Turkey's clandestine 'space programme' in Somalia
For several years, it had been rumoured that Turkey was interested in establishing a research hub in Somalia to advance its space programme. In early 2024, Somali and international media sources reported that Ankara had already clinched a covert deal with Somalia and procured a strip of land north of Mogadishu, near the coastal town of Warsheikh, to establish a space science facility to develop and test-launch space vehicles and rockets. In November, credible reports further emerged suggesting the space programme is actually a clandestine military project to test a class of new intercontinental medium-range ballistic missiles, among them Tayfun and Cenk, developed by the part-state-owned Roketsan defence contractor.
Turkey is well-known for its advanced drone technology, particularly the Bayraktar TB2s, but its unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) superiority has been eclipsed-- at least in strategic terms-- by the fast-expanding range and lethality of Iran's ballistic missile arsenal. Tehran has supplied a vast quantity of devastating missiles and kamikaze drones to the Russian military, as well as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), providing Mohajer-6 drones that can fly up to 2,000 km. Ankara has historically regarded Iran as its most significant regional competitor and a possible threat to its broader foreign policy ambitions. Despite a mellowing of intra-Gulf tensions in the wake of the Gaza conflict and Turkey's vocal criticism of Israel, that threat has not gone away, and the demand to compete with Iranian long-range and hypersonic missiles is now acute. There is also an additional worry for Turkey, like other Middle Eastern states, calculates Iran may already be on the cusp of becoming a nuclear-armed state.
Consequently, Turkey's interest in using its outsized leverage in the Horn state to fast-track its space/ballistic programme comes as no surprise. Due to Somalia's geographic position on the equator, rockets can be launched with maximum angular momentum, which saves on both fuels and reduces launch costs. Florida, the site of both Space X and NASA, is similarly located near the equator and, like Somalia, has a coastline that can allow for boosters to be retrieved and rockets fired into the ocean. Shortly after the election of former US President Donald Trump to the White House on 4 November, Somalia's Ambassador to the US, Dahir Hassan, met with Space X executive Michaela Pawlak. Perceived as an opportunistic photo-op due to Space X owner Elon Musk's rapid ascension as a Trump ally, Hassan offered up Somalia as a possible site for the company's expansion.
Egypt is another potential adversary that may not be pleased with Turkey's purported ballistic programme in Somalia. The two Mediterranean states remain regional rivals despite a recent détente and a shared opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). European nations and fellow NATO member-states of Italy, Greece, and France are all likely to be concerned by the reports for their own reasons.
Still, it is worth exercising a degree of caution when it comes to infrastructure projects in Somalia, considering the number of ambitious developmental and military plans that have run aground on the country's political and economic realities. Where precisely Turkish support and investment is located will inevitably be fought over between Mogadishu and the government elite, who will want to secure it for their own clans and patronage networks. Other issues, such as the entrenched Al-Shabaab presence in and around Mogadishu, could further complicate any significant Turkish mission, offering up a possible attractive target for the jihadists. And the destabilising, ongoing fallout between Jubaland and Villa Somalia may yet make Ankara baulk at the prospect of investing more money and political capital into the country's federal government. Despite all this, Ankara's assertive 'Neo-Ottoman' foreign policy and aspirations of regional hegemony may override concerns about Somalia's suitability. The geopolitical competition being fought across the Red Sea by a host of powers has repeatedly won out over long-term feasibilities. Space and Somalia are just two parts of these much broader geographical, ideological, economic, and political frontiers.
By The Somali Wire Team
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