rival domestic administrations continues apace.
Nor is Somalia at 'peace with the world.' After sustained hope in Villa Somalia—well past the point at which the administration had veered off course—trust in the government is finally plunging amongst international partners. The US and others are now weighing whether the exorbitant funds ploughed into the government have been worth the meagre political and security returns. In particular, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) is nearing collapse, with Washington warning against using assessed contributions under Resolution 2719 to fund peacekeeping operations in a closed-door meeting on Monday. The anticipated vote on the future of the mission yesterday has now been delayed to later this month. Having pleaded to 'surge' 8,000 AUSSOM troops despite insisting that they previously withdraw, Villa Somalia is now scrabbling to develop foreign security partnerships, particularly with Türkiye and Qatar, no matter the cost. But while these forces may provide short-term tactical support, they remain no substitute for a coherent military strategy or making the necessary political concessions to help unify the divided Hawiye against Al-Shabaab.
After three years, HSM may have built a party and launched an election plan—but at what cost? Somalia's transitional political arrangement has been badly fragmented, and the federation is facing near-total collapse. The attempts to bring the security forces under HSM's direct control may be working to bring elements of the divided Mareehaan in Gedo into his camp, but Al-Shabaab is the only force that has benefited from such destabilisation. The Farmaajo government undoubtedly wrought significant damage to Somalia's nascent institutions and security architecture, but today, the country is even more divided, vulnerable, and unstable than it was in May 2022. With only a year left in office, dependent on HSM improbably not angling for a term extension, the optimism and opportunities presented to the second-term president have all faded. Today, the best-case scenario is a short-term fix to the fraught political settlement to cobble together an anti-Al-Shabaab coalition to prevent Mogadishu from falling to the jihadists and get over the line to the 2026 polls, but this requires concessions that Villa Somalia has shown no interest in offering. And with every day that passes, the promise of Soomaali heshis ah, oo dunidana heshiis la ah rings ever more hollow.
The Somali Wire Team
