Laftagareen's Awkward Moment in the Political Spotlight
Once again, South West State President Abdiaziz 'Laftagareen' appears to be preparing to split from the slumping federal government. Last week, the only non-Hawiye regional president still participating in the National Consultative Council (NCC) returned to Baidoa, delaying the latest centralising political gambit from Villa Somalia-- the launch of the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). A notoriously vacillating politician, Laftagareen is again threatening to return to his original plan of organising his own non-direct regional elections in blunt defiance of the federal government's defective one-person, one-vote (OPOV) project.
Last week, Laftagareen arrived in Mogadishu for two key appointments. The first was the NCC meeting, already compromised by the absence of Darood-majority Puntland and Jubaland, which released its usual fluff about securing direct polls and defeating Al-Shabaab, ignoring the holes that have been blasted through the country's political settlement. For Villa Somalia, the presence of an elected Digil-Mirifle leader at the NCC has provided the barest of fig leaves to present the platform as a forum for 'national consensus,' even though it has been reduced to rubber-stamping regional term extensions in exchange for backing Mogadishu's unilateral political agenda.
The second pertained to the establishment of JSP, a re-hashing of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) Union and Development Party (UPD) that marks the latest attempt to co-opt regional presidential leaders through a consolidated, Islamist political vehicle to usher in a third term for the president. The new structure, however, did not sit well with Laftagareen. The South West president was frustrated by a perceived slight, having been only offered the post of deputy chairman-- just one among three. His counterproposal that the Digil-Mirifle be handed the post of secretary-general within JSP was shot down by Villa Somalia. However, with Laftagareen having left town and the latest domino teetering, it has been reported that the South West president is being offered the sole position as deputy chair in an attempt to entice him back to the fold. If the rift widens and the leader firmly peels away from the HSM camp, that could well spell the definitive end to Villa Somalia's national OPOV plan. In the coming days and weeks, HSM will almost certainly try to forestall that prospect and entice Laftagareen back by dangling more carrots, attempting to offer him a deal he cannot refuse.
It is a familiar game of cat-and-mouse that has played out several times in the past year, but with the political and security context of the country so deteriorated, it may just prove to be decisive this time. And having returned to Baidoa, as is his wont, Laftagareen directed his regional officials to outline some of his misgivings. On Saturday, South West's Information Minister condemned the launch of a centralised party in Mogadishu, asserting it was a bid to unseat the regional president and that malcontents had been mobilised in the capital to "destabilise" his administration. Villa Somalia has undoubtedly kept a toehold within South West's opposition camp, wielding them to constrain Laftagareen when he strays from the party line.
However, the information minister's comments also appear to be a reference to Mohamed Adan Ibrahim 'Farkeeti's' announcement of a new party entitled the 'Democratic Change Party' (DCP). There is no love lost between former Finance Minister Farkeeti and Laftagareen, with tensions over a term extension for the South West president spilling over into violence in December 2022 between regional forces and the former's militia. While there is no current evidence of a direct connection between Farkeeti's new party and Villa Somalia, it is plausible that if Laftagareen does move ahead with securing his own political future, some may seek to use the DCP as another platform to undermine the incumbent South West leader.
Meanwhile, Villa Somalia has already seized on another route to attempt to coerce Laftagareen into joining its authoritarian-minded political party. The federal government is reported to be now dithering on its promise to deliver several dozen Toyota Land Cruiser battlewagons to Sector 60 forces battling Al-Shabab in South West. Instead, Villa Somalia offered to dispatch the vehicles with accompanying Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers. As is always the case with this government, it was purely performative, with Villa Somalia well aware that Laftagareen has repeatedly refused non-Rahanweyne troops to be deployed to Baidoa, regarding them as a possible Trojan Horse. Such blatant politicisation of critical military materiel comes despite the sweeping advances of Al-Shabaab through Middle and Lower Shabelle and the urgent need to mobilise forces against the jihadists from South West to relieve pressure on the capital.
Recent days have underscored the ruthless transactionalism of Laftagareen, who remains no democrat nor particularly interested in wresting Al-Shabaab from its strongholds in Bay and Bakool. Once an acolyte of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and forcibly installed during violent scenes in December 2018, he has proved adaptable under HSM's administration and able to survive multiple national and regional crises. In particular, Laftagareen was able to weather last year's Mogadishu-Addis enmity, though he faced a barrage of attacks from senior federal officials when he publicly resisted the proposal that Ethiopian troops entirely withdraw from Somalia - dismantling the security umbrella across Hiiraan, Bay, Bakool, and Gedo. Then, Villa Somalia entertained the notion of conducting rival presidential elections in Baraawe. After much wrangling - and even though Laftagareen returned to the fold to participate in the NCC - Villa Somalia still does not trust him and will continue to employ both political and security levers to try and bring the South West leader to heel.
So, snubbing HSM's party launch may yet prove simply another bargaining tool of Laftagareen designed to extract maximum profit from Mogadishu. Unlike Puntland and Jubaland, the South West president remains dependent on regular financial disbursements of budgetary support from Villa Somalia, as well as undocumented cash to prop up his patronage networks. With Laftagareen's administration disfavoured amongst influential Digil-Mirifle sub-clans such as the Leysan and enjoying minimal state-level revenue generation stemming from ports like Kismaayo and Bosasso, he appears reluctant to jump ship too early. But fast-changing political dynamics on the national stage may force his hand. Ambitious and still relatively youthful, Laftagareen may decide to shift to the Puntland, Jubaland camp, playing into his clan's historical grievances against Somalia's successive central governments.
Laftagareen's flirtation with breaking ranks with HSM would further imperil the legitimacy of the federal government. Whether Villa Somalia would divert from its destabilising course is another matter, but it would heap fresh pressure on the government. On Friday, the US State Department made an explicit criticism of HSM's unilateral agenda, responding to the skewed NCC 'agreement' with the demand that "All relevant stakeholders should have a say in changes to Somalia's federal and election systems." The national Hawiye opposition has also reiterated its criticisms of Villa Somalia in recent days, with both former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed and prominent opposition MP Abdirahman Abdishakur releasing statements. The latter, warning against the monopolisation of power, said the formation of the JSP "resembles the one-party dominance of the Siyaad Barre era."
Laftagareen may resent his dependence on Mogadishu's largesse, but he has another key patron to contend and consult with-- Addis. In Baidoa, earlier this year, amidst massive pomp, Ethiopia organised a major ceremony to celebrate the 129th anniversary of the Battle of Adwa, where Emperor Menelik II defeated the Italian invaders. Laftagareen attended, alongside hundreds of Ethiopian troops and armoured vehicles, in a clear display of Addis Ababa's support for the South West leader. But since tensions have further abated between Mogadishu and Addis, the Ethiopians may now be more reluctant to place a finger on the scales if Laftagareen definitively abandons Mogadishu.
Laftagareen withdrawing from the dangerous farce that is the JSP, and perhaps the NCC as well, could prove a positive development at the national level, but his aspirations to orchestrate his own re-election could easily spell renewed violence in Baidoa and beyond. But if Laftagareen has to choose between holding his own contentious elections and aiding and abetting Villa Somalia in driving the Somali federation over a precipice, he may be inclined towards the former. In turn, Laftagareen turning his back on the JSP-- and by extension the rump NCC-- may not only mark the end of the OPOV charade, but it could also finally be the measure that forces HSM back to the negotiating table. Without the South West leader at the table, the NCC would be reduced to a Hawiye conclave, which Villa Somalia would have great difficulty presenting as inclusive, credible or legitimate. With the future of not just South West State, but also of the entire country, balanced precariously on a knife edge, Laftagareen finds himself once again quite uncomfortably in the spotlight of local, national, and arguably regional politics.
The Somali Wire Team
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