Issue No. 805

Al-Shabaab and a 'Post-Jihadist' State

As Al-Shabaab continues to advance ever closer to the Somali capital, and the threat of Mogadishu's capture appears increasingly real, the jihadist group has telegraphed neither its purposes nor political demands. While plenty of comparisons may have been made to the sudden fall of Damascus at the hands of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) earlier this year, there are several key differences, not least the careful recalibration of the Syrian group's image away from its jihadist roots. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, has displayed little willingness to consider any ideological concessions or negotiations since it first emerged over 20 years ago. For a rebel group that believes it is on the cusp of victory, Al-Shabaab remains obdurately inscrutable, leaving its opponents and onlookers to divine its true intentions.

How, therefore, might Al-Shabaab govern it were to seize control of Mogadishu and remove Somalia's hapless federal government? Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen is not just Al-Qaeda's most powerful affiliate-- its manpower, military strength, and economic clout arguably dwarf those of Al-Qaeda proper. And in contrast with Al-Qaeda's somewhat nebulous aspiration to create an Islamic Caliphate, Al-Shabaab harbours very concrete ambitions to establish a more modest Islamic Emirate spanning not only Somalia, but also large parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and possibly even Eritrea. 

Growing ties between Al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen could yet signal broader regional jeopardy on both sides of the Red Sea – one of the world's most strategic waterways. The Houthis are increasingly sourcing material for their military campaign against the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States through supply chains in the Horn of Africa, facilitated by Al-Shabaab and other well-established smuggling networks in northern Somalia. In return, Al-Shabaab is receiving more advanced weapons platforms, particularly drones, and training in their deployment. This perilous partnership would likely become even more formidable if Al-Shabaab were to seize – and hold - Mogadishu as its seat of power. And the possibility of Somalia becoming a safe haven for other jihadist groups, akin to Sudan in the early 1990s, should not be discounted.

Meanwhile, most of Mogadishu's population – those who cannot catch one of the last flights out of Halane - would face the imposition of Al-Shabaab's extreme neo-Salafist ideology, which allows no space for dispute or theocratic nuance. Since Al-Shabaab has so far shown no inclination to soften, HTS-style, its puritanical doctrine, a post-jihadist Mogadishu would probably resemble Jilib, Kunya Barrow, and other Somali towns ruled by Al-Shabaab fiat. Schools would adhere to strict, neo-Salafist educational curriculum that erases any references to Somali history and culture. Women would be largely sequestered in their homes and limited workplaces and required to wear the full niqab when circulating in public. Music, dancing, and even playing football would be banned since Al-Shabaab's clerics prohibit such pastimes under a harsh interpretation of the principle of 'lawh,' which limits pursuits that distract from religious devotion (in July 2024, Al-Shabaab bombed football fans gathered at a popular cafe in Mogadishu, watching the England-Spain Euro finals). Khat and cigarettes, too, would likely be forbidden. The only remaining public entertainment would be the executions of 'spies' and 'apostates' or the bizarre exhibitions of children's military prowess that Al-Shabaab enjoys showcasing for Islamic holidays.

On the security front, there is little prospect of a formal disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) process for Al-Shabaab fighters, or the integration of their fighters into a professional Somali National Army (SNA). Instead, it is highly probable that the reverse would happen, with any remaining federal soldiers who had not melted away or joined their clan militias being absorbed into Al-Shabaab's military structures. The much-feared Amniyaat would probably absorb whatever remains of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). 

Curiously, Al-Shabaab does not seem to be in a hurry to seize power. The reasons for its hesitation are a matter of speculation. But within the impenetrable 'black box' of Al-Shabaab's leadership, there are continuing leadership tensions within the shura council - especially over the succession to Al-Shabaab's current 'Amir', Ahmed Diriye or 'Abu Ubaidah,' who has reportedly been gravely ill for some time and thus incapable of guiding such a major transition.

Historically, Al-Shabaab prefers its senior leadership to be drawn from smaller clans to limit the perception that the group represents the interests of a singular major clan, from either the Darood or Hawiye. Diiriye's principal deputy, Mahad Karate, however, hails from the Habar Gidir, a major sub-clan of the Hawiye, and is both notoriously ruthless and ambitious. Alongside the concerns about appointing a Hawiye 'Amir', some within Al-Shabaab's leadership are reportedly worried that if Karate fronts Al-Shabaab's seizure of the capital, it could unify the presently divided Abgaal against the militants. 

While Al-Shabaab may not have planned to seize Mogadishu so soon, the jihadist group may yet be forced to if it anticipates the deployment of further foreign military hardware or even special forces from Türkiye. The extremists are undoubtedly monitoring President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's dash to Türkiye this week to secure additional military support, though what form this takes has yet to be revealed. Al-Shabaab's leadership may feel compelled to act—despite their internal disputes—if they believe foreign reinforcements are imminent. However, their current encirclement of the capital is not yet complete, and they would need to capture Aden Adde Airport to prevent a possible deployment of Turkish SADAT mercenaries, for instance. The militants, too, have been left with unpalatable choices to either accelerate their offensive – despite their internal disputes and risking high casualties – or to withdraw, and possibly wait several years for another chance.

If the jihadists do indeed succeed in taking Mogadishu, the international community will be confronted by a number of thorny challenges and choices. The first -- and probably most significant-- is whether Western partners would consider recognising Al-Shabaab as the legitimate and sovereign representative over Somalia. If so, that would imply the lifting of sanctions on Al-Shabaab by the UN, US, EU, UK, and others. It would also open the door to Al-Shabaab's representation of Somalia at the UN, African Union, Arab League and other multilateral bodies. An even harder question to answer is whether Al-Shabaab could be persuaded to offer concessions in return. Apart from possibly renouncing its lingering ties to Al-Qaeda, which are of little practical value, Al-Shabaab shows little appetite for compromise.

The Somali Wire Team