The Threat of Wet-Bulb Temperatures to Somalia
In 2022, during Somalia's prolonged drought, temperatures regularly exceeded 32°C, displacing over a million people and killing thousands. While the increasing regularity of Somalia's ever-more extreme drought-flooding cycles is generally understood, one of the more overlooked climate threats —known as 'wet bulb temperature' (WBT)— is likely to have a significant impact on the country.
WBT is a variable metric that refers to extreme humidity and high air temperatures, with the human body unable to cool itself down through sweating after this point. It varies but is largely around 32-35°C, which is already routinely exceeded across swathes of Somalia, including the hot and humid coast and the drier hinterland. Luuq in the Gedo region near the Ethiopian border is considered to be one of the country's hottest- if not the hottest- areas. With projections suggesting a 3.2°C to 4.3°C rise by 2100 in Somalia, the dangers of WBT are also rapidly accelerating.
The risks of extreme heat are significant; just a few hours outside in wet-bulb temperatures above 35°C-- the level at which the body's sweat cannot evaporate and cool the body-- often proves to be fatal. Manual and agricultural labour in temperatures above 31°C also risks heat stress, heart attacks, kidney damage, and other issues. With agriculture being the main source of employment in Somalia, there are significant economic consequences as well, with labourers already at risk of heatstroke after just 30 minutes of outside work. According to a 2021 Nature Climate Change study, climate change has reduced agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa by 10-20% in recent decades.
Already, the effects of rising and unpredictable temperatures in Somalia are upending entire economies and social structures that have existed for centuries. The 2020-2022 drought savaged the pastoralist lifestyle that sustains millions of Somalis, as well as the cyclical drought-flooding episodes since. The country is one of the most rapidly urbanising in the world as a result of these massive displacements, but the dangers of WBTs persist in cities as well. Cities including Mogadishu and Kismaayo are more vulnerable to experiencing the 'urban heat island effect', where concrete structures and lack of greenery trap heat.
Afternoons are often a quiet affair in the heat of the day in Somalia's towns and cities, where men socially chew khat before the place comes alive again at night as the temperature cools. Lido Beach in Mogadishu, for instance, quickly fills up as the heat drops, and young Somalis can be seen enjoying a fruit cocktail in the evenings. This is far from unique for Somalia, and many hotter countries follow this pattern of the day in parts of the year. However, one threat of rising temperatures is that society is forced to shift even further into the evening and night, making it nearly impossible to leave a dwelling during the day without serious risks. Temperatures between June and September, known as the Xagaa dry season, can already exceed 30°C for days on end.
Somalia is not alone in facing these dangers. According to climate projections, the population exposed to heatwaves is expected to increase by 21.1% by 2030. Heat-related deaths are also anticipated to rise from 1.3 to 3.2 per 100,000 people annually. In parts of India that experience extreme sustained heatwaves and WBT, some industries have shifted their labour to nighttime hours. This is particularly the case for construction and agriculture, work-intensive sectors that cannot be carried out during extreme daytime heat. But this poses other dangers-- including disrupted circadian rhythms and sleep deprivation. Moreover, this kind of industrial shift also relies on reliable electricity for lighting, which remains absent in Somalia, where only a third of the country has access to sustained electricity.
The inequalities of the climate crisis are well-known to be extreme, with Somalia being one of the harshest examples. The country is ranked second most vulnerable to climate change on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), but the population is responsible for only 0.08% of global CO2 emissions. Yet the drought-flood pattern has had innumerable consequences in Somalia, including accentuating the clan-based resource conflicts over diminishing pasture and water. Al-Shabaab has also sought to stoke these and exploit these conflicts in turn, with the jihadist group implicated in the significant spate of clan violence in 2024. Within the country, the inequities of the climate crisis are also being unfairly felt, with communities such as the historically rural-dwelling Somali Bantu displaced from their territory. The AC-cooled high-rises populated by the national elite in Mogadishu face no real threat from WBT.
It is more than apparent that Somalia-- as well as other Horn nations-- will require much more climate financing for the green energy transition and to deal with the immediate impacts of the crisis. There are significant ongoing investments, such as the USD 100 million pledged by the Green Climate Fund in October 2024 and the Jowhar Offstream Storage Programme to improve water management and food security, but the scale of the need remains overwhelming. Yet amid these immense crises, Somalia's Ministry of Environment and Climate Change remains better known for its reputation of graft and corruption. Just this week, the Ministry's Director General Yusuf Abdirahman Samatar has been accused of misappropriating USD millions in donor funds intended for climate resilience. Other issues, such as the perennial 'gatekeepers' for the climate displaced, often from lower-caste clans, in major cities remain. Directing climate aid and support to the most vulnerable in Somalia and navigating the political-economic realities is an immense challenge.
There are known, viable solutions to tackling the rising dangers of WBT. In cities, this could include heat-reflective shelters and urban greening projects, as well as installing AC in communal spaces-- such as mosques in Somalia-- for people to cool down during the day. Expanding solar power access and irrigation systems to sustain food production have also been touted for Somalia's context. But with the security of much of central-southern Somalia remaining so poor, there are also complexities regarding monitoring and evaluating climate projects on the ground and ensuring that funds are not siphoned off or having unintended circumstances. These are not insurmountable, though, and proactive adaptation efforts can provide a lifeline for those facing an increasingly unliveable climate.
The Somali Wire Team
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