What might 2025 have in store for Somalia?
The coming year is almost certain to be an exceedingly difficult one for Somalia, with the political turmoil and security deterioration of 2024 likely spilling over into 2025 with a vengeance. Driven by the centralising ambitions of the federal government, disputes over electoral models, the constitutional 'review' process, and federalism have surged this year, most recently resulting in open conflict in Ras Kamboni in Lower Juba between federal Gorgor soldiers and Jubaland troops. The widely shared perception the government has consolidated around a Damul Jadid, the Islamist faction linked to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and a Hawiye-Abgaal clan core has ostracised it from large parts of the population. And without serious attempts at national reconciliation in 2025, these rifts will only deepen-- and dangerously.
While Villa Somalia appears likely to continue to hobble on with its diminished coalition to force through further constitutional amendments and electoral changes, it will come up against concerted opposition and reality in 2025. The hodgepodge of ill-conceived electoral plans remains unworkable, particularly with the two Darood-majority Federal Member States (FMSs) disavowing Mogadishu. The prospect for genuine, free and fair direct elections in Somalia in 2025-- despite the rhetoric-- is virtually non-existent, barring some deus ex machina that can rewrite Al-Shabaab's presence out of central and southern Somalia and suddenly restore long-absent political consensus.
As was the case during Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's government, the incumbent president may eventually be forced to abandon his gerrymandering electoral plans, but Hassan Sheikh has shown a seeming disregard for the country's splintering political settlement. There also remains widespread speculation that the president will seek a term extension under one guise or another. However, Hassan Sheikh is not the only leader in Somalia expected to come under renewed pressure; South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and his Galmudug counterpart Ahmed Abdi Karie 'QoorQoor' will face further scrutiny if they do not hold long-overdue regional presidential polls. Whether these elections are essentially orchestrated by the incumbent, as the recent Jubaland polls were, are competitive, like the Puntland presidential elections in January, or are 'overseen' by the federal commission picked by Villa Somalia will be one of the biggest storylines of 2025.
A government reshuffle is also anticipated for early next year as Villa Somalia searches for a scapegoat for the Jubaland debacle and a reset to its floundering agenda. The Ogaadeen PM Hamza Abdi Barre, and once-close ally of Jubaland leader Ahmed Madoobe, has been touted as the fall guy, but he remains a loyal enforcer of the president. Another senior minister possibly on the outs is the hawkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiqi, who has repeatedly clashed with close allies of Somalia. As Somalia takes up its non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 period, it will require a less abrasive and divisive figure than Fiqi to attract new allies and project influence on the global stage. The negotiated transition of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia towards a leaner, less political operation will also begin in earnest next year, diminishing international scrutiny in a crucial moment for the country.
On the geopolitical front, China appears set to step up its diplomacy in Somalia to counter both Taiwan and the US. Beijing views Taiwan's growing influence in Somaliland as a strategic threat, not least because of its proximity to its only overseas military base located in Djibouti. China is believed to be increasing support for anti-Somaliland groups as both Mogadishu and Beijing increasingly tout their unitarist credentials. Simultaneously, Mogadishu recently posted Dr Hodan Osman, a China-educated, high-profile official, as ambassador to China –who is married to a former minister who also pushed a hard line against Somaliland.
The return of mercurial US President Donald Trump to the White House has generated much speculation about what this portends for the Horn, including the possible sovereign recognition of Somaliland. For Somalia, it may precipitate another US troop withdrawal as it did in Trump's first term, as he seeks to end America's 'forever wars.' It was also during the 'America First' president's administration that the Qatar-negotiated talks with the Taliban occurred, paving the way for the withdrawal of US forces and the fall of Kabul in August 2021. Trump's recent announcement that Syria is "not our war to fight" following Bashar al-Assad's ouster suggests that he would have little appetite to resist an Al-Shabaab takeover in Somalia either.
In this vein, the discussion of whether Doha-driven negotiations between the federal government and Al-Shabaab had receded somewhat in recent months, but the fall of Damascus to a jihadist movement has abruptly revived this scenario. Moreover, the transnational Salafist group Al-I'tisaam wields ever-increasing influence over Somali politics. Al-I'tisaam shares a jihadist ancestor with Al-Shabaab and previously lobbied for talks with the extremists during the Farmaajo presidency through Fahad Yasin, then spy chief. Al-I'tisaam aspires to a unitary, Islamist vision of Somalia and would be the silent, influential partner in any negotiations. It is also playing a growing role in steering the domestic and foreign policy of the embattled Villa Somalia, again contributing to the destabilisation of Jubaland as it did in 2019.
On the security front, the African Union peacekeeping mission remains in flux ahead of its anticipated transition. Whether Ethiopian troops will withdraw remains to be seen, but it is now anticipated that they will stay with the acceptance of Mogadishu, thanks to last week's hastily agreed Ankara Declaration. This is undeniably positive for the areas of central and southern Somalia that fall under Ethiopia's security orbit. However, the months of turmoil have burnt through significant goodwill and efficient planning, with the vast majority of funding for the mission still absent. A staggered and disorganised transition now appears inevitable. Meanwhile, in a bid to undermine its political rivals, Villa Somalia has increasingly sought to destabilise the security of both Jubaland and Puntland, among other territories, through various tactics, playing into the hands of the jihadists. Al-Shabaab is now believed to be preparing to launch a new offensive in the New Year, having quietly consolidated its position in 2024 amidst the political turmoil, and is actively considering attempting a Syria-style takeover.
In Puntland, how the military operations against the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) unfold is still uncertain, with the impact of Puntland Security Force commander Asad Diyaano's appointment as Police Chief in September complicating matters. But Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni's plans to proceed with an offensive against ISS in the Al-Miskeed mountains reportedly enjoy the tacit endorsement of the Americans, who have tired of Villa Somalia's attempts to undermine Puntland's stability and security.
Predicting what will happen in Somalia is often a fool's errand, but the prospects are grimmer today than they have been for several years. Thanks to Villa Somalia's myopic politics and magical thinking, Somalia's fragile political settlement is unravelling-- and fast. As was the case in 2013 after the disastrous first attempt to unseat Jubaland leader Madoobe, forging a government of national consensus based on reconciliation is the only way forward. Whether Villa Somalia has the capacity or sense to backtrack on its destabilising agendas is dubious, but continuing down the current path in 2025 will inevitably plunge the country into further disarray and political violence. And with Al-Shabaab waiting in the wings, the coming 12 months promise to be some of the most consequential in the modern history of Somalia.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.